Senses in Visual Arts as a Prism for Philosophy and Through the Prism of Philosophy

Autor

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18778/0208-6107.41.01

Słowa kluczowe:

senses/synaesthesia, painting, body, ontology, epistemology, metaphysics, flesh

Abstrakt

The aim of this paper is to show how a sensory approach to visual arts can be relevant for philosophy and how this prism, once brought to philosophy, can give insights on art in return. I will try to demonstrate that the difference between modernity’s two main schools of thought (namely, materialism and idealism) can be understood – thanks to the model of painting as an allegory of the world – as an exclusive preference for one sense: touch for materialism and sight for idealism. Much as the two schools differ, both consider the painting (or the world) a finite picture, whose elements can be juxtaposed in a single homogeneous plane of knowledge devoid of any opacity. This leads to separate both vision and the mind from the body and from the world. As a result, sight and touch end up dissociated. That is why, to challenge this modern paradigm and renew with a holistic relationship to the world and to ourselves, philosophers and artists propose a shift towards a synaesthetic approach to painting. Such an approach will uncover a modality of being where the body, the subject, and the world, as well as sight and touch, can be reunited. Thus, I will show that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh – that echoes through the paintings of artists who attempt to break free from the frame and engage the observer with all his senses and being, such as Racławice Panorama, Malevich, El Lissitzky, Cézanne or the Navajos’ sand paintings – can offer, thanks to a synaesthetic approach, both a new framework for philosophy and a new understanding of visual arts.

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Opublikowane

2022-12-09

Jak cytować

Heusghem, C. (2022). Senses in Visual Arts as a Prism for Philosophy and Through the Prism of Philosophy. Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica-Aesthetica-Practica, (41), 9–30. https://doi.org/10.18778/0208-6107.41.01