Does the principle of in dubio pro tributario apply in the goods and services tax?

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to answer the question posed in its title – whether, in a situation where doubts arise as to the content of VAT legislation, it is possible to apply the principle in dubio pro tributario. This principle gives precedence to the linguistic interpretation and respects the EU interpretation only when its application leads to an interpretation more favourable to the taxpayer. However, this is in conflict with the obligation to apply a consistent interpretation to harmonised VAT rules. The research method used consists of an analysis primarily of the CJ ruling in the Herst case, as well as of the Advocate General’s opinion in that case, supplemented by an analysis of other – selected as representative in the case – judgments of the Court in terms of pro-EU interpretation. The study was also enriched by the views of domestic and foreign doctrine in the areas examined. As demonstrated – the question posed in the title should be answered in the affirmative, although this answer requires clarification that this principle, viewed in an objective manner, is only applicable if it is not possible to apply the EU interpretation, and this inapplicability must also be objective in nature. The view presented will, however, be verified in the course of application of the law by administrative courts, as it is the judicature that will determine the limits of application of the principle in dubio pro tributario in VAT.