Luis Escobedo

Colonial heritage in multi-ethnic societies: undercover racism in twenty-first-century Peru

Since the beginning of the 16th century, Peruvian society has undergone an intense ethnic and cultural mixing. This process has involved fusion and diversity, whereby it has revealed a variety of antagonisms and conflict, especially found between the regions of the Coast – particularly, Lima – and the Andean Mountains. The importance of Lima as a political and economic center during the Colony, favored the people of the Coast over Andean people – predominantly indigenous. This disparity persisted after Independence, given that, in the absence of Spaniards, Creoles had become the ruling class. Since the beginning of the 20th century, however, Andean people have found in migration towards urban and Coastal areas an opportunity to improve their living conditions. Yet, even if Andean migrants and their descendants continue to grow in power and status, they are still subject to racial discrimination. Together with Peruvians of other origins who have similarly accumulated disadvantages throughout history, such as afro-Peruvians, they are perceived and stigmatized as part of an unofficial category of non-whites. Though in a complex and undercover manner, Peruvian society has given this grouping poor valuation. On the contrary, white Peruvians have been highly valued. Drawing upon social scientific research on racism since the late 1980s, the present paper aims at explaining why and how people of more predominant European features are rather idealized whereas the ones with less European features are rather denigrated, and how racism works covertly within the daily social relations among Peruvians today.

Keywords: racism, ethnicity, nationalism, interethnic relations, post-colonialism.

1. Introduction

There was no limit to what we could do to people both unlike and beneath us.
(Moss 2001, p. 1321)

The Proclamation of Independence in Peru, on July 28th, 1821, could be considered the birth of the Republic of Peru or, as some scholars on nationalism would say, the beginning of its “invention” (Bákula 2006, p. 332). However, the first hundred years of the formation of the republican state did not have major repercussions in the socioeconomic situation of the lowest social strata (Cotler 1992, Flores Galindo 1993). The state continued excluding them, only managing to make the already strong social differences deeper, and favouring the formation of what could be labelled as a “citizen-less republic” (Lumbreras 2003, p. 77). Taking into consideration that since the Colony social differences
had been intensely linked to ethnic origin, the relationship between the new state and the non-white groups, the indigenous population in particular\(^1\), was characterized by the exclusion, paternalism and vertical assimilation of the latter. Hence, taxes applied to the indigenous population, slavery among the people of African descent and serfdom, lived along with the republican regime for a long time after Independence (Valdivia, Benavides and Torero 2007, pp. 621–622). The acknowledgement of the collective rights of the most disadvantaged classes by the state only started after Peru’s defeat against Chile during the War of the Pacific (1879–1883)\(^2\). The Creole elite took this event as a reference to insufficient national unity among Peruvians by the end of the 19th century. In this way, at the beginning of the 20th century, thinkers and activists mainly belonging to Generación del 900 movement\(^3\), the social-democratic party Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), and communist and pro-indigenous ideologies, together with president Augusto Leguía’s (1919–1930) government, included in their academic and political discourse the importance of integrating the most excluded social classes of Peru (Nalewajko 1995).

Until then, after having accumulated disadvantages throughout history, the indigenous population appeared to be the most affected by “hard” social exclusion. Yet, its integration could not be accomplished through a discussion exclusively carried out by a group of intellectuals and politicians on “the question of the indigenous”. The indigenous population and the Creole elites had undergone four centuries of such divergent – even opposing – social experiences that a great cultural barrier had already been solidified between the Creole identity and its European influence on one side, and the Andean and indigenous identity on the other side (Degregori 1995, Nalewajko 1995, Montoya 2002, Valdivia, Benavides and Torero 2007, p. 207). Likewise, negative value had been ascribed to the Andean and indigenous identity. For that reason, in the nineteen twenties, defining Peruvian identity largely meant defining whether

\(^{1}\) In the present paper, we subscribe to the definition of “indigenous population” proposed by R. Stavenhagen (1995, p. 151): “human groups that could be considered descendents of Americas’ first settlers before the European invasion, that share today cultural characteristics that differentiate them from the rest of the national society, and that generally hold a position of economic and social inferiority and marginalization in front of the rest of society” (translation mine).

\(^{2}\) J.M. Bákula (2006, pp. 332–335) attributes the great difficulty of building a Peruvian nation to three major ruptures in the History of Peru: the Castellan conquest, the American emancipation and the War of the Pacific.

\(^{3}\) Generación del 900 “assimilated conceptually the national military disaster and began the inquisition in the name of sociocultural identity and the passion for the geographical landscape as a source of national character” (Velázquez 2002, p. 12, translation mine).
Peru had to follow the indigenous tradition – degraded and based on an Inca imaginary – or if it should rather follow the Creole tradition – enrooted in Europe and associated with Peru’s defeat against Chile (Nalewajko 1995, pp. 181–225). Even though a path was never officially outlined, Peru was nevertheless – accidentally – entering the 20th century with a more inclusive debate on social issues. Over this dual discourse and influenced by the implications of a larger global tendency for democratization, the following decades saw the realization of a number of left-wing parties, agrarian and peasant movements, an agrarian reform and agrarization policies, among others (Valdivia, Benavides and Torero 2006, p. 622). Nevertheless, the persistence of customs inherited from the Colony, within social relations between Peruvians and its display through the character, structure and actions of public and private institutions, did not yet present a suitable ground for discussion with the most excluded classes of a society. They were still talked about but were not being approached directly. This lack of consideration brought detrimental consequences on the development of the twentieth-century Peru. One of the most damaging was the armed conflict that erose during the eighties and nineties between the state and extreme left terrorist organizations Sendero Luminoso and Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA), a price that was paid with 69,280 victims (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2003). However, beyond any proposals of social inclusion and national unity coming from politicians and intellectuals, and beyond any subversive action hidden behind the alibi of advocating for the most needed, a social phenomenon in the hands of the historically most excluded groups themselves, came into effect to make a major change in the economic, social and political life of the twentieth-century Peru: mass migration from the rural to the urban areas, from the Andean Mountains to the Coast, from the rest of Peru to the capital city, Lima. This phenomenon would henceforth have a strong influence on social relations among Peruvians.

2. From a rural and Andean Peru to an urban and Coastal Peru

In El Otro Sendero (1986), one of Hernando De Soto’s most relevant works, the author uncovers that in 1700, 85% of Peru’s population lived in rural areas and 15% in urban areas (Fig. 1–2). H. De Soto (1986, p. 7) continues by stressing that in 1876, almost two centuries later, the population of Peru was still largely rural: 80% of Peruvians still lived in the countryside while the remaining

4 “The rest of Peru” is more appropriate than “provinces” for Lima is a province, too. The Province of Lima is one of the ten provinces in the administrative region of Lima.
20% resided in cities. According to the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática – INEI, in Spanish), the main agency in charge of administering statistical and informatics systems in Peru, by 1940 most Peruvians were still rural dwellers (64.6%) (INEI 2008b, 2013). However, by the 1981 census these percentages were inverted: the urban population multiplied by five, increasing from 2.2 million to 11.1 million dwellers, while the rural population grew from 4 to 5.9 million (INEI 2008b, 2013, Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social 2011). In other words, while in 1940 two out of three Peruvians lived in the countryside by 1981 two out of three lived in cities. Following this tendency, the urban population reached 70.1% in 1993 and 75.9% in 2007 (INEI 2008b, 2013, Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social 2011). Today, more than three quarters of the census population of Peru is urban. Given that the results of the 4th Population Census and 6th Housing Census in Peru, conducted by INEI, provide the most recent demographic data, the present paper will refer to them when describing Peru’s current social context.

Fig. 1. Peru: urban population by administrative regions (2007)
Source: own elaboration adapted from INEI (2013)
Peru is politically divided into 24 administrative regions and one constitutional province, namely Callao. Likewise, it is considered to have three main natural regions: the Coast, the Andean Mountains and the Amazon Rainforest. If we observe the distribution of the population of Peru by natural regions, we will realize that Peru is not only a country with a high percentage of urban dwellers but also with a high percentage of Coastal residents. According to the demographic data collected by INEI in 2007, considering Callao an administrative region, out of the nine administrative regions with the highest percentage of urban dwellers, eight are located on the Coast and one, namely Arequipa, in the...
Andean Mountains. In the same way, out of the nine administrative regions with the highest percentages of rural dwellers, eight are located in the Andean Mountains and one, namely Amazonas, in the Amazon Rainforest. In all administrative regions of the Coast more than 74% of the population live in urban areas (INEI 2008b, 2013). Besides Arequipa, in which more than 90% of the population live in urban areas, in all administrative regions of the Andean Mountains less than 68% of the population are urban dwellers (INEI 2008b, 2013). Moreover, five out of the six administrative regions with the majority of dwellers living in rural areas are located in the Andean Mountains: Huancavelica (68.33%), Cajamarca (67.3%), Huánuco (57.7%), Apurímac (54.06%) and Puno (50.3%) (INEI 2008b, 2013). The administrative region of Lima and the Constitutional Province of Callao, both located in Peru’s Central Coast, lead the list of administrative regions with the highest percentage of urban dwellers (INEI 2008b, 2013). Hosting 30.81% of Peru’s 27,412,157 inhabitants, Lima is the most populated administrative region in the country (INEI 2008b, 2013). 90.1% of its population are dwellers of the Province of Lima, the most populated province of Peru, with 7,605,742 inhabitants, and the country’s capital city (INEI 2008b, 2013). Callao is the second most populated city of Peru with 876,977 inhabitants (INEI 2008, 2013). Callao’s entire population lives in urban areas. This makes it the province with the highest percentage of urban dwellers in the country (INEI 2008b, 2013). The Province of Lima, or Lima city, follows with a 99.9% (INEI 2008b, 2013). Both provinces, Lima and Callao, together make up Lima Metropolitan Area. The administrative region of Arequipa presents a particular case, too. Although it is an administrative region of the Andean Mountains, Arequipa is among the administrative regions with the highest percentage of urban dwellers. This is due to the fact that three quarters of its population live in the Province of Arequipa, or Arequipa, the third most populated city of Peru, after Lima and Callao, with 864,250 inhabitants (INEI 2008b, 2013); 97.5% of this city’s population are urban dwellers (INEI 2008b, 2013).

Thus, from the demographic information collected by INEI in 2007, we could draw two facts relevant for the purposes of the present paper. The first one is that, in almost 70 years – from 1940 to 2007 – Peru’s urban population has multiplied by 9 while its rural population has not even doubled 1940’s figures (INEI 2008b, 2013, Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social 2011). Today 75.9% of Peruvians live in urban areas and 24.1% in rural areas (INEI 2008b, 2013). The second important fact is that Peru’s urban population is mainly located on the Coast. Let us, then, compare INEI’s demographic data collected in 1940 and 2007, in order for us to observe how the percentages of dwellers of the Coast and the Andean Mountains have been similarly inverted between both
census years. In 1940, one fourth of Peru’s population lived on the Coast while two thirds lived in the Andean Mountains (INEI 2008b, 2013, Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo 2011). In 1972, however, the number of inhabitants of the Coast had already exceeded the number of inhabitants in the Andean Mountains (INEI 2008b, 2013, Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo 2011). Around twenty years later, in 1993, the majority of Peruvians lived on the Coast (INEI 2008b, 2013, Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo 2011). Finally, in 2007, 54.6% of Peruvians lived on the Coast and 32% in the Andean Mountains (INEI 2008b, p. 14, Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social 2011).

As a consequence of the massive internal migration from the first half of the 20th century, the majority of Peruvians today live in urban areas (75.9%) and in the natural region of the Coast (54.6%). In other words, from being rural and Andean, in less than a century Peru’s population has become urban and Coastal. One out of every three Peruvians are urban dwellers, and more than half of the total population live on the Coast. Moreover, Lima Metropolitan Area gathers 30% of the country’s population, making one third of Peruvians, people of Lima, or limeños. Peru’s twentieth-century massive internal migration has been more than a relocation of the population. It has meant the arrival of the rural to the urban, of the Andean to the Coastal, of the rest of Peru to Lima Metropolitan Area. It has meant the meeting of geographies, of cultures that have for long kept together a profound antagonism, of ethnic groups that now walk through the same streets or live together in them, consume the same products or compete with the ones of their own on the same market, access the same public services or run for a seat in the parliament to advocate for the ones they represent. However, more than four hundred years of urban-rural, Coastal-Andean, Lima-rest of Peru dichotomies would not allow for an easy fusion of Peruvian identities. These dichotomies carried along enough social characteristics as to make the adaptation of the new Andean and rural dwellers on the Coast and the urban areas an arduous quest.

3. Geographic dichotomies in social indicators

The highest level of social development in Peru is concentrated on the Coast and in urban areas. Contrarily, the lowest level is perceived in the Andean Mountains and rural areas. Poverty and inequality, public services, employment, education and health indicators are presented next in order to portray the socioeconomic circumstances that establish a considerable disparity between the Coast and urban areas on the one side, and the Andean Mountains and rural areas on the other side. They are extracted from demographic data collected by INEI and the Peruvian Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) in 2011.
Poverty and extreme poverty affects less urban areas and the region of the Coast than rural areas and the region of the Andean Mountains. 18% of urban dwellers are poor and 1.4% of them are extremely poor (MEF 2011). As for the rural dwellers, 56.1% of them are affected by poverty and 20.5% by extreme poverty (MEF 2011). Likewise, 17.8% of the people of the Coast are poor and 1.2% of them extremely poor (MEF 2011). In the Andean Mountains, however, 41.5% of the regional population is poor and 13.8% is extremely poor (MEF 2011). As for public services, the Coast and the urban areas have considerably better access to water supply, basic sanitation and street lighting than the Andean Mountains do. While 9.5%, 11.7% and 1.6% of urban dwellers do not have access to water supply, basic sanitation and street lighting, respectively, 61.6%, 56.1% and 35.8% of rural dwellers do not have access to the three public services in question, respectively (MEF 2011). When comparing Lima Metropolitan Area and the rural areas the difference in percentages is even more severe: 6.8%, 6.3% and 0.4% of the dwellers of Lima Metropolitan Area do not have access to water supply, basic sanitation and street lighting, respectively (MEF 2011).

Employment is another important social indicator that portrays the urban-rural and Coast-Andean Mountains disparities. While 53% of the economically active population (EAP) in urban areas is properly employed, 77.9% of the EAP in rural areas is underemployed (MEF 2011). The main reason of the under-employment of the latter population lies in income inequality (MEF 2011). The average per capita income in Peru is 721.2 Nuevos Soles (MEF 2011). While in urban areas the average per capita income is 850.3 Nuevos Soles, in rural areas the average income is 349.8 Nuevos Soles (MEF 2011). The difference is even more prominent when comparing the average income in the rural areas and Lima Metropolitan Area, where on average the EAP earns 943 Nuevos Soles (MEF 2011). Likewise, the average income on the Coast is higher than in the Andean Mountains (MEF 2011). Yet, the average expenditure on the Coast and in the urban areas is higher than in the Andean Mountains and rural areas (MEF 2011)

Finally, education and health indicators present contrasting results between different areas of residence and natural regions, too. Let us take, for instance, illiteracy and chronic malnutrition in infancy. 7.1% of the population of 15

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5 1 Peruvian Nuevo Sol is equal to 1.13 Polish Zlotys, 0.27 Euros and 0.36 US Dollars, as of September 30th, 2013 (Exchange Rates 2012).
6 The average expenditure in Peru is 548.9 Nuevos Soles: 639.6 Nuevos Soles in urban areas and 287.8 Nuevos Soles in rural areas (MEF 2011). Lima Metropolitan Area has an average expenditure of 702.3 Nuevos Soles (MEF 2011).
7 To be understood in Spanish as desnutrición and not malnutrición.
years of age or more is illiterate, that is, it does not know how to read or write (MEF 2011). 17.4% of rural dwellers are affected by illiteracy, while that phenomenon affects 4% of the population in urban areas (MEF 2011). As for chronic malnutrition, 37% of rural dwellers under the age of 5 are affected by malnutrition while in urban areas there is a 10.1% rate (MEF 2011). Likewise, the rate of malnutrition in the Andean Mountains (30.7%) and the Amazon Rainforest (28.2%) is considerably higher than on the Coast, especially when compared to Lima Metropolitan Area (6.8%).

4. The Cholo

Drawing upon the demographic and social indicators previously shown, we focus on two aspects: one that attempts against the development of Peru as a multicultural society and another one that suggests a solution against such a challenge. The first aspect refers, on the one hand, to the substantial socioeconomic disparity existing between urban and rural dwellers, and the residents of the Coast and the Andean Mountains, and, on the other hand, to the socioeconomic gap existing between Lima Metropolitan Area and the Andean Mountains. The second aspect relates to the urban areas, the region of the Coast and Lima Metropolitan Area, as the main Peruvian destinations for economic migrants – mainly Andean migrants – due to their favourable social indicators. Even though this second aspect suggests that the most developed areas of residence, natural regions and administrative regions and provinces of the country present more favourable socioeconomic perspectives to migrants, it is not accurate to consider them a solution to the interregional inequality. Instead, massive labour migration is more likely to be a sign of an early stage of industrialism (Gellner 1983, p. 42). However, it is also particular to the early period of industrialization that “entrants into the new order who are drawn from cultural and linguistic groups that are distant from those of the more advanced centre suffer considerable disadvantages” (Gellner 1983, p. 62). This would have major implications on social relations among Peruvians. In the current paper we depart from the postulate that Andean migrants8 and their descendants living in Lima Metropolitan Area, the Coast and urban areas, are, in the first place, people of Lima, people of the Coast and urban dwellers, who are exposed to the social circumstances of their place of residence rather than of origin – or the place of origin of their ancestors – and whose Andean and rural origin is uniquely

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8 Given that migration from the Amazon Rainforest has occurred in a considerably lesser scale, for the purposes of the present paper, the main focus is on migration from the Andean Mountains.
a cultural aspect that characterizes them as part of a multicultural frame. In this way, it could be said that the twentieth-century phenomenon of massive internal migration in Peru has resulted in the convergence of Andean and peasant traditions and identities with the modern experience provided by life in the city and the capitalist market (Quijano 1980). This confluence may have produced a new Peruvian identity, a “new Peruvian”, one that has been attributed the denomination of *cholo*.

Given that the interaction between the urban and the rural, the Coastal and the Andean, and the capital city and the rest of Peru is not an event particular about the 20th century, the denomination “cholo” was already part of the public discourse. In previous centuries, the word “cholo” had a rather ethnic connotation: cholo was a mestizo with highly noticeable Andean features, culturally and physically speaking (De Cangas 1780 cited in Varallanos 1962). However, by the beginning of the 20th century, the denomination “cholo” had gained a second relevant connotation: cholo was now a medium for the indigenous culture to participate in Peruvian cultural life, too.

“At the beginning of the 20th century, the cholo appeared as a sort of intermediary between the indigenous individual and the rest of society, even between different groups of indigenous people. The presence of the cholo suggested a change in the mind set of traditional indigenous people, somehow she/he liberated them from ‘isolation and apathy’” (Nalewajko 1995, p. 139).

As M. Nalewajko (1995, p. 139) states it, from the beginning of the 20th century, the cholo was able to adapt certain elements of the indigenous – or Andean – culture and certain aspects of the Creole – or Coastal, mainly from Lima – culture, transform them into her/his own contribution, and participate in the construction of a more diverse national culture. This “new” Peruvian individual has been building a culture of its own ever since: the cholo identity. That is, a cultural identity began to exist around the cholo. However, as entrants to the new order, Andean migrants and their descendants simultaneously suffered considerable disadvantages. They became a more immediate target of discrimination in the hands of the social classes of higher status, especially in Lima and the provinces of the Coast. If we take into consideration the socioeconomic disparity between urban and rural areas, and between the Andean and the Coastal regions, then, given the origin of the migrants, discrimination may have been triggered originally by economic, social or educational factors. That would have meant that even a minimum improvement in the living conditions of migrants as a group, would have brought along an improvement in the perception locals had of them. However, as mentioned above, the cholo was perceived not only as an

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9 To be understood in Spanish as *lo cholo.*
intermediary between the indigenous and the national culture. Traditionally, the cholo was also as a mestizo with no so inconspicuous indigenous physical features. In this way, local people who identified themselves as the authentic people of Lima or the Coast found it logical to stigmatize the cholo. Cholos were thought to be carrying along cultural, linguistic, physical aspects that used to be attributed to a population in socioeconomic disadvantage: the Andean and rural population. If the cholos – the migrants and their descendants together – however, had already become urban and Coastal dwellers holding a number of socioeconomic aspects that differentiated them from the rural and Andean population, and yet both cholos and their ancestors were fit within the same category, the stigmatization of the cholos and their consequent discrimination could not be responding to economic and social factors uniquely. The “deep racial disdain and rejection” (Romero 1955, p. 117) with which cholos were treated could not be caused by simple economic and social reasons. In other words, this was not about first corroborating the salary or the level of education of the individual and then discriminating against her/him. This was driven by a more conspicuous factor: ethnicity.

5. Ethnicity in Peru

Let us depart from Brubaker’s (2002) views on ethnicity: “Ethnicity, race and nationhood exist only in and through our perceptions, interpretations, representations, categorizations and identifications. They are not things in the world, but perspectives on the world […] These include ethnicized ways of seeing (and ignoring), of construing (and misconstruing), of inferring (and misinferring), of remembering (and forgetting). They include ethnically oriented frames, schemes and narratives and the situational cues that activate them, such as the ubiquitous televised images that have played such an important role in the latest intifada. They include systems of classification, categorization and identification, formal and informal. And they include their tacit, taken-for-granted background knowledge, embodied in persons and embedded in institutionalized routines and practices, through which people recognize and experience objects, places, persons, actions or situations as ethnically, racially or nationally marked or meaningful.” (Brubaker 2002, pp. 174–175).

If ethnicity, according to R. Brubaker (2002), exists in and through our perceptions, interpretations, representations, categorizations and identifications in the world around us, ethnicity is a social construct variable according to time and context. The people of Lima, the Coast and the urban areas of Peru construct an image of the cholos Lima while perceiving, interpreting, categorizing and identifying them as Andean people and peasants first. What they perceive in
cholos is what links cholos to an Andean and rural identity rather than what links them to the traditionally perceived as urban and Coastal residents. But cholos are not precisely Andean people or peasants anymore – as in the case of migrants – or they simply never were – as in the case of the descendants of migrants, born and raised as people of Lima, the Coast and urban areas. Nonetheless, they are still stigmatized according to their cultural background in the first place, to that factor that makes them ethnically different, to that aspect that makes them indigenous. The self-denominated authentic local people do not perceive cholos as people like them, first; but they misinterpret and misinfer the meaning of cholo; ignore and forget who is the cholo. They do not refer to the cholo as a neighbour, as someone from Lima, as someone from the Coast, as an urban dweller, but rather as a physical object, ethnically classified, formally or informally racialized. The cholo is urban and in many cases costeño (from the Coast) and/or limeño. Thus, it is not the Coastal or the urban identity, or the identity of the people of Lima, which contrasts with the cholo and the cholo identity. It is white people and the white identity what does (Bustamante 1986; Portocarrero 1992).

H. Tajfel (1984) indicates that in Peru white people are attributed a positive value due to the fact that they have been for long associated to a great ability for accomplishing a legitimate and stable socioeconomic status, and power. If that were the case, taking into account the above-mentioned social indicators, then if the living conditions of the indigenous people and their descendants improved in the context where they now live, as cholos, then indigenous people and cholos would valuate ethnically, too. However, as it is observed in a study on exclusion, ethnic identity and policies of social inclusion in urban areas, conducted by N. Valdivia, M. Benavides and M. Torero (2007), the indigenous population is Peru’s most disadvantaged ethnic population, economically and socially speaking. And this goes beyond its geographical location, as the study was conducted in Lima. It is as if the geographic antagonism between the Andean and rural identities, and the Coastal and urban identities, have been transferred to the capital city and the main provinces of the country. According to D. Sulmont (2010, pp. 1–2), indigenous people, on average, are not only poorer than the rest of the population; have a lower level of education; have access to less qualified positions in the labour market or are employed in economic activities of low

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10 A. Panizo (2012) describes racialization as “the discourse through which an ethnic group, a sector of society, constructs discursively a notion of race.” Panizo (2012) states that every word or expression that is used to categorize an individual as part of a “race”, for more naïve that it may be, responds to a social construct. That is, such a word is related to a racial conception.
productivity\textsuperscript{11}; and have limited access to public services or social programmes, or when they have it these tend to be of less quality (as in the case of the public health sector)\textsuperscript{12}; but also indigenous people have been the main victims of political violence (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, 2003)\textsuperscript{13} and have not counted with much representativeness in democratic institutions\textsuperscript{14}. This form of suppression of a social group, limiting its access to participate thoroughly in the economic, social, political and cultural spheres is called social exclusion: lack of access to proper health insurance, inadequate access to the labour market, segregation on the labour market, residential marginalization, limited access to quality education and lack of effective political representation in front of the state (Figueroa, Altamirano and Sulmont 1996, Ñopo, Saavedra and Torero 2004, Torero et al. 2004). Social exclusion is also about being indifferent to the suffering of excluded groups, to their lack of access to the most basic resources. It means to develop a relation with them in which respect and justice are absent and, as during the armed conflict of the eighties and nineties, in which even the violation of their rights as human beings and political repression are possible (Morales 2003 cited in Espinosa et al. 2007). And, where is the cholo in all this? Is the cholo simply an urban indigenous identity discriminated for being considered firstly indigenous? Or, do urban cholos and urban indigenous people exist separately, too? The first step would be to define what is indigenous in the Peruvian context.

According to D. Sulmont (2010, p. 3), there are two relevant approaches to measure ethnicity: “The first one focuses on processes of categorization. These

\textsuperscript{11} According to A. Figueroa (2000), indigenous people entered the new millennium excluded from the labour markets due to the fact that they failed on accumulating physical and human capital, and lacked enough access to public goods as to develop their own ways of learning about new technologies.

\textsuperscript{12} M. Torero et al. (2004), indicate that the amount of school years, the enrolment in private schools, the access to phone lines and the availability of health care are all negatively correlated to the characteristics of the indigenous population.

\textsuperscript{13} The profile of the most affected part of the Peruvian population during the armed conflict experienced during the eighties and nineties was the one of a traditionally excluded ethnic and social group (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2003, Manrique 2007, Merino 2007). 75% of the 69,280 victims reported by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) were indigenous people, whose mother tongue was Quechua, Aymara or an Amazonian language (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2003, Manrique 2012).

\textsuperscript{14} In a study conducted by Sulmont in 2005, 15% of the participants considered that indigenous people managed to make their rights be respected always or almost always. In the contrary, close to 50% and 80% considered that mestizos and whites could do it always or almost always (Sulmont 2005).
processes use supposedly ‘objective’ cultural, racial or ethnic labels, such as mother tongue, place of origin, religion or ‘skin colour’ (chromatic scales) in order to classify people. The second approach uses self-identification. In this approach, interviewees are asked to place themselves in a range of ethnic, racial or cultural categories presented in a survey.” (Sulmont 2010, pp. 3–4).

Considering that the residents of Lima, the Coast and the urban areas, regardless of their cultural background, share the same space and should be considered, in the first place, people of Lima, the Coast and the urban areas, the most suitable approach to use is self-identification. The next step would be to determine in which ethnic categories are Peruvians divided. For that, D. Sulmont (2010) presents an analysis on ethnicity in social and opinion surveys: the 2009’s National Households Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares – ENAHO, in Spanish), the 2008’s AmericasBarometer Survey conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), the 2006’s World Values Survey (WVS) and the 2005’s Democracy in Peru Survey by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). D. Sulmont (2010) observes the ethnic categories used in the different items of the surveys and compares the results according to the type of category that appears in them. Finally, the author concludes that the answers given by the interviewees do not depend on how identified they felt in a particular group, but on what categories are used to ask about the ethnicity of the interviewee. Cultural categories based on language (“Quechua”, “Aymara”), geography (“from the Amazon Rainforest”), the skin colour or the physical features (“black/mulatto/zambo”, “white”, “mestizo”) and of the origin (“of European origin”, “of African origin”, “of Asian origin”, “of Amazonian origin”, “of Spanish and native origin”)\(^{15}\), combined differently in ENAHO, WVS and Democracy in Peru surveys, all present similar results. For example, in the ENAHO survey 36% of Peruvians are indigenous or native, while in the Democracy in Peru Survey indigenous or native Peruvians are 26.3% of the population (Sulmont 2010, p. 13). The results of the Democracy in Peru Survey come close to matching the 25% proposed by Peruvian sociologist N. Manrique (2012). However, when the items in the surveys include uniquely categories related to the interviewee’s phenotype or chromatic scale, the results across surveys vary considerably. This is the case of the AmericasBarometer Survey, in which categories such as “white”, “mestizo”, “indigenous”, “black or afro-Peruvian”, “mulatto” and “oriental” are used\(^{16}\). The results of this survey showed that only 7% of Peruvians admit being “indigenous”.

\(^{15}\) All categories have been translated to English by the author of this paper.

\(^{16}\) All categories have been translated to English by the author of this paper.
As seen above, using categories related to the phenotype and the chromatic scale could be perceived as ambiguous by the interviewee. Thus, defining the indigenous population of Peru requires a different set of labels. Sulmont (2010) takes the 2009’s ENAHO Survey to exemplify how a proper combination of categories could give more exact results. In this survey, the indigenous population is determined by adding the results obtained in the categories “Quechua”, “Aymara” and “from the Amazon Rainforest”\textsuperscript{17}, which are 30.9%, 3.8% and 2%, respectively. ENAHO is a survey conducted by INEI. As stated before, INEI is the main agency responsible for all statistic and informatics systems in Peru, which has made it responsible for the Population and Housing Censuses. For that reason, it is adequate to observe what INEI understands for ethnicity. INEI defines ethnic group as a group united “by common cultural practices of linguistic and religious behaviour” (INEI 2013). That explains the kind of ethnic categories used by ENAHO in 2009\textsuperscript{18}.

Quechua and Aymara are two native languages whose origin is attributed to the Andean region of Peru. From these two languages two cultural groups emerge: the Quechuas and the Aymaras. The remaining languages, given their Amazonian origins, make up together a third cultural group: the people of the Amazon Rainforest or Amazonians. Considering that an individual may be part of a cultural group by self-identification although she/he may not necessarily speak the original language of that group and, similarly, be able to speak the group’s language but not consider her or himself part of the group, ENAHO uses mother tongue in combination with self-identification to determine with more precision Peru’s indigenous population. The results were as follows: 3.3% of the interviewees spoke Quechua, Aymara or an Amazonian language but did not define themselves as Quechuas, Aymaras or Amazonians; 12.1% of them defined themselves as Quechuas, Aymaras or Amazonians but did not have Quechua, Aymara or an Amazonian languages as their mother tongue; and, finally, 24.7% of them defined themselves as Quechuas, Aymaras and Amazonians and had, at the same time, Quechua, Aymara and an Amazonian language as a mother tongue. Adding together the three results, 40.1% of Peruvians are indigenous.

Let us now see how a socioeconomic indicator such as poverty affects Peruvian people, when distributing them by language groups (Spanish and Native

\textsuperscript{17} All categories have been translated to English by the author of this paper.  
\textsuperscript{18} In the chapter “A Story of the Providence and the Production of the Colonial Serf” (translation mine) of his work \textit{Profetas del Odio} (2012), Portocarrero (2012, pp. 57–74) explains how religion in Peru played an important role in interethnic relations during the Colony. However, as the author explains later in the same work, there are today more successful factors establishing ethnic differences among Peruvians.
Tongues) and by the self-identification of the head of household with an ethnic group. The data is extracted from INEI’s 2011 database.

According to table 1, poverty affects people whose mother tongue is Quechua, Aymara or an Amazonian language. Likewise, as it is shown in table 2, people of Quechua, Aymara or Amazonian origins are the most affected by poverty in Peru. In the Andean Mountains, the majority of afro-descendants (56.5%) consider themselves poor, and in rural areas the majority of afro-descendants (52.3%) and native people (52%) consider themselves poor. Yet, in rural areas, the percentage of poor whites (45.4%) and mestizos (42.4%) are considerably high, too.

Table 1. Peru: Incidence of poverty by mother tongue and area of residence, 2011 (percentage in relation to the total population of each mother tongue)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Mother tongue</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Native tongue&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Native tongue&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Native tongue&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Values were adjusted to projections based on 2007’s Population Census.
<sup>a</sup> Quechua, Aymara and other native tongues.
Source: own elaboration adapted from INEI (2013).

When observing urban and rural areas, and the natural regions of the Coast and the Andean Mountains, separately, the highest percentage of poor people within their own ethnic group in every case is found among the heads of households who identify themselves as blacks/mulattos/zambos, that is afro-descendants. In the contrary, when taking urban and rural areas, and the natural regions of the Coast and the Andean Mountains, separately, the lowest percentage of poor people within their own ethnic group in every case is found among the heads of households who identify themselves as whites.

As it is shown in table 2, the percentages of poor native people and poor black/mulatto/zambo people are almost as high, yet the afro-descendants are worse off when taking every geographical area – with the exception of the Amazon Rainforest – separately. Likewise, the percentages of poor whites and poor mestizos are similar, yet whites are better off when taking every geographical area – with the exception of the Amazon Rainforest – separately. This brings a critical idea into context. In contemporary Peru, ethnic differentiation
is not based on a white-indigenous bipolarity. It is about whites and non-whites.

Table 2. Peru: Incidence of poverty among heads of household, by self-perception of the ethnic origin and by geographical area, 2011 (percentage in relation to the total amount of heads of households of each ethnic origin)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Origin $^a$</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/Mulatto/Zambo</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Origin $^a$</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/Mulatto/Zambo</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Origin $^a$</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/Mulatto/Zambo</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coast</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Origin $^a$</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/Mulatto/Zambo</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Andean Mountains</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Origin $^a$</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/Mulatto/Zambo</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amazon Rainforest</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Origin $^a$</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/Mulatto/Zambo</td>
<td>$^b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>$^b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Values were adjusted to projections based on 2007’s Population Census.

$^a$ Quechua, Aymara and Amazonian Origins.

$^b$ Less than 30 cases registered.

Source: own elaboration adapted from INEI (2013).

According to N. Valdivia, M. Benavides and M. Torero (2007), social exclusion in Peru has not only affected the indigenous population but also the afro-descendants. In this way, we would not be talking anymore about a Peru made of whites and indigenous but of whites and non-whites, a Peru in which non-whites are still more likely to be discriminated against and, in some cases, even excluded. But, we must differentiate the meaning of social exclusion and discrimination. Exclusion alludes to structural processes that are institutionalized as time goes by, while discrimination is linked to daily practices expressed “face to face” (Valdivia, Benavides and Torero 2007, p. 611). That is, not all groups that are excluded are also discriminated against, and not all discriminated groups are excluded (Valdivia, Benavides and Torero 2007). However, in Peruvian society both situations tend to coincide and affect ethnic groups, such as the afro-descendants and the indigenous population (Valdivia, Benavides and Torero 2007, pp. 611–613). Discrimination, then, constitutes an expression of social exclusion suffered by such groups (Figueroa, Altamirano and Sulmont 1996, Torero et al. 2004).

Daily practices of discrimination and social exclusion based on stereotypes – a stereotype is an “over-simplified mental image of (usually) some category of person, institution or event which is shared, in essential features, by large numbers of people” (Bullock and Stallybrass 1977, p. 601) – and prejudices – emotional charges directed towards a group as a whole or towards an individual for her/his belonging to that group (Allport 1954, Gardener 1994, Stangor 2000) – have been legitimized and institutionalized along history in Peru. These practices make up the regular behaviour of Peruvians today. These practices were originally developed in a context of intergroup relations based on fear, as it happened during the Colony. However, the persistent manifestation of practices, such as prejudice, discrimination and exclusion, “may have reduced the responses to fear and reinforced the responses oriented toward intergroup differentiation through the search for power and the execution of it” (Espinosa et al. 2007, p. 330, translation mine). Hence these practices become invisible and unavoidable, even for most of their victims (Opotow 1990). The perception there is of groups of high and low status according to Espinosa et al. (2007, pp. 324–325), makes Peru a country that tolerates social differences. This tolerance makes up the foundations of a culture that values and promotes hierarchies, and that is almost insensitive to the damage provoked on those who are excluded from the exercise of power (Espinosa et al. 2007, pp. 324–325). Power has been understood historically in Peruvian society as “an imposition of people or groups strong enough to apply it” (Bruce 2012a, p. 30). In other words, a dominant
group imposes its own value system and ideology over other groups, and those groups are subordinated or feel obliged to comply with them (Espinosa et al. 2007, p. 330). Failing to comply leaves the dominated groups out of the scope of justice and the moral concern of the more powerful group, economically and politically speaking.

A. Espinosa et al. (2007) indicate that most people in Peru value white Peruvians more positively than they do other racialized groups, by associating them to positive stereotypes such as development, capability and success. Another group valued positively is the one of Peruvians of Asian origin or Asian Peruvians, considered to be polite, honest, trustworthy, capable, successful and developed (Espinosa et al. 2007, pp. 312–321). The better valuation ascribed to white Peruvians, according to H. Tajfel (1984), is associated with factors that provide a better valuation overall, such as power and status. Adversely, Andeans, Amazonians and afro-Peruvians are represented by stereotypes related to backwardness, conformism, underdevelopment and laziness, which are all factors isolated from power (Espinosa et al. 2007, p. 321). In this way, we could observe that power and accomplishment are, in fact, highly appreciated by Peruvians, reason why stereotypes such as corruption and individualism as means to attain them, are also attributed to white Peruvians (Espinosa et al. 2007, pp. 320–321). Thus, if the highest status and power can increase the value of an ethnic group (Tajfel 1984), then we could assume that from the general perspective of Peruvians, people of Asian origin and whites should be sharing the same upper position in every field or be considered part of the same group. Yet, that is not the case. From the traditional Peruvian perspective, people of Asian origin do not fit in the “prospect of the ideal partner”, which, for instance, for the female gender would be “a high-class white man with a good socio-economic position” (Bruce 2007, p. 59). Even though, we cannot dismiss that Asian Peruvians and other racialized groups may one day become “the ideal partners”19, the higher valuation of whites in Peru today is not only based on the

19 The report “Unstoppable Asian Fever” (“Imparable Fiebre Asiática”, translation mine), shown by the TV programme Cuarto Poder, could be one of the first to suggest the more positive valuation of Asian or oriental features in Peru. Sol Carreño, the presenter of the program, introduces the Peruvian followers of “oriental fashion” as “people who believe in aesthetics and a culture uncommon to us, but that is digging up with every time more strength: oriental fashion” (Imparable Fiebre Asiática 2013). The presenter places “aesthetics” and “culture” in one sentence. Moreover, the report, besides talking about fashion, also gives space to other fields related to the show business, such as K-pop music. A group of fans is shown idealizing their pop stars of Korean origin and whose physical aspect – although it is not new in the Peruvian context – is not represented enough by publicity and is not considered to be the “prospect of the ideal partner” (Bruce 2007, p. 59) in Peru.
simple perception – to put it in R. Brubaker’s (2002) words – that they are economically, socially and politically more successful and powerful. Whites are ascribed a higher valuation more importantly due to the white factor per se. In other words, in Peru, the phenotype and the chromatic scale, what is popularly called “race” – a social construct that varies historically and locally (Palmié 2007, p. 205) – still matters.

J. Bruce (2007, pp. 65–80) attributes great part of the cause of this phenomenon to the mass communication media: “Mass media, publicity in particular, play a role of immeasurable impact, by propagating a racist ideology tightly related to physical appearance. This goes up to the point in which aesthetic canons appear to be the essential ingredient to perpetuate racist discrimination.” (Bruce 2007, p. 68).

In fact, one cannot deny that publicity in Peru tends to omit characters whose phenotype is associated to people of indigenous – and cholo – African or Asian origin, “when advertising products associated to the privileges of a particular social class, one that it is linked to specific images based on aesthetic patterns of Eurocentric origin” (Bruce 2007, pp. 67–68). However, something we must take into consideration is that communication media are only a tool for the propagation of an ethnic hierarchy that favours whites over non-whites. The problem is not in the media itself. It is related to idiosyncrasy; it is cultural, it is Peruvian. The people of Peru cannot forget that mainly Peruvians run the communication media in Peru, and that human beings developed the media and not the other way around. Thus, racism is not propagated and perpetuated only through the media, but through every single medium and in every single sphere: from the daily verbal communication to official policies promulgated by the government. The role of communication media was rather facilitating equal access to the full package of the racist ideology. Consequently, the racist thought, action and discourse has been standardized in society. The role of communication media in the propagation of racist ideology lies in its capacity of democratizing it. And within this process of democratization is where the image of the beautiful white has been constructed, overrunning the image of the rich and powerful white, given that non-whites are increasingly becoming richer and more powerful. In Peru, whiteness is a characteristic of beauty and beauty a characteristic of whiteness.

According to J. Bruce (2007, p. 68), “the question of aesthetics applied to the physical beauty of Peruvians has been sealed by the strict prevalence of Eurocentric patterns”. The cholos, on the one hand, as non-whites, and on the other hand, as people of Andean and rural origins, have been excluded from the beauty canons associated to white skin. G. Portocarrero (1993) calls this kind of discrimination “aesthetic racism”: “In our country, the typical features of the
cholo are devaluated. Coppery skin\textsuperscript{20}, medium height, plentiful black and straight hair, no facial hairiness, thick lips, all these characteristics have very little prestige. There is sort of consensus around the fact that tallness, white skin, light hair, thin lips have the reputation of being of better ‘quality’, therefore, are better appreciated.” (Portocarrero 1993, p. 218).

Even if this idea is transmitted through the media without major opposition – besides of the one of isolated cases, especially used to favour the rating of a TV channel or feed some TV presenter’s ego – and that what is perceive as beautiful in Peru is, in fact, adding value to a number of brands, “many of the consumers that are confronted in the daily basis with the incongruence between those privileged images and their own reflection in the mirror” (Bruce 2007, pp. 67–68) are still subject to alienation and psychopathological effects: “Identification with the aggressor, auto-devaluation, conflict with one’s own image, embarrassment, pain or even the irritation produced by one’s own representation, and the pathway toward action, of course, such as compulsive visits – for the one who can afford it – to the plastic surgeon.” (Bruce 2012b).

Nevertheless, there are no clear proofs that a considerable amount of Peruvians possess in fact a restrained desire of becoming whites\textsuperscript{21}. According to R. Brubaker (2002), an individual’s identity is defined by “strong” and “weak” conceptions. “Strong” conceptions of identity are understood as the ones that an individual has or should have (Brubaker 2002), for instance, skin colour. “Weak” conceptions of identity are the ones that appear as a consequence of experiences of identity construction in a determined setting (Sulmont 2010, p. 4), for instance, regional traditions. The subject categorizes the object and her or himself according to those “strong” and “weak” conceptions of identity together (Sulmont 2010, p. 4). According to G. Portocarrero (1992), most Peruvians consider themselves middle-class mestizos. The results of the psychological study on stereotypes, prejudices and social exclusion in Peru, conducted by A. Espinosa et al. (2007, pp. 319–320), confirm that statement, given that the category mestizo scored the highest when interviewees were asked about the degree of identification they had with each ethnic group presented. Moreover, in the section about stereotypes, the results of the study by A. Espinosa et al. (2007), show that the categories “Peruvian mestizos” and “Peruvians in general” are

\textsuperscript{20} In the Peruvian context, coppery skin (piel cobriza, in Spanish) is the term increasingly used to describe chromatically anyone that neither belongs to the white group nor could she/he be described as afro-Peruvian or Asian Peruvian.

\textsuperscript{21} Market research analyst R. Arellano (2005) explains that only 4% of the people of Lima aspire to be whites without being whites. The author stresses that when models are too far away from what the target market could aspire to become, the usual response is rejection.
equally associated to hard work, distrust, corruption, joy, falsehood, impoliteness, conformism, among others\textsuperscript{22}. Although this is a set of ambiguous – mainly negative – characteristics, the similar perception about both groups suggests that most people in Peru place themselves in an intermediate point between groups of high and low status (Espinosa et al. 2007, p. 321). In this way, the denomination “mestizo” is also a more inclusive identity indigenous people and their descendants in Lima, the Coast and urban areas could opt for. This is because for the indigenous individual, skin colour and any other physical feature is “a less visible element, given that for her/him, racial, ethnic and social conditions happen to be strongly interwoven” (Valdivia 2003). This is not the case for people of African origin, given that for them identity is mainly supported by racial differentiation rather than cultural (Valdivia, Benavides and Torero 2007). Yet, even if the differentiation of the indigenous population from other ethnic groups is based mainly on cultural factors, it does not mean that the racial factor is absolutely invisible.

Peruvian society is a consumerist society in which economic success and power are highly appreciated. Besides that, it is a society in which racialized groups have been divided into categories of high and low status. For that reason, the damage and alienation suffered by people emerging socioeconomically, such as the cholos or the indigenous people, could make them identify themselves with a category they consider to be better off and that liberates them from pain and alienation. This does not mean that by calling themselves mestizos instead of indigenous or cholos, these groups of people are trying to “whiten up”\textsuperscript{23} themselves with the purpose of “achieving power and a more prominent position in the sociocultural framework that establishes differences between whites and non-whites” (Panizo 2012). In reality, cholos and indigenous people, by calling themselves mestizos, endeavour to amend the stigma that associates them to a history of economic marginalization and social exclusion (Sulmont 2010, p. 17). That is the reason why it is common that economically emerging racialized groups identify themselves with a social group that is better accepted and less discriminated, yet that is not that different from the one to which they belong. In other words, they use a label that allows them to keep the respect for themselves but, moreover, that provides them with more options of maintaining and valuating their own culture. That is the reason why usually Peruvians define themselves as mestizos but rarely as cholos or indigenous (Bruce 2007, p. 32, Sulmont 2010, p. 17).

\textsuperscript{22} All categories have been translated to English by the author of this paper.

\textsuperscript{23} Whitening is “adopting the cultural and physical characteristics associated to white people” (Panizo 2012).
However, the fact that “mestizo” is a more accepted and valuated denomination today does not mean that whoever who called herself/himself mestizo was not, in fact, carrying the negative emotions that result from discrimination – in the case of the individual in a more vulnerable position – or making use of that term to suggest a sense of *nationhood* with the intention of being exculpated after a discriminatory act had been committed – in the case of the individual in a more favourable position. The utilization Peruvians have of the concept of *mestizaje* \(^{24}\) (Spanish for crossbreeding or interbreeding) to exculpate themselves from their incapacity to renounce to the ideological symptom of racialization is what J. Bruce (2007, p. 32) calls Peru’s “gigantic excuse”. We must take into account that mestizos in Peru have confronted obstacles, frustration and suffering, too. M. Nalewajko, in her work *El Debate Nacional en el Perú (1920–1933)*, published in 1995, relates to how mestizos were perceived at the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century: “The participation of mestizos (and their readiness to adjust to the hierarchy in force) made them be tolerated by the *Criollo* people, who, at the same time, were not forgetting about the ‘indigenous-like’ status of the mestizos. […] It should not surprise us, hence, the presence of resentment towards mestizos who tried to accomplish individual progress in society by accepting the rules of the game in force. The cost of their economic and social development is high given that by uprooting themselves from their environment and grumbling about part of their tradition without achieving the full recognition of the groups they aspire to belong to and that perceives them as packed of such a tradition, they are uprooted, and isolated somewhere between two worlds.” (Nalewajko 1995, pp. 123–124).

M. Nalewajko (1995) also presents the cholo and the mestizo at the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century as two different characters. In fact, they were then and they are today two different characters, but mainly for the popular perception. In social and opinion surveys, in the main population and housing statistics, in psychological studies, among others, cholos do not appear as an ethnic category. And, as we have seen above, the denomination mestizo does. Moreover, as mentioned before, Peruvians prefer to denominate themselves mestizos rather than cholos. Considering M. Nalewajko’s (1995) account on the arduous process of valuation a mestizo had to undergo still at the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century and the better position mestizos enjoy today, we could say, then, that the denomination mestizo as an ethnic category has been, in fact, valuated in less

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\(^{24}\) According to the dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy (RAE), *mestizaje* is (1) the crossing of different races; (2) The group of individuals resulting from that crossing; and (3) a mix of different cultures that give place to a new one (Real Academia Española 2013, translation mine).
than a hundred years. As for the cholos, they may be occupying today the position mestizos once had. The mestizo and the cholo, thus, may be the same character, but in different versions, in different moments, in different degrees of comfort with her/his society. In this society, Peruvian society, one of strata, one that has mastered the exercise of ethnic stigmatization for almost five centuries, still presents a less hospitable environment for those who stand further away from what is perceived as European phenotype. The more opportunities for social advancement in Peru today have only helped characterising racism in a different way: from the radical racism (Portocarrero 2009) practiced in most postcolonial societies until the 20th century, Peruvian society has moved to the application of “cultural racism” (De la Cadena 2004). M. De la Cadena (2004) describes cultural racism as the discrimination resulting from the mixture of elements that carry a cultural legacy – being the physical aspect only the most evident of them – with the socioeconomic status.

Already by the end of the eighties and beginning of the nineties, authors such as W. Twanama (1992), suggested that discrimination in Peru was rather the result of face-to-face mapping or identification of physical, socioeconomic, intellectual and cultural elements all at the same time. W. Twanama (1992) called this daily process the Mathematical Model of Cholear (Modelo Matemático de Cholear, in Spanish). The term “cholear” comes from the verbalization of the word “cholo”, which would not translate the term conceptually to “calling somebody a cholo” but rather to “considering somebody less and establishing boundaries”. The term “cholear” has been articulated to form the word “choleo”, which is the act or instance of “cholear”. And this is, in fact, what happens in Peru today, in that country of “all” identities (Vargas Llosa 2010), a country where discrimination is a permanent game of attributing oneself a higher score and attributing someone else a lower score. Yet, even when this procedure is not particular to Peruvian society, what makes choleo, a kind of discrimination particular to the Peruvian context, is precisely the origin of the people that inhabit it, the cultural factor, the presence of that game of geographical and cultural dichotomies, antagonisms that go hand in hand with different degrees of urbanization and development in natural regions, regions linked to ethnicity, to colour, to phenotype, to a history that started with the clash between the Inca and the Spanish empires almost five hundred years ago and that lives today behind the “gigantic excuse” of mestizaje and of the unstoppable economic growth.

During the eleventh congress of the European Sociological Association (ESA), ESA 2013, in Torino, the distinguished sociologist M. Lamont (2013) left with the audience an idea that fits solidly the study of all kinds of discrimination: “(US) American literature on racism has for long been concerned about actions that could be sued, rather than about the stigmatization lived in the
daily basis”. In this particular case, one can add that the strength of US American law practically has made the daily practices of stigmatization more complex, up to the point of becoming nearly inconspicuous, although prejudices may still be present. A number of Peruvian sociologists have characterised racism in Peru as inconspicuous, too. Yet, it is not. The study of racism in Peru as a research topic in particular – its beginning is attributed to Alberto Flores Galindo in the late eighties – has greatly embraced daily life issues. This makes stigmatization nothing but visible. Thus, the problem of racism in Peru is not a problem of invisibility. It is about the lack of understanding of the universal meaning of racism and discrimination, in combination with a deliberate blindness, an internalization of suffering and hence little concern about what is detrimental – unless it is extremely harmful and visible at the same time – weak law enforcement, weak regulations, a culture ruled by social norms inherited from colonial times, a culture of transgression, one where all are somehow participants of an archaic theatre performance – even those who claim to be the advocates of democracy – a racism that hides itself, that does not admit that it is what it is, that is customary and cynic.

Racism is visible because these aspects are visible. It is covered with many layers, overdressed. That is why it is more conspicuous. The more suffering, indifference, lack of understanding, colonial-style social norms, habituation, transgression, denial, cynicism, weak regulations and weak law enforcement, the more conspicuous racism becomes. Different authors have given racism in Peru multiple denominations in the last twenty-five years. Yet, most of them agree that racism in Peru today is “undercover” (Callirgos 1993) and that it is a form of discrimination inherited from colonial times (Callirgos 1993, Portocarrero 1993, Manrique 1999, Santos 2003, De la Cadena 2004, Drzewieniecki 2004, Sulmont 2005). U. Montoya (2002) indicates that, nonetheless, the new generations in Peru are renouncing the historically established identity and instead are choosing to portray themselves as heterogeneous subjects who resist “hierarchical opposition, separation and conciliation” (translation mine). Only time and major scientific research will tell whether or not, in fact, this kind of observations are accurate or if phenomena like racism will keep perpetuating, sophisticating, and covering themselves up eternally.

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Dziedzictwo kolonialne w społeczeństwach wieloetnicznych: utajony rasizm w Peru w XXI wieku

Streszczenie

Od początku XVI w. społeczeństwo Peru zostało poddane intensywnemu wymieszaniu pod względem etnicznym i kulturowym. Proces ten obejmował łączenie i godzenie różnorodności, jednakże odsłonił także liczne antagonisty i konflikty, szczególnie widoczne pomiędzy regionami na Wybrzeżu (zwłaszcza w Limie) a Andami. Znacząca pozycja Limy jako ośrodka politycznego i ekonomicznego w okresie kolonialnym spowodowała faworyzowanie ludzi z Wybrzeża, kosztem mieszkańców Andów, głównie autochtonów. Ta dysproporcja utrzymywała się w czasach po odzyskaniu niepodległości, pomimo że w obliczu nieobecności Hiszpanów, Kreole stały się klasą rządzącą. Od początku XX w. ludność z Andów upatrywała szansę poprawy warunków życia dzięki migracji do miast lub na wybrzeże. Mimo że ludność napływowa z Andów oraz ich potomkowie zaczęli z czasem partykularyzować w sprawowaniu władzy, zyskując przy tym równy innym obywatelom status społeczny, nadal byli przedmiotem dyskryminacji rasowej. Razem z Peruwiańczycami o innym pochodzeniu, którzy byli w historii podobnie uznawani za obywateli niższej kategorii, jak np. afro-Peruwiańczycy, postrzegano i znaczano ich jako przynależnych do nieoficjalnej kategorii niebiałych. I chociaż odbywało się to w skomplikowanej i ukrytej formie, społeczeństwo Peru przynosiło tej grupie niższą ocenę, a biali Peruwiańczycy byli oceniani wyżej. Czerpiąc z naukowych badań społecznych nad rasizmem, przeprowadzonych od lat 80. XX w., artykuł stanowi wyjaśnienie, jak rasizm funkcjonuje obecnie wśród Peruwiańczyków jako utajona forma dyskryminacji, oraz dlaczego i w jaki sposób ludzie o wyraźnie europejskich cechach są idealizowani, podczas gdy ci o mniej europejskich cechach są dyskredytowani.

Słowa kluczowe: rasizm, etnocentryzm, nacjonalizm, stosunki międzyetniczne, postkolonializm

Luis Escobedo, mgr
Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (ITESM), Calle Epigmenio González 500, Fracc. San Pablo, 76130 Querétaro, Meksyk
Instytut Studiów Iberyjskich i Iberoamerykańskich, Uniwersytet Warszawski, 00-927 Warszawa, ul. Oboźna 8