Factualism of David Armstrong

Authors

  • Dawid Firszt Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, Instytut Filozofii Teoretycznej image/svg+xml

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18778/0208-6107.24.07

Abstract

In my article I present David Armstrong's stance on properties, relations, particulars and states of affairs. I introduce this categories to show, at the most general level, his metaphysical system called factualism. My article consists of four parts, in each one I characterize following categories: 1. Properties 2. Relation 3. Particulars 4. States of affairs. I also discuss Armstrong's arguments considering the nature of those categories and their role in his philosophy. Also, I try to emphasis differences between Armstrong's factualism and other contemporary metaphysical positions (Bundle theory and Trop theory).

References

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Hawley, Katherine (2010), "Temporal Parts", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (red.),

URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/temporal-parts/>

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Oddie G. (1982), Armstrong on the Eleatic Principle and Abstract Entities, „Philosophical Studies”, 41, s. 285–295. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00354868

Pages J. (2002), Structural universals and formal relations, „Synthese”, 131, s. 215–221. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015765414172

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Published

2011-01-01

How to Cite

Firszt, Dawid. 2011. “Factualism of David Armstrong”. Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica-Aesthetica-Practica, no. 24 (January): 105-20. https://doi.org/10.18778/0208-6107.24.07.