The Theoretical Analysis of Factors Stimulating Cross-Border Cooperation between Regions

Maria  Greta; Krzysztof  Lewandowski

doi:10.18778/1508-2008.8.10

Authors

Maria Greta
Krzysztof Lewandowski

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18778/1508-2008.8.10

Abstract

Cross-border cooperation can bring benefits from the economic point of view and lead to the Pareto-like improvement. The theoretical analysis shows that regional institutions will not establish cross-border cooperation in each case. The lack of such cooperation can also take place even if it allowed reducing disadvantages stemming from peripherality or achieving benefits from public servicing. There are three main reasons for that: difficulties in partners’ cooperation (prisoner’s dilemma), political problems in the participating regions and an excessive centralisation with the provision of regional services with one or several partners.
The conducted analysis allows identifying factors which will influence cross-border cooperation in a positive way. These factors are presented in the form of hypotheses. However, it should be noted that these factors can but not necessarily have to contribute to the success of the venture. Hence, the recognition of the factor alone tells nothing whether and to what extent it affects the success of the cooperation project. What really matters is that the identification of the factor affects the fact that the problem does not occur nor has any negative influence on the project realisation.

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