What makes decisions wise?

Abstract

It is methodologically easier to gain access to the concept of wise decisions than to the general concept of wisdom. Once we know what wise decisions are, the corresponding properties and abilities of the deciding person can be inferred. This paper will show that the analysis of wise decisions must not be restricted to the attributive reading of “S makes a wise decision”, but must be extended to the adverbial reading of “S decides wisely”. The externalistic perspective of the former reading exposes a necessary qualitative requirement (a long-range improvement of the situation for all parties involved) which must be met by the outcome of any wise decision. Only the internalistic perspective of the latter reading complies with our intuitions that the outcome must not be achieved by chance, but by the agent’s epistemic abilities such as his competence of judging and reflecting the reasons for the decision. These abilities include in particular the agent’s meta-competence of distinguishing first-order and second-order reasons that pertain not to the value of the object of the decision but rather to the value of the attitude underlying the decision.