Norms of Reciprocation Exhibited by Polish Students in the Trust Game: Experimental Results

Urszula Markowska-Przybyła; David Mark Ramsey

doi:10.18778/0208-6018.323.01

Authors

Urszula Markowska-Przybyła Wrocław University of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Management and Tourism, Department of Spatial Management
David Mark Ramsey Wrocław University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Computer Science and Management, Department of Operations Research

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18778/0208-6018.323.01

Keywords:

social capital, generalised trust, reciprocation, norms, experimental game theory, the Trust Game, Poland

Abstract

Norms of reciprocity and the level of generalised trust are components of the social capital of a society, which is argued to be associated with economic growth. This article presents results from a large scale study of Polish students based on the Trust Game, in which an initiator and respondent can obtain mutual benefits when the initiator exhibits trust in the respondent, who then expresses positive reciprocity. Based on these results, we investigate norms of positive reciprocation within the Polish student community. Analysis indicates that a large proportion of students seem to use one of four simple norms of reciprocation. In statistical terms, the level of reciprocation is rather well reflected in the expectations of the initiators.

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