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Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
90-131 Łódź, ul. Lindleya 8
www.wydawnictwo.uni.lodz.pl
e-mail: ksiegarnia@uni.lodz.pl
tel. (42) 665 58 63, faks (42) 665 58 62
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THE ACT OF FICTIONAL COMMUNICATION IN A HERMENEUTIC PRAGMATICS

TAHIR WOOD
University of the Western Cape, South Africa
twood@uwc.ac.za

Abstract
This paper is concerned with fictional communication, as the act of an author in relation to a reader. Fictional discourse exhibits certain complexities that are not observable in other forms of discourse. For example, the author's act is mediated for the reader by that set of persons called *characters*. This fact generates a range of relations, firstly the triad of author-reader, author-character, and reader-character. But closer observation reveals that this mediation may be such that it gives way to another, deeper set of relations. At the deepest level one may postulate reader's relation to author's self-relating and author's relation to reader's self-relating. These questions are explored with view to deriving a revisionist notion of pragmatics that is open to agency.

1. Beyond speech act theory: 'Serious' and 'non- serious'

In literary studies, following Barthes (1977) and Foucault (1980), the notion of authorship has been proscribed in favour of studies of pure textuality. But this is not an appropriate step from the point of view of pragmatics, where we are concerned with the nature of the performed *act*, not only the artifact. But pragmatics has not had an especially fruitful relationship with fiction. In speech act theory, for example, literature has been treated as '"not serious" and "not full normal"' use of language (Austin 1975: 104). Speech acts performed by characters in a novel are regarded as non-serious because the characters do not actually exist as people; therefore their utterances cannot meet felicity conditions. Pragmatics has rarely addressed the question of what it is that *authors* are doing, that is, the nature of their performed *acts* in relation to their readers, and how their characters are integral to these acts.

The alternative that will be explored is that of a hermeneutic pragmatics, in which the question of what agents do relative to one another is asked, i.e. what an actor in a given situation is doing *to* or *with* or *for* another. So it is the relation between the two, rather than the action of the one, that is of interest.

It is proposed that in a hermeneutic pragmatics an important emphasis be placed on genre. To begin with, we should be able to distinguish between primary and secondary genres (Bakhtin 1986), so that primary genre can be compared with the notion of speech act, and then secondary genre can be thought of as something beyond speech acts, and having a different sort of normativity.

A genre is considered as a means of achieving a certain range of individual or subjective purposes of communicators in relation to one another. This is seen in the definition of genre by Voloshinov:

> It is in the course of a particular speech interaction, itself generated by a particular kind of social communication, that this utterance, as a unit of speech communication, as a meaningful *entity*, is assembled and acquires a stable form. Each type of communication … organizes the utterance *in its own way*, structures it *in its own way* and completes its grammatical and stylistic form, its *type-structure*, which we shall … call genre. (Voloshinov 1983: 116)

The key words interaction and social communication are important for my purposes. Speech act theory, by contrast, has tended to concern itself rather with an essentially autonomous speaker, with the relationship to the other reduced to the limited notion of 'uptake' and the rather marginal notion of 'perlocutionary' effect. However this state of affairs has not gone uncriticised, for example in the following:

> There is no sharp line between illocutions and perlocutions *at discourse level*; instead their relationship is constantly being negotiated. A text, and most of all a literary text, is always redefining the codes that allow us to understand it, escaping automatism and convention, and therefore redefining the play of illocution and perlocution. Each phase of the sender's utterance has a corresponding activity in the reader if communication or understanding is to take place. The author's speech must be complemented by the reader's interpretive act (Garcia Landa 1992: 99 [emphasis added]).

This admirable statement might be a manifesto for a hermeneutic pragmatics. I have stressed the phrase "at discourse level" because it is here that theory must depart, not only from the micro level of the isolated speech act, but also from the purely normative domain, in order to enter the domain of agency (Wood 2011b). So discourse is taken as implying two distinct things: a larger or more macro level than that of the simple utterance, by which speech acts are usually illustrated; secondly, a shift from the decontextualised and abstract domain into that of actual use.

So when one turns to the secondary genres as encountered in contexts of actual discourse, one needs to pose the question of how these relate in each case to the purposive act of an author in relation to a reader (one *agent* to another), since it is in the nature and functioning of genre that it should provide affordances for such subjective purposes and relationships. Here the problem resembles the one that Searle once formulated as follows: "Literary critics have explained on an ad hoc and particularistic basis how the author conveys a serious speech act through the performance of the pretended speech acts which constitute the work of fiction, but there is as yet no general theory of the mechanisms by which such serious illocutionary intentions are conveyed by pretended illocutions" (1975: 332). My contention is that the problem is framed here in such a way as to preclude a decent solution, because it insists that the author's "serious" purpose must have the character of an "illocutionary intention".

Searle's most serious error lies in his thinking that it is the meaning of words that is mainly at issue in the overall meaning of an author's work. He says that "if the sentences in a work of fiction were used to perform some completely different speech acts from those determined by their literal meaning, they would have to have some other meaning"

(1975: 324). This is an "impossible view", he says, "since if it were true it would be impossible for anyone to understand a work of fiction without learning a new set of meanings for all the words and other elements contained in the work of fiction". We have here a catalogue of errors. Firstly, speech acts *cannot* be determined by the "literal" meanings of the words that make them up; we know that the relationship is much more oblique than that. Two quite different speech acts might use the very same words, while two similar ones may use different words, depending on the context. This is actually a confusion of semantics with pragmatics. Secondly, words outside of their use are polysemous and/or general in their meanings, so that their relationship to the meaning of a sentence is underdetermined. But thirdly, what makes this argument theoretically uninteresting is the extraordinarily flat or non-laminated approach to textual meaning that Searle adopts here. One surely needs to distinguish between layers of meaning, e.g. lexical, contextual, thematic.

Maybe the inadequacy of certain pragmatic theories in relation to fiction reflects a more general inadequacy? Certainly the terms 'locutionary act', 'illocutionary act', and 'perlocutionary act' seem ill-suited to an analysis of the author-reader relationship and the way that it is experienced in fictional communication. On even the most perfunctory reflection it is evident that there are a set of multiple relations that need to be accounted for: reader-character; author-character; author-reader. As a first approximation we might say that the relations between author and reader are mediated by their relations with the characters and by the characters' relations with one another. If even this level of complexity cannot be handled by speech act theory, then it may be that the theory is generally weak and many other complexities of communication have been similarly etiolated by this theory. We should consider this possibility.

Often pragmatic analyses in fiction are confined to the fictional world itself, for example the speech acts that characters perform in relation to one another, the implicature of their reported speech, and so on. But this cannot amount to more than one level of analysis, no matter how deep and intriguing the fictional world may be. A host of questions remain: 'What is the author's purpose in creating such a fictional world?' 'Why are readers interested in such worlds and what makes them actively engage with the many pages of a novel?' 'What sorts of positings are involved in the act of communication, for example author's positing of reader, reader's positing of author?' 'How much of convention is there in a work of fiction (in the way that a speech act is conventional), and how much of a fictional text is a once only *non-recurrent act* of communication'? 'Does an author aspire to change the reader, i.e. to educate, persuade, etc., and are such perlocutionary results of a reading part of an authorial intention that can be formalised?'

Note the extreme formalism of the notion of illocutionary act, whereby terms such as 'act' and 'intention' have been defined, since *How to Do Things with Words*, in such an astringent way as to exclude all specificity of the concrete situation in which intentional acts arise. Act became sundered from its purposes and intended effects; intention itself came to have nothing to do with effects and everything to do with an idealised communicative performance that was presumed to be universal. Let us now begin to consider the alternative.

	a. Memory	**b. Performance**
1. Convention	**1a *Signification***	**1b *Genre***
2. Autopoiesis	**2a *Knowledge***	**2b *Agency***

Table 1: The hermeneutic square

This model introduces the term autopoiesis as counterposed to convention. Autopoiesis refers to the ways in which the self is made and maintained through language and communication, including the development of understanding and self-understanding. Convention refers to those aspects of language and communication that are normative and susceptible to being formulated as *rules*. The vertical columns distinguish between the contents of memory and the performance of acts. The intersection of the rows and columns yields four distinct quadrants, which are briefly explained as follows:

1a. When viewed from the perspective of 1a alone, language comprises an open system with an unstable and quasi-infinite set of potentials for meaning. Language decontextualised in this way is given the name of signification, to link it with its true theoretical foundations, i.e. the Saussurean tradition of linguistics. All forms at this level, lacking a context of application, are subject to polysemy and/or vagueness.

2a. When a speaker begins to speak or an author begins to write, meanings become relatively fixed, as particularised thoughts and ideas, facts, information, relations between actants, and so on. This includes inter alia those forms that are called propositions by philosophers. If 1a is a dictionary, then 2a is an encyclopedia. It is epistemic.

1b. The genre of communication, e.g. the novel, stands as a set of conventions and generic possibilities, which are abstractly shared by reader and author. As I have already suggested, it is in this domain that what are called speech acts are to be considered, as primary genres. Secondary genres, such as sermons or novels, can be thought of as created out of the primary genres, but they are much more difficult to formulate as normative rules than the latter, even though their formal being is similar, that is, having the nature of a norm, convention or type-structure. They are performative in the sense that they are the shapes of language in action. So to deliver a sermon is to perform a different sort of *act* from writing a novel.

2b. In the performance of writing, these generic possibilities are actualised as text, its actual form determined by the interests of readers and purposes of an author. If 1b is generic, then 2b is non-recurrent (Bakhtin 1993) and attributable to a unique agent. A hermeneutic pragmatics must include a focus on 2b, because there can be no true understanding or interpretation that does not focus on the purposive and the unique. Notice the difference from speech act theory: the text is now read as a datum from which to recover the *subjectivities* of those who have shaped it.

2. Intention, purpose, motivation

We should try to determine the meanings of these three terms in a way that can illustrate the nexus between 1b and 2b in the hermeneutic model sketched above. Here is a preliminary attempt.

Beginning with the middle term, purpose, we may define it as a state of affairs that is desired by a participant in communication and to which the communication is somehow oriented by this agent. This purpose has an inner form and an outer form. Its inner form is motivation, that is, the force that impels one towards certain ends, which is not directly observable and may not be fully accessible even to the consciousness of the agent him or herself. The outer form of purpose is intention, which is the socially recognisable nature of the act being performed.

So we have a communicative act performed by an agent relative to another which is unique and non-recurrent insofar as it involves an individually motivated purpose, but if it is understood at all, it will be understood as an intention, that is, as one of a number of communicative acts that are socially defined. These will not all be illocutionary acts. They might involve other sorts of intention, which nevertheless have commonly understood definitions, such as to deceive, to tease, to seduce, to amuse, and so forth. Each of these verbs entails actant *x* acting upon actant *y* towards a state of affairs *z*. Note that the purpose behind these may conceivably remain unrecognised even while the nature of the intentional act is grasped. Thus one may ask a question such as "why did you deceive me?" wherein the intentional act is recognised but not the purpose or the motivation behind it.

A purpose is intimately related to context; it is *this* person's purpose in *this* precise situation, at *this* place and time. It is also intimately related to the motivation of the one who acts, a deep structure of subjectivity, which is other than the recognised intention and may be quite resistant to exact description. That is why there is the possibility of self-deception; one's true purposes can become distorted as soon as they are described and rationalised, as intentions. If the road to hell is paved with good intentions, then it is surely because underlying those intentions there are purposes and motivations that have been obscured or distorted by the very language (and thought) of social intentionality.

Thus the intentions that one has in communication with another are social and conventional, as the speech act theorists have said, but they also reflect individual purposes. So intention is a kind of boundary concept linking 1b and 2b of the model. On the side of 1b it represents an act of a recognisable type, a genre; at the same time it reflects from the side of 2b an agent's unique purpose.

Let us take comedy as an example. On the conventional side we understand that there are genres whose function is to amuse. The amusement of the other is a socially determined constituent of the act. It makes no sense to say that one is telling another a joke without us understanding the nature of a joke in terms of this 'perlocutionary' intent inherent in it. While one can tell jokes for other *purposes* than to amuse someone (for example to earn a living as a comedian), it could never have been the case that the joke-form could have taken shape if there had *never* been an intent to amuse. Thus there is a sort of perlocutionary intent built into the act regardless of whether individual *x* or *y* turns out to be amused on such and such an occasion. The fact that one can be amused

by a badly written proposal, on the other hand, could never mean that the genre of proposal writing was identical with that of joke telling.

If intention is the link between (social) function and (unique) purpose, we still need to show the role of *consequences* in relation to these. If we say that '*x* amused *y*', we focus on a consequence of the action, not necessarily on the intention. If we say that 'x praised y' we focus on the intention and not the consequence. If we say '*x* manipulated *y*' we focus on neither the intention nor the consequence but rather on the purpose (without being specific about it). Thus our common verbs of communicative action are heterogeneous with respect to these concepts. Some of them reflect generic intention (1b of the model), some reflect unique purposes (2b), others reflect consequences and still others combinations of these.

A theory of communicative action cannot, it is true, deal with the matter of consequences as purely empirical outcomes. However, the same should by no means apply to consequences that are either intended or purposed in the act, which are *a part of the structure of the act* itself. We always recognise intentions of actions in relation to their typical consequences and we very frequently hypothesise concerning the purpose underlying an action and the unique consequence at which it is aimed. So to joke with others is an act that has the *typical* consequence of amusing them, but it may have a purpose aimed at a further *unique* consequence, e.g. becoming popular with the others.

This distinction between intentions of a conventional type and unique purposes must be sustained in our discussion of fiction and its authorship.

3. The act of authorship

The following questions may throw light on the authorial act, when considered by a reader.

- What sort of world does the text present, in terms of character, milieu, incident and relation to the actual world of experience?
- What ideas are thematised in the work and how is this achieved?
- What is the relation to other texts, whether literary or non-literary, in terms of style, content and focus?

I suggest that a critical consideration of these questions makes it difficult not to perceive a rhetorical act on the part of the author. 'Rhetorical act' here is one that is aimed at bringing about an effect upon a reader. It implies that the author him/herself is somehow a presence in the text and has a purpose in writing it, that is, beyond the generic intention of simply producing a novel of a certain type. At the same time we need to keep in mind that the act of fiction writing is one in which the author, while ostensibly telling a story about characters whose existence precedes the story, is in actuality creating these characters. Thus the creation of character *is* a relation with a reader.

Now the role of the author as communicator has sometimes been obscured in discussions of the so-called narrator. Following Searle (1975), Ryan (1981) argues on logical grounds that the "speaker" cannot be the author, since "the author does not fulfill the felicity conditions relating to the text", e.g. a commitment to the truth of the events reported in the narration. (1981: 519). Instead a "substitute speaker" must be posited, but this has the drawback that "if the concept of substitute speaker turns out to be

inapplicable in impersonal fiction, the validity of this model will be restricted to the case of personal fiction" (1981: 519).[1] She thus goes on to suggest that in the case of impersonal narratives the reader has no need to ask who the speaker is, but rather regards "him (sic) as an abstract construct deprived of a human dimension" (1981: 519). There are a great many problems with this solution, which I cannot pursue here, one of which is the further logical problem of a speaker (who even has a gender!) who is at the same time an abstract construct and non-human. But putting such problems aside, what concerns me more is rather the reluctance to conceive of the author as the true communicator. This reluctance seems to be entirely at variance with the aims and methodology of pragmatics. Is there no way we can say that the speaker is the author?

Contra Ryan, I propose that the 'voice' or the 'speaker' in fiction is best understood as a "formal and generic mask" (Bakhtin 1988: 161) adopted by the author, and not as a person or being of any kind separate from the author.[2] This mask is rather like the *persona* which a speaker is sometimes said to adopt for different sorts of communicative situation. Let us imagine it this way: that in the case of impersonal fiction what is really happening is that the reader grants a certain poetic licence to an author so as to legitimise this mask or persona, and thereby grants the author the right to speak *as if* he or she is telling a story. It is surprising that pragmatics and speech act theory in particular should supposedly have so much attachment to the felicity conditions of everyday life, yet have difficulty with an example of poetic licence of this kind, which surely amounts to a kind of felicity condition appropriate and unique to fiction.

Notice also that when the narrative is not impersonal in Ryan's sense, but is apparently delivered by a character or characters (typically in the first person), it is not necessary to suppose that the voice of the author is entirely absent in such speech either. Rather we may say that it is refracted into the voices of these characters: "We acutely sense two levels at each moment in the story; one the level of the narrator, a belief system filled with his objects, meanings and emotional expressions, and the other, the level of the author, *who speaks (albeit in a refracted way) by means of this story and through this story"* (Bakhtin 1988: 314 [emphasis added]).

In this way even a narrating character is a mask or persona of the author, in the specific sense that the authorial purpose is being served by speech that is ostensibly the speech of another. Here we come back to our earlier distinction, whereby the author has a generic intention in writing a novel, a genre in which there are characters who speak, but who has an individual purpose, which is ventriloquised, as it were, through the characters' speech. The author "makes use of this verbal give-and-take, this dialogue of languages at every point in his work, in order that he himself might remain as it were neutral with regard to language, a third party in a quarrel between two people (although he might be a *biased* third party)" (Bakhtin 1988: 314). This "making use" is what I have discussed as purpose.

Thus there is a sense in which the voice of the author is ever-present in a work of fiction, regardless of its narrative style.

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[1] By "impersonal fiction" Ryan is making reference to use of the so-called third-person omniscient narrator.

[2] "The novelist stands in need of some essential formal and generic mask that could serve to define the position from which he views life, as well as the position from which he makes that life public" (Bakhtin 1988: 161).

Let us remember here that there could never be a fictional world that was not already dependent on real-world experience for its construction, some of which experience must be shared by reader and author for the work to be intelligible. To forget this would be to obscure the rhetorical purposes that fictional and non-fictional genres sometimes have in common. The role as rhetoric that literature plays among communicators *in the actual world* should not be obscured by an over-emphasis on its purely imaginative dimension, i.e. on its powers of simulation, as important as these are. Let us consider that: "Readers cannot be content merely to construct fictional worlds, as if this in itself were endlessly satisfying; they must also be concerned to evaluate them, to bring them into relation with the larger context of their own experience and understanding." (Walsh 2003: 114)

Similarly, to paraphrase Walsh, one might say that authors cannot merely be content to *create* fictional worlds without evaluating them and bringing them into relation with their own experience and understanding. Therefore it must be that readers sense something of the purpose of the author in the communication. George Orwell once wrote: "When one reads any strongly individual piece of writing, one has the impression of seeing a face somewhere behind the page" (Orwell 1940: no pagination). Bakhtin expresses something similar when he says: "The author's reaction to what he depicts always enters into the image. The author's relationship is a constitutive aspect of the image." (Bakhtin 1986: 115). John Fowles has said with deceptive simplicity that "you are every character you write" (interviewed in Lee-Potter 2003: no pagination).

When Orwell says the following, "every line of serious work that I have written since 1936 has been written, directly or indirectly, *against* totalitarianism and *for* democratic socialism, as I understand it" (Orwell, 1946: no pagination), he is describing how his own image of himself is reflected in the way his characters and their situations are evaluated. Elsewhere (Wood 2011a) I have shown how John Fowles pursues on occasion the same sorts of ideologically-charged rhetoric in his novels (fictional world) as he does in his interviews (actual world).

So fictional worlds serve rhetorical purposes, and these purposes must have a relevance to the actual world. They would not be rhetorical otherwise; they would contribute only to a kind of pointless daydreaming activity.

Fiction in this view then is an externalisation of an author's own subjectivity, whether as a matter of fantasy, sympathy, antipathy or humour. If it were not so, the attempts to develop characters' own subjective life would be hollow and implausible. At the same time we would be at a loss to understand why certain types of characters have an inner life that is made richly available to us as readers and why others are portrayed only externally. Such phenomena reflect an authorial perspective. Žižek says: "The reality I see is never 'whole' – not because a large part of it eludes me, but because it contains a stain, a blind spot, which indicates my inclusion in it" (2009: 17). It is suggested that those characters that are represented only externally have some purpose that renders their inner lives irrelevant to the author; they are outré or they are uninteresting or they are aesthetically repulsive to the author.

The 'intention of the author' is obviously a part of the pragmatics of fiction, as Searle (1975) correctly notes. But if one is to take Searle at his word, intention is only a generic concept; the author's intention would be little more than to write a novel successfully (felicitously one might say). This tells us noting about the specific purpose of *this* author

in writing specifically *this* novel. But, as I have argued, such purposes are part of the act, which could not exist without them.

4. Simulation and mindreading

We cannot conclude this discussion without considering what it is that makes the writing of fiction different from any other genre and why it is that readers read it. It is suggested that the following are the key characteristics of fiction, as opposed *to* all other sorts of narrative:

1. *Penetration of private worlds*. This is an inherently fictional activity, since it presents matters that mostly cannot be known by any kind of author or human narrator concerning actual persons. In fiction there are invariably cases of these non-observables that are presented as fictional disclosures, even if the characters are not entirely fictional. A hypothetical example might be: an author reports 'verbatim' an intimate discussion taking place between Eva Braun and Hitler in the bunker between 1:00 p.m. and 3:30 p.m. on the 30th of April 1945.
2. *Representations of thought processes*. This is a more radical variant on the same principle. Whereas there can be social and ethical constraints on obtaining data about certain intimate actions and events, there are also natural constraints in the case of 'mindreading' (Zunshine 2003). Again the novel can and frequently does present these even more strictly non-observable events as fictional disclosures.
3. *Counterfactuals*. Novels frequently tell a kind of alternative history, where certain historical facts are retained and new ones invented (particularly at a micro level), so that known history becomes viewed in a new light. A relationship of this kind between fact and invention is a necessary constitutive factor in all fiction. It is of course impossible to invent a world consisting of nothing familiar whatsoever, since there would not be (inter alia) a vocabulary adequate to the task.
4. *Implausibility naturalized*. In a novel such as Kurt Vonnegut's *Slaughterhouse 5*, events that would usually be regarded as implausible and fantastic are grafted onto actual events such as the Second World War and the firebombing of Dresden. This is how much, or perhaps all, of science fiction and fantasy, including horror genres, operates, through the combination of the natural with the unnatural or supernatural. This is a radicalisation of the principle of counter-factuality mentioned above.

The author *simulates* in the reader's mind a knowledge of reality, a particularly esoteric form of knowledge, since the author offers to the reader nothing less than radically enhanced powers, such as the power to read another's thoughts. Perhaps it suggests an inverse relationship to actual subjectivity that may be a source of special satisfaction to a reader. Whereas the reader has his or her own secret subjective life that is withheld from the big Other, to borrow a Lacanian term, an 'omniscient narrator' is a linguistic device that puts the reader virtually in the place of the big Other, in the fascinating position of occupying the perspective from which the inner world of another seems to become pleasingly transparent. As this 'quasi-omniscient reader', one is opaque to the big Other oneself, since one's own thoughts are private, but at the same time one can also *be* the big Other in relation to the transparent thoughts of another. Surely the omniscient

narrator of the critics is really nothing other than our desire to be in this position, our willingness to grant the author the licence to put us in this position, and the authors skill in adopting this linguistically created narrative mask or persona that will make it seem that he or she is able to do just that.

So a reader is driven through his or her own wish to insert him/herself into novelistic worlds as spectator and to attain there a kind of *faux* omniscience. But for the reflective reader or critic, I suggest, along with Walsh (2003), what is at stake beyond this must be his or her recognition of the subjectivity of the author, an envisioning of the author's relationship to his or her own self. An author does not simply write to create these revelations for a reader, but also to externalise an aspect of his or her self-relation. What is supremely real then in fiction is not some simple mimetic relation but much more profoundly the subjectivities of author and reader and their mutual engagement through the *simulated* subjectivities of characters. The reader imagines the author's relation to self and the author wishes to somehow affect a reader's relation to self, all of which works through the mediation of a third set of subjectivities, those of the characters.

A final remark on characters: a character in a fictional world is a figure that presents a social milieu to us, no doubt a milieu that has been experienced by the author, or which resembles milieux of the author's experience. That milieu is not likely to be presented to us in anything like an ideal form, but in such a form as to bring out its inherent problems, tensions and conflict, which provide the ground for both character and incident. Without the character the milieu cannot be manifested, except stereotypically; without the milieu the character can be nothing more than an atomistic individual and not a realistic subject. Therefore it is for the reader to determine what sort of problematic relation the posited author (the "face" behind the text of which Orwell speaks) bears towards just that sort of milieu. We need to consider that the author's act is a motivated one, and to consider whether it is not the case that his or her own problematic relationship to society is being presented to us, *as an influence upon us*. So in considering the author's relationship to him or herself, we discern something of the complexity of the author's relationship to us, indeed as a relationship full of potentials for us to reflect on our relations with ourselves. This development of the reader's notion of self may turn out to be part of the author's purpose. In this multiplex web of relations we may discern something of the prodigiously intricate potential of human communication.

5. Closing comments

I have proposed a hermeneutic model for pragmatics, consisting of four distinct components. Two of these I regard as constitutive of pragmatics itself, 1b and 2b, which fall under the heading of performance. I have tried to show that received pragmatics can only constitute a part of one of these two, 1b, that of genre. Even much of what is covered by genre finds no place in received pragmatics, and I have turned to Bakhtin for assistance with some of the remaining aspects. Secondly, there is a whole domain of agency, 2b in the model, which must be regarded as inherently part of any act that is performed. This is no simple matter as I have tried to demonstrate, albeit in a preliminary fashion, with respect to fiction.

An author does not stand entirely outside the work. For us the attraction into the subjective world of a character is first a simulation of invaded privacy, the lure of a simulated mindreading ability and the promise of other normally denied forms of knowledge. But what lies beyond this *faux* omniscience for us is recognition of the subjectivity of the author, an envisioning of the author's relationship to his or her own self, as externalised in fictional character. An author does not simply create revelations for a reader's enjoyment, but also draws the reader into his or her own self-relationship.

By examining fictional literature in this way I make the case for a revisionist pragmatics, a hermeneutic pragmatics, which looks not only for the act of an atomistic individual, but more deeply for the relationship toward another.

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About the author

Tahir Wood is Director of the Academic Planning Unit at the University of the Western Cape, a historically black South African university He obtained his PhD from the University of Cape Town in 1994, supervised by the author and Nobel Laureate, J. M. Coetzee. He has published in the fields of Linguistics, Literature and Education and presented conference papers in the United States, New Zealand, Cuba, Germany, Spain, Italy, Hungary, Portugal, Poland and South Africa. Except for brief periods, he has always lived in Cape Town.

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EPISTEMIC VIGILANCE, CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM AND SOPHISTICATED UNDERSTANDING

MANUEL PADILLA CRUZ
University of Seville
mpadillacruz@us.es

Abstract
Humans have developed a critical alertness to the believability and reliability of communication: *epistemic vigilance* (Sperber et al. 2010). It is responsible for trusting interlocutors and believing interpretations. But what is exactly its role in communication? This paper suggests that epistemic vigilance may trigger shifts from a default processing strategy driven by expectations of optimal relevance to more complex processing strategies. These would be enacted when hearers notice speakers' linguistic mistakes, hearers realise that they have made interpretive mistakes or when hearers discover that speakers seek to mislead them to erroneous or unintended interpretations.

1. Introduction

Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004) puts forward a model of utterance interpretation in which the comprehension module performs several simultaneous tasks. Their result is an interpretation of the utterance, which, if considered to be *optimally relevant*, will be regarded as the speaker's *informative intention* – i.e. the set of assumptions that she intends to make manifest or, in other terms, what she purports to communicate. But in order to think that a particular interpretation is what the speaker intends to communicate, hearers must believe speakers are willing to do so and trust them as both information givers and competent, skilful communicators who make use of the linguistic code in an efficient way. Also, hearers must trust and rely on their own interpretive abilities and capabilities, as they may make interpretive mistakes that might go unnoticed.

When communicating we exchange information that may be true, false, incomplete, ambiguous, tricky, deceptive or presented to us not in the best linguistic form. Humans have developed complex cognitive mechanisms targeted at their sources of information and the content of information that they process. These check speakers' competence and benevolence and the credibility of information. Mascaro and Sperber (2009) and Sperber et al. (2010) argue that such mechanisms make up a mental module, which they label *epistemic vigilance*. This module is, therefore, responsible for one of the perlocutionary effects of communication, namely, whether we end up believing our interlocutors and the information they provide us with (Sperber et al. 2010; Wilson 2011, 2012a, 2012b). It checks both the quality of the information we receive and the individuals who dispense it. As a mental module, it has a very specific domain of operation and works in an

incredibly fast and sub-conscious way. However, if it contributes to the mentioned perlocutionary effect and hence plays a crucial role in communication, it might somehow be related to the comprehension module and affect its tasks.

This paper suggests what that relation between epistemic vigilance and the comprehension module might be and the consequences of its working on the comprehension module. It argues that, as a verifier of the reliability and credibility of both communicators and information exchanged, epistemic vigilance checks, on the one hand, our interlocutors' benevolence and linguistic or pragmatic competence, and, on the other hand, it monitors and surveys the different interpretive steps that we take as hearers, their potential or actual outcomes and the pragmatic material exploited in them in order to test their trustworthiness, usefulness and viability for the process of comprehension. If it discovers that something goes wrong or might go wrong, it is capable of instructing the comprehension module to adopt more complex and effort-demanding processing strategies than the strategy that it might make use of by default, driven by expectations and considerations of optimal relevance. More specifically, this paper proposes that epistemic vigilance is able to make the comprehension module shift from the strategy labelled *naïve optimism* to either *cautious optimism* or *sophisticated understanding* (Sperber 1994). Such shifts would be enacted if epistemic vigilance discovers that (i) our interlocutors are not (very) competent language users, (ii) we make interpretive mistakes at either the explicit or implicit level of communication, and (iii) our interlocutors either do not behave benevolently and intentionally try to deceive us by offering information that cannot or should not be believed or play with us by inducing us to arrive at an interpretation that could be initially accepted and believed, but must be subsequently rejected. In other words, epistemic vigilance might trigger the said processing strategies when it finds out that speakers make expressive mistakes, we make interpretive mistakes or speakers intentionally mislead us or playfully fool us for the sake of achieving effects like humour.

This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises some of the relevance-theoretic postulates on and claims about utterance interpretation and introduces epistemic vigilance. Section 3 describes naïve optimism and argues that it may be the processing strategy that the comprehension module resorts to by default. Then, Section 4 shows that naïve optimism may be abandoned in favour of cautious optimism when epistemic vigilance notices that either the speaker may not have a proper command of language or that the comprehension module may be affected by temporary or permanent pragmatic deficits. Finally, Section 5 argues that the comprehension module may turn to sophisticated understanding when epistemic vigilance detects that the speaker is trying to fool and mislead the hearer to an interpretation that does not correspond to her actual informative intention. It illustrates this by discussing how epistemic vigilance would react to a playful, innocuous, amicable type of deception like jokes.

2. Relevance and epistemic vigilance in comprehension

Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004) is grounded on two general principles based on a tendency of our cognitive mechanism,

which seem to be the result of centuries of continuous evolution in order to achieve greater efficiency of resources. On the one hand, the *Cognitive Principle of Relevance* states that "Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance". On the other hand, the *Communicative Principle of Relevance* claims that "Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance" (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 260).

Relevance theory seeks to solve the problem of why, out of the many possible interpretations that utterances and stretches of discourse may have, all of them compatible with the information linguistically encoded, hearers arrive at one interpretation. It argues that comprehension is relevance-driven and that hearers opt for one particular interpretation and believe it to be the speaker's informative intention on the basis of the expectations of relevance that utterances generate. It defines relevance as a feature of ostensive stimuli like utterances which depends on two factors:

a) The *cognitive effort* that the hearer will have to invest when processing an utterance. This depends on the psychological complexity of utterances or the mental effort required in selecting an appropriate context for interpretation.
b) The *cognitive effects* that the processing of the utterance will yield. These are the benefits the utterance will provide the hearer with, i.e. *strengthening* of previous information, *contradiction* and rejection of old information, or the derivation of new information from the information the utterance makes manifest and the old information the hearer has stored –*contextual implications*.

Expectations of relevance are constant throughout the comprehension process, which involve both decoding and inference. The former is performed by the language module of the brain and its output is a *logical form*, or structured sequence of concepts parsed and grouped into sentential constituents (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 74). But the logical form of an utterance is not fully propositional and hence communicatively useless unless it is pragmatically enriched with contextual information. Such process involves the assignment of reference to certain expressions, the disambiguation of syntactic material, the narrowing or broadening of concepts up to a point in which *ad-hoc*, occasion-specific concepts are built, and free enrichment of non-coded concepts (Carston 2002, 2010).

The result of these tasks is a fully-fledged propositional form, or the basic *explicature* of the utterance. This may be further inserted into a speech-act or propositional-attitude description. If this basic explicature is a *lower-level* explicature of an utterance, such a description is its *higher-level* explicature. The explicature of an utterance may be what the speaker intends to communicate in an explicit way. However, if the hearer has evidence to believe or senses that the speaker might intend to communicate some message implicitly, his expectations of relevance will prompt him to use the explicature as further input for inferential processes with a view to arriving at that implicit content. Then, the hearer will relate it to any other contextual assumptions manifest to him which he feels the speaker intended him to use –*implicated premises*– in order to reach the *implicated conclusion* that she wanted to communicate. Those assumptions make up the *context* for interpretation and are stored in an organised way. Some of them are cultural information or *cultural metarepresentations* (Sperber 1996), while others are grouped in different types of *make-sense* frames (Yus Ramos,

forthcoming a), schemata or scripts in order to capture different aspects of reality, experience, relations etc[1].

All these interpretive processes are not sequential, but happen simultaneously. When carrying them out, hearers normally follow the path requiring the least cognitive effort possible and yielding the highest amount of cognitive benefit. This tendency is known as the *relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure*, and entitles hearers to allocate the minimum processing effort possible when constructing interpretive hypotheses about both the explicit and implicit content of utterances and to stop processing when their expectations of relevance are satisfied, i.e. when they feel that they have obtained some worthy cognitive gain. If the interpretation at which they stop is the least effort-requiring and the most effect-yielding one, that interpretation will be *optimally relevant*. Since comprehension is relevance-driven, once the comprehension module finds an optimally relevant interpretation, the hearer may conclude that such interpretation corresponds to what the speaker intended to communicate.

However, for the hearer to conclude and believe that an optimally relevant interpretation may in fact be what the speaker intended to communicate and expected him to arrive at, the hearer must trust his information sources, i.e. both his interlocutor and the different *contextual sources* he accesses –cultural metarepresentations, make-sense frames, the physical environment, etc. (Yus Ramos 2000)– and rely on the interpretive procedures conducive to that interpretation. Although the hearer arrives at a particular interpretation and finds it optimally relevant, he might realise that such interpretation was unintended because the speaker made some expressive mistake –a slip of the tongue, a pragmalinguistic or a sociopragmatic failure (Thomas 1983)– owing to some temporary or constant pragmatic deficit. Alternatively, the hearer may be uncertain about the plausibility of a particular interpretation because he might have made a mistake at any of those steps and consequently feel that, to a greater or lesser extent, he has misunderstood his interlocutor. Therefore, he must make sure that the different interpretive steps he takes and their outcomes are fool-proof.

Our cognitive mechanism seems to have developed a certain capacity to check whether we can trust and rely on our interlocutors, different information sources and mental procedures. Also the result of evolution and the constant search for maximum efficiency, this capacity is epistemic vigilance (Mascaro and Sperber 2009; Sperber et al. 2010). It consists of a captious alertness to the believability and reliability of communication and the individuals involved in it, which incites hearers to adopt a critical stance towards messages, their senders and how they interpret messages (Sperber et al. 2010: 363). As a mental module, it targets and operates on the domain of the information exchanged in communication, the information used in comprehension and the mental operations performed when processing it. Epistemic vigilance does not oppose to trusting, neither is it some kind of default distrust; it is opposed to blind and naïve trust (Sperber et al. 2010). Therefore, it induces individuals to adopt some form of caption towards others, messages, our own abilities and preferences as interpreters and the interpretations we may reach (Padilla Cruz, in press).

[1] Yus Ramos (forthcoming a) coins the term *make-sense* frame in order to overcome the existing overlapping between terms like 'frame', 'schema' and 'script'. Make-sense frames consist of encyclopaedic information related to specific terms (*word-associated schemas*), actions (*sequence-associated scripts*) and situations (*situation-associated frames*).

Since epistemic vigilance checks the credibility of information and our interlocutors' honesty, it plays a major role in argumentation by testing the internal consistency of assertions and their logical or evidential relations to the contextual information employed to support or disconfirm them (Oswald 2011). Epistemic vigilance mechanisms are also linked to the modality and evidentiality markers that some languages have developed, which activate mental procedures geared to assessing the reliability, honesty and trustworthiness of our communicators and the information that they provide (Unger 2012; Wilson 2012b). As a consequence of its operation, epistemic vigilance may also be crucial in the avoidance of the epistemic injustices that may arise as a result of our interlocutors' perceived temporary or recurrent pragmatic incompetence (Padilla Cruz, forthcoming). If epistemic vigilance evaluates the reliability of information, it may also be postulated to act like some kind of ever-working filter or fault-finding checker of interpretations of any information at every step of comprehension: hypotheses about explicatures, implicated premises needed and implicated conclusions expected or intended. If an interpretation passes through the filters of epistemic vigilance and is found to be believable, reasonable and fault-free, the hearer may take it to be the speaker's informative intention, but, more importantly, he may add up the information that it makes manifest to his personal universe of beliefs (Wilson 2011, 2012a, 2012b).

But what happens if an interpretation does not pass the filters of epistemic vigilance? In other words, what if epistemic vigilance does not find the speaker to be (fully) competent or trustworthy, or, alternatively, if it detects that something could have gone wrong when processing discourse? This is what the following sections discuss.

3. Naïve optimism

In ideal circumstances, when interpreting utterances hearers follow the least effort-demanding and most effect-yielding interpretive path. When they arrive at an interpretation that appears optimally relevant, they stop processing and take it to be their interlocutor's informative intention. Accordingly, the comprehension module could be thought to activate some kind of default processing strategy which would be the easiest, simplest and most straightforward available. Sperber (1994) terms this strategy *naïve optimism*. When individuals resort to it, they behave as naïvely optimistic hearers.

A naïvely optimistic hearer presupposes two fundamental things about his interlocutor:

(i) The speaker is *benevolent*, i.e. trustworthy, and therefore will not seek to deceive him by providing him with false, unreliable or incomplete information.

(ii) The speaker is *competent*, i.e. she has an adequate command of the grammatical rules and the norms of usage of the language with which she communicates, and will attempt to provide information that turns out optimally relevant

Consequently, a naïvely optimistic hearer will follow the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure and will metarepresent his interlocutor's informative intention because he takes for granted the following:

a) The speaker knows the abstract system and the different conventions of meaning and use of the vehicle for communication that she uses.

b) The speaker will try to make manifest her informative intention in the most straightforward way, avoiding ambiguities, vagueness or inaccuracies liable to result in misunderstandings.
c) The speaker, in doing so, will guide the hearer to the intended interpretation in the most efficient way, i.e. the least effort-consuming and most effect-yielding way.

If the speaker is indeed competent and benevolent and does not want to appear otherwise, she will check the following:

a) That the information that she intends to communicate will in fact become optimally relevant to the hearer by producing a satisfactory amount of cognitive effects in exchange of a reasonable amount of cognitive effort.
b) That the communicative strategy with which she conveys her message is appropriate, i.e. that its pragmalinguistic structure, lexical constituents, syntactic organization and any paralinguistic device he resorts to are not misleading.
c) That the hearer will quickly and easily recover the intended interpretation instead of unintended ones which may appear relevant enough.

If all this applies, the chances for communication to succeed and for the hearer to arrive at the intended interpretation are very high. However, and quite regrettably, communication faces plenty of risks and challenges conducive to failure. When processing utterances at the explicit level, the comprehension module might make mistakes by assigning the wrong reference to referential elements, not disambiguating syntactic structures correctly or not making the appropriate conceptual adjustment, for instance. Likewise, at the implicit level of communication the comprehension module might relate utterances to unintended or inappropriate cultural metarepresentations or manifest contextual assumptions, find it hard to access implicated premises crucial for the derivation of implicatures, or activate inaccurate or inappropriate frames.

On the other hand, the speaker, even if benevolent and trying to appear competent, may not behave in a fully competent manner. She may inadvertently make mistakes when formulating her utterances by using wrong referential elements, inadequate lexical items, inappropriate intonation or selecting inadequate pragmalinguistic strategies. These may misguide the hearer when interpreting the explicit content of utterances. Also, speakers may expect hearers to be able to recover some implicit content on the basis of specific cultural metarepresentations, make-sense frames or manifest assumptions, but they may be unaware that those are unavailable or easily accessible to them, or that their contents vary to a greater or lesser extent. If this happens, hearers may reach unintended interpretations.

If epistemic vigilance acts as a monitor of the interpretive routes hearers opt for, and as a verifier of the credibility and reliability of information sources and the content of the information the comprehension module works with, it might detect that the interpretive hypotheses about both the explicit and implicit content of utterances constructed may be erroneous, inaccurate or inappropriate and, therefore, may prevent the hearer from correctly inferring the speaker's informative intention. Consequently, if it notices that an interpretation reached or reachable when following naïve optimism might not be the intended one, epistemic vigilance might trigger a shift of processing strategy. The following sections argue that epistemic vigilance might cause the comprehension module to turn to two more sophisticated processing strategies: *cautious optimism* or *sophisticated understanding* (Sperber 1994).

4. Epistemic vigilance and cautious optimism

Speakers may inadvertently make mistakes when formulating their messages, which might lead hearers to misunderstand them. Needless to say, hearers may also make interpretive mistakes. If such mistakes went unnoticed, a naïvely optimistic hearer might end up arriving at an interpretation, though seeming relevant enough, is unintended. However, epistemic vigilance could detect those mistakes and prompt a shift to cautious optimism (Sperber 1994).

Cautious optimism entitles a hearer to assume that, even though his interlocutor is benevolent and does not seem to be deceptive, her level of competence might be less than appropriate. Consequently, a cautiously optimistic hearer can realise that an interpretation reached on the grounds of a particular linguistic formulation appearing relevant enough might not be the actually intended one. As a consequence of her cognitive abilities and expressive preferences, the speaker may make slips of the tongue or unfortunate stylistic choices that do not guide the hearer to the most easily accessible and least effort-demanding interpretation. On the contrary, these result in undesired interpretations accidentally achieving relevance or desired interpretations accidentally not achieving relevance (Wilson 1999). To overcome these problems, cautious optimism encourages the hearer to engage in further inferential processes that lead him to abandon an infelicitous interpretation that accidentally appears relevant or irrelevant, and to attribute to his interlocutor the intention to communicate another interpretation that he cannot arrive at because of the speaker's momentary or constant incompetence. But that shift to cautious optimism would not take place unless epistemic vigilance alerts the comprehension module to some inconsistency or flaw in the linguistic formulation or to foreseeable undesired consequences.

On many occasions, speakers select linguistic material that misleads hearers when constructing the explicature of an utterance. For instance, they select wrong lexical items to allude to some entities (1), inappropriate gendered forms of personal pronouns to refer back to a particular individual (2) or deictics which fail to correctly locate an object in space (3):

(1) Yes, they are building a new *sky-scratcher* in the city!
(2) And Tom arrived and saw Mary and he said […] and *she* [Tom] was very happy to meet her [Mary].
(3) Give me *this* knife, please!

Epistemic vigilance would warn the comprehension module that the speaker might have unknowingly made a mistake because the resulting interpretation would be at odds with contextual assumptions already manifest, fail to make sense or simply not achieve an optimal level of relevance. Consequently, epistemic vigilance would set cautious optimism in motion, which would encourage the comprehension module to wonder which other lexical item, pro-form or deictic the speaker should have employed, or, alternatively, which referents the speaker would have meant, for the envisaged interpretation to be really optimally relevant.

Epistemic vigilance might also trigger cautious optimism when speakers mispronounce words or have very strong or unfamiliar accents. Mispronunciation or

strong accents may make the comprehension module regard what seems to be a hard-to-understand utterance as irrelevant owing to additional load of cognitive effort and prevent it from understanding it. Thanks to cautious optimism, however, the comprehension module would look for alternatives to incomprehensible words or stretches and strive to make sense out of them. For instance, epistemic vigilance seemed not to be fully operative when a Briton congratulated a Canadian father who was explaining that his son was 'autistic'. Not fully understanding the Canadian father's pronunciation, the Brit took the Canadian's pronunciation of the word 'autistic' to mean 'artistic' –which did not at all make sense in that context, though– hence the misunderstanding. Likewise, epistemic vigilance seemed not to work properly when a British Railway waiter gave 'a Hague' (whisky) to an American Southerner who had intended to order 'an egg' for breakfast but pronunced [ɛɪg] (Wells 1996).

On other occasions, speakers select wrong intonation contours which induce hearers to embed lower-level explicatures under incorrect higher-level explicatures, as intonation has a procedural meaning that guides the construction of the latter (Wharton 2009). This results in *puzzled understanding* (Yus Ramos 1999), a misunderstanding which Tannen (1984) observed, for instance, at a canteen where a foreign waiter used a falling intonation instead of a rising one when offering customers gravy. Customers perceived her offer as impolitely imposing. To avoid the misunderstanding, epistemic vigilance should have alerted the customers' comprehension module to the infelicitous intonation and triggered cautious optimism. As a result, customers would have discarded the undesired order-interpretation and attributed to the waiter the intention to make an offer, though in a somewhat strange manner.

Quite similarly, many non-native speakers transfer inadequate pragmalinguistic strategies from their L1 to make their informative intention manifest. Since these have a specific meaning or value in the L1, they may cause a native hearer turn an intended explicature into an unintended implicature (Yus Ramos 1999). This is what may happen to waiters when dealing with Spaniards learning English, who directly translate the *alerter* and head act frequently employed in Spanish to make an order (4) into English (5). Instead of recovering the request- or order-interpretation, waiters may interpret this sequence as over-imposing, threatening or defiant:

(4) ¡Oiga! Póngame un café
(5) Listen! Put me one coffee / Give me one coffee!

In a case like this, having checked speakers' benevolence, epistemic vigilance would alert the comprehension module to the unfortunate selection of this pragmalinguistic strategy and trigger cautious optimism. Cautious optimism would lead hearers to discard unwanted implicatures of impoliteness or undue imposition and to conclude that the learners' intention was only to order something in a somewhat awkward way because of their low level of competence in the L2.

Although many times individuals' competence as speakers is at stake, other times it is their competence as hearers. Just in the same way speakers' stylistic choices may be unfortunate because of momentary mental limitations or lack of mastery of the linguistic system, hearers may also experience constant or temporary problems when processing utterances. These may result in their reaching unintended interpretations, which they

might unfortunately consider to match their interlocutors' informative intention, as such interpretations accidentally seem relevant enough. As a critical alertness to the reliability of communication, epistemic vigilance would monitor comprehension by keeping track of the choices the language and comprehension modules make and the contextual material the latter resorts to. It would assess the accuracy of the interpretive tasks performed, the believability and suitability of the information employed, the reliability of the interpretive routes taken and the potential plausibility, correctness and relevance of the interpretation selected. Thus, epistemic vigilance might spot flaws and trigger cautious optimism, if it detects that those modules perform inefficiently or ultimately feels that the hearer's competence is momentarily impaired.

At the explicit level of communication, epistemic vigilance can notice that an explicature might be unintended because of errors in reference assignment (6), disambiguation (7, 8) or conceptual adjustment (9). As a result, epistemic vigilance would enact cautious optimism so that the comprehension module searches for alternative referents, parses ambiguous syntax differently or narrows or broadens concepts as expected:

(6) Leave it there! (*there* = on the table? on the shelf?)
(7) John saw the man with the red glasses. (John saw [the man with the red glasses]]/[John saw [the man] [with the red glasses]]?)
(8) They are hunting dogs. ([They are hunting [dogs]]/[They are [hunting dogs]]?)
(9) Martha cut the tree. (Martha *CUT the tree [an *ad-hoc* concept referring to a particular type of cutting –with a saw instead of with scissors, for instance])

Epistemic vigilance can also detect that a belief the hearer holds (10) may induce him to build an erroneous higher-level explicature and misinterpret the illocutionary force of an utterance –for instance, as a criticism or sarcasm instead of as praise or compliment (11):

(10) Peter disapproves of women wearing mini-skirts to attend religious services.
(11) Oh, cute skirt! ([Context: right before a religious service] irony, sarcasm, implicit criticism, complaint…?)

Upon detecting that the interpretation reachable on the grounds of that belief might conflict with, for example, manifest contextual elements like paralanguage (gestures, face-expression, etc.), epistemic vigilance would instruct the comprehension module to enact cautious optimism in order to revise the belief entertained and, if necessary, entertain another which makes it possible to arrive at another interpretation that achieves an optimal level of relevance and turns out to be more consistent with what is perceived.

At the implicit level of communication, epistemic vigilance can also alert the comprehension module that an implicature (14) might be unintended because the comprehension module unnecessarily took the explicature of an utterance (12) as input to further inferential processes, in which it was related to unwarranted implicated premises (13):

[*Context*: two friends strolling aimlessly down the street, without a clear direction]
(12) It is 20.20! (intended as a phatic remark)
(13) a. Shops close at 20.30. b. Speaker might want to buy something
(14) We should hurry up!

Cautious optimism being triggered, the comprehension module would discard such implicated premises and backtrack to the explicit interpretation of the utterance.

Quite similarly, epistemic vigilance can also find an initial explicit interpretation (16) of an utterance (15) not to be optimally relevant and feel that the speaker might have intended to convey some implicit content. Since the comprehension module has initially failed to arrive at it, cautious optimism aids in helping the hearer search for the necessary implicated premises (17) that yield such implicit content (18):

[*Context*: Mary's birthday is approaching. Mary and Peter are window-shopping]
(15) *Mary*: Isn't that mobile cute? I love it! It must be fab!
(16) Mary loves that mobile.
(17) a. Mary's birthday is approaching.
b. Mary loves technology gadgets.
c. A mobile is an excellent birthday present.
(18) Mary might be suggesting that he would love a new mobile as a birthday present.

Finally, epistemic vigilance could also sense that an implicature that the comprehension module arrives at differs from what the speaker could have wanted to convey –i.e. is an *alternative* implicature (Yus Ramos 1999)– because the comprehension module has relied on cultural or contextual assumptions different from those that the speaker might have expected the hearer to resort to. Cross-cultural encounters attest this type of misunderstanding. For instance, Reynolds (1995) reports that Finnish students were surprised and even bothered by their British mates' small talk in some situations. Having perceived their benevolence, epistemic vigilance should have triggered cautious optimism so that the Finnish students would have discarded cultural assumptions referring to the inconvenience of small talk in those situations and have processed it against other assumptions. This would have led them to a more plausible, optimally relevant interpretation of that conversational behaviour.

5. Epistemic vigilance and sophisticated understanding

Communication is an ostensive-inferential activity in which the speaker draws the hearer's attention because she has an informative intention (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995). The hearer must infer that intention from utterances, which are indirect, more or less reliable, evidence of what the speaker intends to communicate. However, on many occasions, and for many reasons, an utterance is unreliable because the speaker does not actually have the informative intention that she appears to have, but some hidden intention. Thus, instead of behaving benevolently and sincerely, and so choosing the ostensive stimulus that most directly guides the hearer to her informative intention with the least effort, the speaker may behave malevolently or deceptively and select stimuli that make the hearer attribute to her an informative intention that differs from her actual one.

Communication also presupposes a *communicative intention* that triggers the hearer's search for the speaker's informative intention. When hearers take for granted that speakers are benevolent and competent, they may think that an interpretation that they reach and find optimally relevant corresponds to the speakers' informative intention.

Therefore, hearers need not worry about the existence of alternative interpretations, which speakers might have purported to communicate. If hearers assume that speakers, though benevolent, are not (fully) competent, they ought to conclude that the speakers' intention may be to communicate another interpretation and not one that only seems relevant and does not correspond to their real informative intention. If hearers feel that their own interpretive skills are impaired, they must deduce that they might not have reached the intended, optimally relevant interpretation. In these two scenarios, epistemic vigilance would alert to speakers' or hearers' incompetence and trigger cautious optimism, as a consequence of which the comprehension module would continue processing and search for more plausible interpretations. Cautious optimism triggered, hearers can question the outcomes of interpretive tasks, distrust some beliefs they could have held and wonder which other informative intention their interlocutors might have but fail to make manifest in the most efficient way or they themselves fail to infer. Consequently, hearers can attribute different beliefs and intentions to their interlocutors, who failed to be optimally relevant even though they attempted to be, or which they unfortunately were unable to perceive.

Finally, when epistemic vigilance cautions the comprehension module that the speaker is competent but is not behaving benevolently, it would enact an even more complex processing strategy: sophisticated understanding (Sperber 1994). When following this strategy, a hearer is capable of inferring another interpretation that would indeed have been optimally relevant but which, for whatever reason, the speaker refrains from transmitting or prevents the hearer from reaching in the easiest way. As Wilson (1999: 138) explains, a sophisticated hearer uses his metarepresentational abilities in order to face utterances wherewith his interlocutor only tries to communicate an interpretation that seems to be relevant but is not the actually intended one. Consequently, a sophisticated hearer does not stop his processing at the first interpretation that he finds optimally relevant, or at the interpretation that he considers the speaker might have expected to appear optimally relevant.

Epistemic vigilance could detect (i) that the speaker attempts to bias the hearer to some parsing, disambiguation, reference assignment or conceptual adjustment that would prevent him from reaching a certain envisaged interpretation which would have achieved optimal relevance, (ii) that the speaker guides the hearer to use implicated premises or to activate mental frames unsuitable for reaching a real interpretation, or (iii) that the comprehension module needs other contextual information in order to infer that interpretation. Therefore, it would trigger sophisticated understanding so that the comprehension module revises or continues its interpretive task until it deduces the interpretation which the speaker avoids communicating in the most direct and effort-saving way. Epistemic vigilance would be able to realise the existence of alternative parsings, disambiguation, reference assignment, conceptual adjustment, implicated premises or mental frames conducive to the interpretation that the speaker attempts to prevent the hearer from reaching. Thus, it would prompt the comprehension module not to regard a first interpretation appearing optimally relevant as the speaker's informative intention, but as incorrect and misleading. On the contrary, upon detecting the feasibility of other interpretive routes and outcomes of interpretive tasks, epistemic vigilance would instruct the comprehension module to search for another interpretation which the speaker, for some reason, refrains from communicating. To do so, the comprehension

module would follow the path it senses will require the least effort and will yield the highest amount of cognitive benefits.

Epistemic vigilance appears essential in exchanges in which speakers intentionally seek or seem to deceive hearers, i.e. in cases in which hearers are led to entertain, and ultimately believe, an interpretation that does not correspond to the speaker's real informative intention. Indeed, the speaker does her best to mislead the hearer by making an unintended interpretation appear very easily accessible, costless, plausible and, therefore, optimally relevant. However, that interpretation is not the one that the hearer should infer. In addition to lies, this happens, for instance, in some types of humour, like jokes.

When telling jokes, speakers move to a *non-bona-fide* mode of communication (Raskin 1985; Attardo 1990, 1993) or to a humorous frame (Yamaguchi 1988), sometimes explicitly indicated by linguistic markers. They play with language, hearers' interpretive capabilities and the likelihood that some interpretations become more or less salient in order to deceive hearers (Yus Ramos 2008: 133). Jokers do not deceive their audience by lying, but by fooling them or pulling their leg[2]. Jokers intentionally mislead hearers to some interpretation, try to make them reach it, consider it optimally relevant and ultimately believe it to be the intended one. But hearers must realise that they are being or have been misguided, backtrack and reinterpret the text (McGhee 1972; Attardo 1993: 551). Thus, they can discard a (literal) bona-fide interpretation, which they probably infer following naïve optimism[3]. As Attardo (1993: 550) puts it, the joker tries to "[…] actually 'fool' his/her [audience] into believing that 'normal' bona-fide text will follow, only to deceive his/her audience, and deliver instead the unexpected punch line"[4].

Reaching the authentic interpretation requires in many cases more effort-demanding interpretive routes, which the joker favours, maybe with the tacit promise of an increase in humorous effects which could not be achieved otherwise (Yus Ramos 2003: 1298-1299). Jokers can intentionally mislead or fool the audience, firstly, because they exploit the pragmatic ambivalence of utterances, which may potentially have a variety of interpretations, all of which compatible with the information linguistically encoded. Jokers are aware that the hearers' comprehension module will not access or juggle with all of them at the same time, as some may be more salient and difficult to put down in a particular context (Peleg et al. 2008), while others look costlier. The hearer will select one interpretation and exclude competing ones on the basis of considerations of cognitive effort and reward (Wilson 1993; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004).

Secondly, jokers can mislead hearers because, so to say, they can read hearers' minds. Jokers can predict to some extent which cognitive operations their

[2] This seems crucial for jokes to fulfil some social functions like decommitment and group identification (Attardo 1993: 554-556). However, this does not operate in subversive humour, where humourists make fun of established norms, rules, practices, etc. in some contexts, like the workplace (Schnurr and Rowe 2008) or schools (Norrick and Klein 2008).

[3] Raskin (1985), Attardo (1990, 1993) and Raskin and Attardo (1994) have accounted for the interpretation of jokes on the basis of the Gricean Cooperative Principle and its maxims. Since Relevance Theory goes well beyond them and rejects their existence, no further explanation of jokes along them will be done.

[4] For a slightly different proposal, see Dynel (2008: 174-176).

comprehension module might perform, which contextual information it will access, which inferential routes it might follow and potential outcomes of those operations (Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004). Hence, jokers rely on their mind-reading ability and "[…] predict that certain stimuli will be more relevant than others and that certain assumptions will inevitably be entertained by their audience during comprehension" (Yus Ramos 2008: 140). Accordingly, in many cases jokers devise jokes in such a way that the audience uses initial and next fragments as an interpretive context against which to process subsequent information (Yus Ramos 2008: 140). They manipulate this context so that the audience is made believe that the joke –or some fragment(s)– has a first –or several– highly salient and easily accessible, but wrong, interpretation(s) –the *multiple-graded-interpretation (MGI) part of the joke*, as Yus Ramos (2003: 1309) labels it. Nevertheless, the following fragment has a single interpretation which surprises or shocks the audience –the *single-covert-interpretation (SCI) part of the joke* (Yus Ramos 2003: 1309)– because of its incongruity with the initial or preceding fragment. The hearer is surreptitiously led to entertain an incorrect interpretation in the MGI part of the joke, so what triggers humour is "The resolution of the incongruity, by finding one overall coherent sense of the whole text, together with the realization of having been fooled into selecting specific interpretation […]" (Yus Ramos 2003: 1309)[5]. The resolution of the incongruity depends on some kind of cognitive rule which reconciles the incongruous part of the joke (Suls 1972). Such rule can be "[…] semantic, logical, or experiential […]" and "[…] is identified through a problem solving activity" (Forabosco 2008: 47). It involves "[…] an element of sense, a *criterion* which renders the stimulus cognitively acceptable" (Forabosco 2008: 49)[6]. Upon realising that the comprehension module has been or is being fooled, epistemic vigilance would contribute to the resolution of incongruities by enacting sophisticated understanding and discovering such a rule or criterion.

Since jokers can predict how hearers might process jokes and are aware of possible ambiguities of linguistic structures, salient information, etc., they try to create humour by manipulating hearers' interpretive steps at both the explicit and implicit level of communication (Yus Ramos 2008). As regards the explicit level of communication, jokers try to fool their audience at the different stages of comprehension, from the identification of the logical form, to reference assignment, disambiguation, conceptual adjustment or the construction of higher-level explicatures. Consider firstly the identification of logical forms. Many humourists bias their audience to a specific ascription of meaning or to an initial syntactic parsing, which must be subsequently invalidated to achieve humorous effects (Yus Ramos 2008: 145-146). This can be seen in jokes (19) and (20):

(19) Why did the blonde take a ladder into the bar? She heard the drinks were on the house.

[5] Yus Ramos' (2003) account of jokes is in line with Suls' (1972) *incongruity-resolution* model and other related proposals (e.g. Forabosco 1992; Attardo 1994, 1997). For criticism, see Forabosco (2008: 55-57).

[6] Suls (1983) concluded that, while some types humour may rely on the perception and resolution of incongruities, other types may only rely on their perception.

(20) The blonde walks into a drugstore and asks the pharmacist for some bottom deodorant. The pharmacist, a little bemused, explains to the woman that they don't sell anything called 'bottom deodorant', and never have. Unfazed, the blonde assures him that she has been buying the stuff from this store on a regular basis, and would like some more. "I'm sorry," says the pharmacist, "we don't have any." "But I always get it here," says the blonde. "Do you have the container it comes in?" "Yes!", says the blonde, "I will go and get it." She returns with the container and hands it to the pharmacist, who looks at it and says to her, "This is just a normal stick of underarm deodorant." The annoyed blonde snatches the container back and reads out loud from the container: "To apply, push up bottom."

In (19) the joker makes the audience firstly regard as optimally relevant the likely, very salient, but eventually incorrect, interpretation "the house will pay for the drinks". However, the correct interpretation is "drinks are located on top of the house". Epistemic vigilance must detect that such initial ascription of meaning to the phrase "drinks were on the house" is unviable and make the language module backtrack so as to realise that a different, locative meaning for the expression "were on the house", which did not initially achieve optimal relevance, can be more viable. Although this backtracking involves some cognitive effort, this is offset by additional cognitive effects, such as realisation of having been fooled, which would be responsible for potential humorous effects in that somewhat strange context of a blonde going to a bar with her ladder. In (20), apart from the ambiguity of the word 'bottom', the joker plays with two possible ways of parsing the string "push up bottom" –[push up] [bottom] vs. [push] [up bottom]– making the former very salient in that scenario. However, for humour to arise, epistemic vigilance should alert the comprehension module that such parsing, even if grammatically expectable, is inadequate. This would activate sophisticated understanding, which would result in the comprehension module considering the other parsing as necessary to grasp the humour in this situation.

Jokers also exploit the way they think the audience will assign reference to some pro-forms (Yus Ramos 2008: 146), as in (21) and (22):

(21) Said the Buddhist to the hotdog vendor: "Make me one with everything."

(22) A husband and wife came for counselling after 20 years of marriage. When asked what the problem was, the wife went into a passionate, painful tirade listing every problem they had ever had in the 20 years they had been married. She went on and on and on: neglect, lack of intimacy, emptiness, loneliness, feeling unloved and unlovable, an entire laundry list of unmet needs she had endured over the course of their marriage. Finally, after allowing this to go on for a sufficient length of time, the therapist got up, walked around the desk and, after asking the wife to stand, embraced and kissed her passionately as her husband watched with a raised eyebrow. The woman shut up and quietly sat down as though in a daze. The therapist turned to the husband and said, "This is what your wife needs at least three times a week. Can you do this?" The husband thought for a moment and replied, "Well, I can drop her off here on Mondays and Wednesdays, but on Fridays, I fish."

In (21) the joker makes the Buddhist echo Dalai Lama's famous motto, but with evidently different meaning and overtones. For humour to arise, epistemic vigilance must alert the comprehension module to the different referential candidates for 'one' ('hotdog' vs. 'oneself') and 'everything' ("all the toppings, ingredients" vs. "the

universe"). Probably, the easiest way of assigning reference to the Buddhist's words is "make me one hotdog with all the toppings", but humour might reside in the absurd possibility that the Buddhist is asking the vendor to enlighten him by "making him one being with all the toppings that the vendor has in his stall". Having noticed the unsuitability of such reference assignment for the achievement of humour, epistemic vigilance would instruct the comprehension module to activate sophisticated understanding in order to assign reference in the way in which the joker would have prevented the hearer from making. Quite similarly, (22) plays with different referential candidates for "do this". While the joker seems to guide the audience to take it to refer to the husband embracing and kissing the wife passionately, epistemic vigilance must discover that the joker did not actually intend that highly salient referent. Upon cautioning the comprehension module about its unlikelihood, sophisticated understanding must be enacted in order to access another covert referent: the husband taking his wife to the therapist for the therapist himself to embrace and kiss her passionately, not the husband.

Senses of words or phrases are also manipulated by jokers to produce humorous effects (Yus Ramos 2008: 146-149), as in (23-25):

(23) *Question*: Why did the bald man paint rabbits on his head? *Answer*: Because from a distance they looked like hares!

(24) "Please remove your blouse and bra," says the doctor to the young blonde, placing his stethoscope around his neck. When she is ready, the doc says, "Big breaths." "Yeth," she replies, "and I'm only thixthteen!"

(25) *Question*: What can a goose do, that a duck can't do and a lawyer should do? *Answer*: Stick his bill up his ass.

In (23) the humourist plays with the homophony between 'hares' and 'hairs', in (24) with 'breaths' resembling 'breasts' when pronounced with lisping, and in (25) with 'bill' being polysemous ('beak' vs. 'invoice'). The audience may be initially led to interpret these words as having a primary sense in those contexts, but epistemic vigilance must alert the comprehension module to the incorrectness of their disambiguation of sense so that it considers alternative senses on the assumption that there will be a humorous reward. Consequently, the comprehension module will engage in sophisticated understanding in order to track the intended sense that the joker might have envisaged in order to produce humour.

Other jokes depend on the conceptual adjustment –narrowing or broadening– which the audience makes, as they contain metaphors (Yus Ramos 2008: 149-150):

(26) A large, powerfully-built guy meets a woman at a bar. After a number of drinks, they agree to go back to his place. As they are making out in the bedroom, he stands up and starts to undress. After he takes his shirt off, he flexes his muscular arms and says, "See that, baby? That's 1000 pounds of dynamite!" She begins to drool. The man drops his pants, strikes a bodybuilder's pose, and says, referring to his bulging thighs, "See those, baby? That's 1000 pounds of dynamite!" She is aching for action at this point. Finally, he drops his underpants, and after a quick glance, she grabs her purse and runs screaming to the front door. He catches her before she is able to leave and asks, "Why are you in such a hurry to go?" She replies, "With 2000 pounds of dynamite and such a short fuse, I was afraid you were about to blow!"

(27) A little boy says: "Daddy, how was I born?" Dad says: "Ah, my son. I guess one day you will need to find out anyway! Well, you see, your Mom and I first got together in a chat room on MSN. Then I set up a date via e-mail with your mom and we met at a cyber-cafe. We sneaked into a secluded room, where your mother agreed to a download from my hard drive. As soon as I was ready to upload, we discovered that neither one of us had used a firewall, and since it was too late to hit the delete button, nine months later a blessed popup appeared and said: 'You've Got Male!'"

The role of epistemic vigilance when processing these jokes would be to check that the comprehension module adjusts the meaning of words like 'dynamite', 'fuse' and 'blow' in (26), and 'download', 'hard drive', 'upload', 'firewall', etc. in (27) as the joker would have envisaged. If it feels that this has not been correctly done, it would prompt the comprehension module to engage in sophisticated understanding in order to broaden them in such a way that the properties stereotypically associated with 'dynamite' and 'fuse' can also be extended to the powerfully-built guy's anatomy or those of 'download', 'hard drive', 'upload', 'firewall', etc. can be applied to the description of the undesired pregnancy.

Finally, other jokes achieve humour because the audience is led to think that some of the characters in them would construct specific higher-level explicatures for some utterances (Yus Ramos 2008: 150-151). For instance, in (28) the audience is guided to believe that the higher-level explicature that the guy would construct for "Take that sheep to the zoo" amounts to command or order:

(28) A guy found a sheep and showed him to a policeman. The policeman said, "Take that sheep to the zoo, now." Next day the policeman sees the man with the sheep again. The policeman stops the guy and says, "What on earth are you doing with that sheep?" The guy says, "What is there to do? Yesterday I took him to the zoo and now I'm taking him to the movies."

Epistemic vigilance must discover that the higher-level explicature that the character is thought to construct is not the one that the character actually constructs. Hence, it must instruct the comprehension module to consider an alternative hypothesis about the higher-level explicature, which, for this joke to be funny, would be one of advice or suggestion.

Regarding the implicit level of communication, many jokes achieve humorous effects as a consequence of a clash between explicit information contained in the joke and the beliefs that the audience is led to retrieve or construct (Curcó 1995, 1996), the initial use of inappropriate or incorrect implicated premises that must be subsequently invalidated (Yus Ramos 2003, 2008) or the activation of cultural or make-sense frames that must be later on discarded (Yus Ramos, forthcoming a). The explicit content of some jokes makes some *target* assumptions –as Curcó (1995, 1996) terms them– strongly manifest, but these turn out inappropriate or incorrect to grasp the humour. Epistemic vigilance would detect this and trigger sophisticated understanding, as a result of which the comprehension module would search for (an)other *key* assumption(s) which the joker intended not to make easily or straightforwardly accessible at the beginning of the joke. This happens in the following jokes:

(29) Mom and Dad were trying to console Susie, whose dog had recently died. "You know," Mom said, "it's not your fault that the dog died. He's probably up in heaven right now, having a grand old time with God." Susie, still crying, said, "What would God want with a dead dog?"

(30) Two blondes are waiting at a bus stop. When a bus pulls up and opens the door, one of the blondes leans inside and asks the bus driver: "Will this bus take me to 5th Avenue?" The bus driver shakes his head and says, "No, I'm sorry." At this the other blonde leans inside, smiles, and twitters: "Will it take ME?"

(29) makes strongly manifest the target assumption that dead dogs might have a grand time in heaven. Epistemic vigilance must discard it in favour of the key assumption that dead dogs cannot have a grand time there precisely because they are dead. In turn, in (30) the audience is initially led to entertain and believe an assumption such as that the bus is not going to 5th Avenue. However, epistemic vigilance must discover its incorrectness so that the comprehension module accesses another contextual assumption, such as that the second blonde believes the bus driver not to be willing to take her friend but might want to take her there.

In addition to the assumptions that the joke makes manifest, many jokes require for the audience to look for implicated premises that yield implicated conclusions in which humour resides (Yus Ramos 2008: 152-153). The role of epistemic vigilance in these jokes would precisely be to alert the comprehension module of the unsuitability of the explicit interpretation reachable for achieving humorous effects and to trigger sophisticated understanding so that the comprehension module expands the initial context by incorporating the necessary implicated premises to understand the joke and its humour. Accordingly, enacting sophisticated understanding when processing (31) and (33) would make it possible for the audience to access the implicated premises in (32 a, b) and (34 a, b, c), which would yield the implicated conclusions (32 c) and (34 d), respectively:

(31) Little Nancy was in the garden filling in a hole when her neighbour peered over the fence. Interested in what the little girl was up to, he politely asked, "What are you up to there, Nancy?" "My goldfish died," replied Nancy tearfully, without looking up, "and I've just buried him." The neighbour was concerned, "That's an awfully big hole for a goldfish, isn't it?" Nancy patted down the last heap of earth and then replied, "That's because he's inside your stupid cat."

(32) a. The girl has killed the cat.
b. A girl who can kill a cat is cruel and remorseless.
c. Little Nancy is cruel and remorseless.

(33) There were four country churches in a small Texas town: The Presbyterian Church, the Baptist Church, the Methodist Church and the Catholic Church. Each church was overrun with pesky squirrels. One day, the Presbyterian Church called a meeting to decide what to do about the squirrels. After much prayer and consideration they determined that the squirrels were predestined to be there and they shouldn`t interfere with God's divine will. In the Baptist Church the squirrels had taken up habitation in the baptistery. The deacons met and decided to put a cover on the baptistery and drown the squirrels in it. The squirrels escaped somehow and there were twice as many there the next week. The Methodist Church got together and decided that they were not in a position to harm any of God's creation. So, they humanely trapped the Squirrels and set them free a few miles

outside of town. Three days later, the squirrels were back. But… The Catholic Church came up with the best and most effective solution. They baptized the squirrels and registered them as members of the church. Now they only see them on Christmas and Easter.

(34) a. Catholics are not (supposed to be) very committed believers.
b. Stereotypical uncommitted Catholics very rarely go to church.
c. Stereotypical uncommitted Catholics (are said to) only go to church on special occasions.
d. The squirrels behaved as stereotypical Catholics.

Finally, in many jokes humourists play with the initial activation of cultural and make-sense frames (Yus Ramos, forthcoming a), which subsequently prove to be inappropriate, so that the comprehension module has to abandon them in favour of other more specific frames[7]. Consider (35) and (36):

(35) An old lady sits on her front porch, rocking away the last days of her long life, when all of a sudden, a fairy godmother appears and informs her that she will be granted three wishes. "Well, now," says the old lady, "I guess I would like to be really rich." *** POOF *** Her rocking chair turns to solid gold. "And, gee, I guess I wouldn't mind being a young, beautiful princess." *** POOF *** She turns into a beautiful young woman. "Your third wish?" asks the fairy godmother. Just then the old woman's cat wanders across the porch in front of them. "Ooh, can you change him into a handsome prince?" she asks. *** POOF *** There before her stands a young man more handsome than anyone could possibly imagine. She stares at him, smitten. With a smile that makes her knees weak, he saunters across the porch and whispers in her ear, "Bet you're sorry you had me neutered."

(36) John and Bob were inseparable childhood friends. One night, they both died in a terrible car accident. When John woke up in heaven, he began to search for Bob but could not find him anywhere. Very distraught, he ran to St. Peter and said, "St. Peter, I know Bob was killed in that accident with me, but I can't find him!" St. Peter said, "My son, I am sorry to tell you Bob didn't make it to Heaven." This upset John so much that St. Peter agreed to let him see Bob one more time. St. Peter parted the clouds and John saw Bob sitting in hell with a keg on one side and a beautiful buxom blonde on the other. John looked at St. Peter sceptically and said, "Are you sure I'm in the right place?" "My son," St. Peter said, "looks can be deceiving. You see that keg of beer? It has a hole in it. You see that woman? She doesn't!"

In (35) the audience is guided to initially activate a cultural frame related to nice old ladies calmly and quietly living their last days at home and fairy godmothers granting wishes. They also have to activate the make-sense frame of the old lady wanting a handsome prince in order to have sex. Epistemic vigilance would check that the latter frame, even if potentially valid, must be rejected at the end of the joke because the cat changed into a prince had been neutered. Therefore, epistemic vigilance would have to

[7] Yus Ramos (forthcoming a) classifies of jokes depending on whether they target at utterance interpretation processes –logical forms, disambiguation, etc.– or the activation of cultural or make-sense frames in what he labels the *Intersecting Circles Model*. Humorous effects are argued to arise as a consequence of manipulating one or a combination of them. Due to space limitations, this discussion will only deal with two examples.

instruct the comprehension module to activate a quite different frame, for instance, one about old ladies eager for sexual intercourse with handsome guys and disappointment at being unable to have it. On the other hand, in (36) the audience is induced to activate a religious cultural frame in which good guys go to heaven and bad guys to hell. Such frame can be questioned when another make-sense frame related to kegs of beer and beautiful women is activated. This contradicts what souls are supposed to enjoy in heaven and hell. The contradiction between both frames is solved at the end of the joke, where the pun on 'holes' appears. As a consequence, epistemic vigilance must discover that the comprehension module was fooled into activating that initial make-sense frame and must hence discard it. Hence, epistemic vigilance must prompt the comprehension module to activate an alternative frame about tricky kegs of beer and deceptive appearances.

6. Conclusion

Understanding utterances is a relevance-driven activity in which the language and comprehension module rely on the linguistic evidence provided and contextual information in order to perform a series of tasks whose result is an interpretation. For the hearer to finally believe that interpretation, he must be certain that it was the interpretation that the speaker actually intended, that the speaker is a trustworthy, reliable and skilled communicator and that he did not make any interpretive mistake. Epistemic vigilance can be seen as a surveillance mechanism playing an essential role in giving credit to our interlocutors, the information that they dispense, how they communicate it, how we process it and which other information we make use when processing it. As such, it would not enter the scene after the final product of comprehension –the interpretation– is reached; rather, it would be operative at every task which the comprehension module performs. Therefore, epistemic vigilance should not be conceived of as a module performing a final test on interpretations, but as an independent module working as comprehension proceeds.

In spite of its independence, its working affects the working of the comprehension module. If epistemic vigilance finds out that speakers make unfortunate linguistic choices which prevent hearers from reaching the intended interpretation, that the language or comprehension modules make mistakes or that speakers seek to mislead or deceive hearers, it instructs the comprehension module to enact cautious optimism or sophisticated understanding. The former enables hearers to overcome expressive and interpretive mistakes by means of a first-order metarepresentation of speakers' informative intention (Wilson 1999) or by searching for more suitable explicatures and implicatures. As a result, hearers can conclude that speakers were mistaken when saying what they said in the way they did or that they misunderstood their interlocutors. Thus, cautious optimism enables hearers to discard accidentally relevant or irrelevant unintended interpretations. As a consequence of the latter, hearers can overcome deception or grasp humorous effects thanks to second-, third- or fourth-order metarepresentations (Curcó 1995, 1996; Wilson 1999), from which they can conclude that speakers are lying, trying to convince them of something contradictory or are humorous. Thus, sophisticated understanding makes it possible for hearers to discard

interpretations which speakers attempt to present as optimally relevant and believable, but are not actually the real, believable interpretations or those necessary to achieve effects like humour.

Sperber (1994) and Wilson (1999) described these two processing strategies, but they did not explain why the comprehension module opts for one or the other. This paper has suggested that the enactment of either strategy follows as a consequence of epistemic vigilance and the search for optimal relevance. It has illustrated this by means of specific cases of misunderstandings and jokes. The same argument could be extended to other relatively similar phenomena, for example, to puns (e.g. Tanaka 1992), with which the communicator misguides the audience to highly salient, maybe equally accessible, interpretations, but intends the audience to reach one interpretation, and also to those interpretations that radically differ from the explicit content, as in some innovative ironies (Yus Ramos, personal communication). In these, the explicit interpretation clashes with contextual information. Upon noticing that the speaker might have intended an interpretation of these utterances despite such clash, epistemic vigilance would prompt the comprehension module to search for a more implicit (i.e. ironic) interpretation (Yus Ramos 2012, forthcoming b). A more detailed analysis of these phenomena should be the subject for future work.

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About the author

Manuel Padilla Cruz received his Ph.D. in English Linguistics from the University of Seville, where he currently teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in pragmatics, ESL, and sociolinguistics. His research interests and publications focus on cognitive pragmatics (Relevance Theory) and social pragmatics (politeness theory). He is a member of the research group "Intercultural Studies (English-Spanish): Pragmatic and Discourse Issues", has authored four manuals and co-edited three linguistics volumes.

THE RELEVANCE-BASED MODEL OF CONTEXT IN PROCESSING PUNS

AGNIESZKA SOLSKA
University of Silesia, Poland
agnieszka.solska@us.edu.pl

1. Introduction

While the essential role context plays in the understanding of expressions and utterances has never been questioned, the way it is perceived has evolved from a static factor established prior to the process of utterance interpretation, indeed a prerequisite for processing information, to a dynamic entity which emerges in this process. The latter view is espoused by relevance theorists, who define context as "the set of premises used in interpreting an utterance" (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 15) and treat it as a mental construct undergoing diverse modifications as the comprehender of an utterance processes and interprets incoming verbal information and other communicative signals supplied by the communicator.

The aim of this paper is to consider the usefulness of this model of context for analyzing the derivation of meaning in puns, i.e. utterances in which, instead of its usual function of allowing the comprehender to resolve ambiguities ubiquitous in language and communication, the context plays a different role of leading him to entertain, and often to accept two diverse readings.

The paper will start with a brief characterization of the most striking features of puns (in section 2), followed by the discussion (in section 3) of the limitations of the most widely accepted approach to pun comprehension, namely Attardo's (1994) connector-disjunctor model. In section 4 the notion of context as it is understood in relevance theory will be examined, and its potential for accountingcc for the key properties of puns (the oscillating effect and the 'connecting' role of the pivotal expression) will be put to the test in sections 5 and 6. The paper will close with a handful of concluding remarks.

2. Key features of puns

Punning can be characterized as relying for its effect on correlating distinct meanings in one linguistic form. This unique property of puns is achieved by diverse structural and lexical means, the systematic study of which has yielded equally diverse pun classifications (e.g. Heller 1994; Attardo 1994 and references therein, Tanaka 1994; Yus 2003), and is grounded in the ambiguity of the pun's pivotal section, variously described as the punning element or the connector. The long list of multiple meanings it engenders includes cases of homonymy, as in (1), polysemy, as in (2), metaphor, as in (3), perfect

homophony, as in (4), imperfect homophony, as in (5), paronymy, as in (6), and homography, as in (7).

(1) Being in politics is just like playing golf: you are trapped in one bad *lie* after another.
(2) There was a sign on the lawn at a drug re-hab centre that said "Keep Off The *Grass*."
(3) Never invest in funerals, it's a *dying* industry.
(4) Everybody *kneads* it. (An advertising slogan for Pillsbury flour) [*kneads*/needs]
(5) *Mud*, Sweat and *Gears*. (The name of a bicycle repair shop) [*mud*/blood, *gears*/tears]
(6) The Crime of *Pun-ishment*. (Title of an essay on puns)
(7) Poland *Polishes* Off U.S. Volleyball Team. (*The Daily Herald* June 17, 2011)

Combinations of these are not are uncommon, as could be seen in (8), which combines homophony with metaphor, as are cases where lexical ambiguity is mixed with structural ambiguity, such as (9):

(8) When it pours it *reigns*. (Advertising slogan for Michelin tyres)
(9) After he ate the duck, the alligator *got a little down* in the mouth.

Deriving and juxtaposing the pun's two meanings is effected in a rather straightforward way in the so-called horizontal, or syntagmatic puns, such as (10), in which the connector appears more than once, on each occasion in a different syntactic role and carrying a different sense. Since the repeated occurrence of the punning element openly points to the punning intention of the communicator, puns of this sort are sometimes described as explicit.

(10) Some men are *wise* and some are other*wise.*

A more ingenious way of deriving and juxtaposing meanings takes place in vertical, or paradigmatic puns, such as (1) – (9) above, in which a single ostensive signal is supposed to communicate more than one meaning. Puns of this sort are sometimes called implicit as there is no guarantee that the interpreter will in fact become aware of the intended duality of meaning. If he does, the potential ambiguities of the pun's pivotal part will remain unresolved and the comprehender will end up swinging back and forth between two interpretations.

This oscillating effect is the key feature of puns regardless of whether the two interpretations involved are equally valid (as is the case with the so-called double retentions puns) or not (as is the case with the so-called single retention puns). For instance, the comprehender of (1) is forced to oscillate between two perfectly legitimate senses of the noun *lie*, i.e. 'deliberate untruth' and 'a position of a golf ball.' In (3), the only viable meaning of the word *dying* is metaphorical, but the special appeal of the utterance lies in the fact that the word is used to describe an industry which specializes in burying or cremating people who are dead in the literal sense of the word. Thus even in

single retention puns the extraneous meaning does not completely evaporate but lingers in the interpreter's mind as the pun-creating counterpoise to the valid meaning.[1]

3. The limitations of the conjuctor-disjunctor model of pun comprehension

Researchers studying puns (Redfern 1982, 1984, 1996; Norrick 1984; Zwicky and Zwicky 1986; Sobkowiak 1991; Tanaka 1992, 1994; Attardo 1994; Giora 1997, 2003; Yus, 2003; van Mulken, et al. 2005; Partington 2009) have always emphasized the role of context in leading the addressee to derive and contrast the pun's two meanings. Indeed, puns have been described as "the product(s) of a context deliberately constructed to enforce an ambiguity" (Attridge 1988: 141). An interesting attempt to systematize this role can be found in Attardo (1994), who outlined what could be called a connector-disjunctor model of humorous texts and who applied it to humorous puns. Identifying the disjunction of meaning and the conjunction of form as the two main properties of ambiguity-based humorous texts including puns, Attardo argued (1994: 134) that "[t]he presence of humorous ambiguity is brought about and resolved (i.e. revealed, or made explicit) by two functional elements in the text": the conjunction of form is made possible thanks to the connector, i.e. "the ambiguous element of the utterance which makes the presence of two senses possible" (1994: 134), while the disjunction of meaning is achieved thanks to the disjunctor, i.e. the element which forces the passage from one interpretation to another. The presence of these two, according to Attardo, constitutes the necessary and the sufficient conditions for the punning effect to arise.

Attardo's main focus was on puns used as humorous texts, such as (11), so he did not try to extend his observations to all kinds of puns, not all of which are humorous. It can be argued, however, that his conjunctor-disjunctor model can be applied to other texts that exploit ambiguity regardless of whether they are humorous or not, as long as they depend for their effect on correlating two diverse meanings in one linguistic form. Indeed, Bucaria (2004) put the model to use in her discussion of punning newspaper headlines, such as (12):

(11) Why did the cookie cry? Because her mother has been away for so long. [a wafer] (Attardo 1994: 128, after Pepicello and Green 1983: 59)
(12) DRUNK GETS NINE MONTHS IN VIOLIN *CASE* (Bucaria 2004: 291)

Both in Attardo's discussion of humorous puns and in Bucaria's analysis of ambiguous headlines (both punning and not) context is understood in a mechanistic way mainly as discourse that surrounds a language unit, though sporadically they also mention non-linguistic factors which enforce the ambiguity of the pun's connector, such as the situation in which the speech event is taking place. For instance, discussing the pun in (13) Attardo feels it necessary to specify the circumstances in which it appeared and Bucaria (2004: 282) bemoans the fact that the "analysis of headlines collected on web

[1] For the discussion of the continued availability of the extraneous meaning in single retention puns see Solska (forthcoming a).

sites is complicated by the absence of the context in which the headlines originally appeared, which could have provided useful information for their semantic disambiguation."

(13) Context: on a birthday card there is a picture of a beautiful woman holding a birthday cake. The legend reads:
"You can't have your cake and *Edith* [eat it] too." (Attardo 1994: 149)

Interestingly, neither Attardo nor Bucaria mentions the knowledge possessed by the comprehender as a factor which might be crucial in allowing him to establish the second, less obvious, interpretation of the connector despite the fact that punning jokes and newspaper headlines whose comprehension depends on the addressee's encyclopedic knowledge are not unusual. For instance, the joke in (14) can only be understood by those who know that American one cent coins bear the image of Abraham Lincoln's profile and full appreciation of the punning headline in (15) depends on the addressee's familiarity with the title of Shakespeare's comedy *Much Ado About Nothing*. In puns like these, the connector's double meaning can only be recognised by those who have access to information that can be obtained neither from the speech situation nor from whatever linguistic material precedes or follows the connector.

(14) Which president was least guilty? Lincoln. He is *in a cent*. [*in a cent*/innocent]
(15) Much Ado About *Muffin* at BA. (Headline of an article in *The Sun* about a British Airways flight attendant suspended for stealing a muffin that a passenger left uneaten on his tray)

Attardo and Bucaria never describe extra-linguistic factors as possible disjunctors, which makes the connector-disjunctor vision of context in pun comprehension somewhat incomplete. If we look further afield, we can easily notice that in many communicative settings extra-linguistic disjunctors, making a reader or hearer aware of another, less salient, sense of a key expression, are quite common. For instance, the punning character of (5) above is apparent only to those who have heard of Winston Churchill's famous "Blood, sweat and tears" speech or at least to those who have heard of the American music group by the same name. The message in (16) would be incomprehensible and its similarity to the common expression "Come what may" would pass unnoticed if it did not appear in a sign over a restaurant. In much the same way, in (17), the less salient meaning of the word *cover*, i.e. '*cover*-as-wrap,' is brought to the reader's attention by a picture showing various objects (among them a chair, a lobster, a bottle and a watering can) wrapped in newspaper sheets.

(16) *Cumquat May*. (Name of a vegetarian restaurant)
(17) And you thought we only *covered* business. (Advertisement for *Financial Times Weekend*)

However, the limited view of context is not the most serious problem of the connector-disjunctor model of understanding puns. What seems puzzling is that it acknowledges and identifies by name only two key ingredients underlying the punning effect and shows no appreciation for the fact that if *two* meanings are correlated in the pun's

connector, *each* of them must be linked to some element in the pun or outside it. This indicates that apart from the connector and the element causing passage from one meaning to another, there has to be another element, namely one that has caused the first meaning to emerge. In other words, the problem with the conjunctor-disjunctor model is that it focuses on establishing the pun's second, less accessible meaning, and takes the first, more accessible meaning, for granted.

Both Attardo and Bucaria seem to assume that the more accessible meaning is simply conveyed by the connector. Among the different possible connector-disjunctor configurations to be found in punning jokes and punning headlines, they mention a 'non-distinct connector-disjunctor configuration,' in which the connector and the disjunctor coincide in one portion of the text. Bucaria (2004: 299) points to the headline in (12) as an example of an utterance exhibiting such a configuration. Undoubtedly, in utterance (12), the switch from one meaning of the word *case* to another cannot take place until the world is actually encountered. However, the 'container' meaning of this word is clearly motivated by presence of the concept VIOLIN, while the other meaning of *case*, i.e. '*case*-as-lawsuit,' by whatever information can be gleaned from the phrase 'gets nine months.' Attardo quotes utterance (13) as an example of a pun in which the connector doubles up as the conjunctor. However, there can be no doubt that one of the meanings to be juxtaposed here is explicitly conveyed by the utterance itself, while the other one has to be retrieved from memory and will only be supplied by those who are familiar with the proverb "You can't have you cake and eat it." Thanks to its phonetic similarity to the predicate *eat it*, the pivotal word *Edith* does act as a switch between meanings since it allows the hearer to identify *eat it* as the 'target' expression with which the explicitly conveyed concept is to be contrasted, but the identification can only be made if the comprehender has heard of the pertinent proverb.

The conclusion one might draw from such examples is that when describing the role of the contextual factors triggering the punning effect it would make more sense to identify not two but three essential elements in puns: the connector and two pun-creating, or 'disjuncting,' elements, which can but do not have to be linguistic in nature and which are like two forces pulling the comprehender in two opposite directions.

Another drawback of the model is that while it emphasizes the 'connecting role' of the pun's ambiguity carrying fragment, it offers no tools for specifying which aspects of its meaning are in fact responsible for its 'connecting' role. Attardo invokes sound symbolism and the human tendency to believe that identically (or similar) sounding expressions are supposed to carry identical (or similar) meanings. The problem is that in puns identical (or similar) sounding expressions, instead of conveying identical (or similar) meanings, somehow end up conveying meanings that are anything but similar.

In what follows I hope to demonstrate that the relevance-theoretic model of context provides better tools for explaining the source of the oscillating effect in puns and for how it is possible for one fragment of a punning utterance to serve as a pivot linking diverse meanings.

4. Sperber and Wilson's dynamic view of context

Sperber and Wilson, the founders of Relevance Theory, forcefully argue (1986/1995: 132-142) for what might be called a cognitive view of context. In their inferential model of human communication, set within a broader cognitive framework, context is understood as the information available for processing an utterance, information that can be gleaned from diverse sources including but not limited to the discourse preceding the linguistic material being processed or the physical setting in which communication is taking place. The extra- and intra-linguistic sources of contextual information would also include "expectations about the future, scientific hypotheses or religious beliefs, anecdotal memories, general cultural assumptions, beliefs about the mental state of the speaker" (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995:15-16). Yet another source of contextual information is the assumptions stored under the encyclopedic entries of the concepts made accessible to the comprehender by the words he will decode while processing the utterance. This sort of information is always used in fleshing out utterance meaning and is of particular importance in the case of puns, many of which tend to be autonomous, self-contained texts. Its vital role underlying the 'connecting' function of the connector will be discussed in section 6.

In the process of working out utterance meaning the comprehender starts off from what Sperber and Wilson call the initial context, which is available to the comprehender before an utterance is produced and which consists of the assumptions remaining in the comprehender's memory from whatever deductive process has just taken place. In other words, it is made up of propositions that are linked to whatever provided cognitive effects prior to the hearing of this utterance. As soon as the first lexical item of a new utterance is produced, the comprehender's first step is to select from the initial context the propositions that he finds relevant to the concept communicated by the item just uttered, i.e. whatever propositions will allow him to modify some element(s) in his current cognitive environment. As the utterance unfolds, newly communicated assumptions, i.e. background assumptions which the utterance has made accessible, will move to the foreground, while others will drop into the background.

The ever-changing context is thus whatever set of assumptions is active at a given time. The assumptions it consists of, often referred to as background or contextual assumptions, are thus assumptions manifest to the hearer, i.e. assumptions which the hearer is able to mentally represent to himself, which may but do not have to represent the actual state of the world and which constitute input to the inferential, i.e. deductive processes of utterance interpretation.

What governs the choice of the contextual subset of assumptions at any given moment is relevance, the key notion in the theory, understood as a trade-off between the cognitive gain achieved by processing the incoming input and the processing effort needed to achieve that gain. In keeping with the communicative principle of relevance,[2] an assumption is judged as relevant if it brings in cognitive effects which the hearer perceives as adequate in the view of the effort he has expended to derive them.

[2] "Every act of ostensive communication conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance" (Sperber &Wilson 1986/1995: 260).

5. The comprehender's cognitive environment as the ambiguity enforcing factor in puns

To see how this dynamic model of context outlined above might account for the way meanings in puns are derived, interpreted and processed, let us consider utterance (1),[3] consisting of a lead-up clause 'Being in politics is just like playing golf' followed by the punning clause 'you are trapped in one bad *lie* after another.' By the time the comprehender encounters the subject pronoun *you* in its second clause, he will have at his disposal an initial context consisting of assumptions which have been made available by the first utterance and which are connected with whatever he believes is involved in 'being in politics' and whatever he knows about 'playing golf.' These assumptions may include those listed in (18):

(18) a. Being in politics involves …
running for office,
trying to get support of the voters,
delivering speeches,
making promises,
winning or losing elections.
b. Playing golf involves …
using a club to hit a small ball into holes in the ground,
being a member of a golf club,
spending time outdoors,
going to the golf links,
winning or losing games.

In additions to these, the initial context will also include the idea (made available by the concept LIKE) that the producer of (1) perceives a similarity between the two spheres of life mentioned in the lead-up clause, and the expectation that this similarity will be explained in the utterance that follows. As the second part of the utterance progresses, some of these assumptions will become more prominent, some less, and totally new assumptions will emerge based on whatever information the second clause will reveal, i.e. based on the information explicitly and implicitly conveyed by the utterance. The process of identifying these two kinds of meanings will require decoding the verbal input into a structured set of concepts, i.e. recognizing mentally represented concepts associated with the words and expressions used in the utterance as well as identifying its logical form, resolving any undeterminacies its component concepts exhibit, and finally, establishing whatever meanings the utterance may imply.

Engaged in this process the comprehender will form and test hypotheses against the information making up the initial context described above. Specifically, he will perform the task of identifying the possible referent(s) of the indexical *you*, he will carry out the contextually appropriate modifications of meaning of the metaphorically used verb *trapped* and the vague adjective *bad*, and he will attempt to select or construct the appropriate sense of the noun *lie*. The fact that the initial context includes both the

[3] A discussion of the explicit and implicit meanings of utterance (1) can be found in Solska (forthcoming b).

concept POLITICS and the concept GOLF, each making available different assumptions, will prevent him from selecting or constructing only one meaning for some of these items. Instead, the initial context will make it manifest to him that *you*, instead of referring to the addressee, is used non-deictically and identifies not one but two sets of people, namely those who 'are in politics' and those who 'play golf.' It will also make it evident that the noun *lie* encodes not one but two equally prominent and equally relevant concepts: LIE_1, pertaining to saying intentional untruths and LIE_2, indicating a position in which something lies.

As predicted by the so-called relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure,[4] the two senses of *lie*, linked to the two concepts the word encodes, will not be derived simultaneously but one by one, with the more accessible meaning emerging first. Since the assumptions making up the comprehender's cognitive environment by this point will make it manifest that the first sense to emerge, though valid, is not relevant enough, i.e. it does not give him the full range of benefits he can expect (in other words, it is not optimally relevant), the comprehender will be compelled to reapply the procedure and search for another meaning, which together with (or contrasted with) the first meaning will finally satisfy his expectations of relevance. As for the meanings communicated by the vague words *trapped* and *bad*, they will only be established after the key expression *lie* has been interpreted, and since the word will yield two equally valid interpretations, each of these items will be taken to convey two slightly different occasion-specific concepts: BAD* and TRAPPED*, applicable to LIE_1 on the one hand, and BAD** and TRAPPED**, applicable to LIE_2 on the other hand. What the comprehender will end up constructing is an explicature consisting not of one but of two equally valid propositions, given in (19), which means that his new current context will now contain the two assumptions given in (20):

(19) a. YOU_x GET* TRAPPED* IN ONE BAD* LIE_1 AFTER ANOTHER (BAD* LIE_1).
b. YOU_y GET* TRAPPED** IN ONE BAD** LIE_2 AFTER ANOTHER (BAD** LIE_2).

(20) a. The speaker believes that politicians get repeatedly hampered because of the falsehoods they cannot get away with.
b. The speaker believes that golf players get repeatedly hampered because of the positions of the golf ball they find it hard to cope with.

The comprehension process is unlikely to stop at this point since most comprehenders will combine the newly constructed assumptions in (20) with other highly accessible assumptions, such as (21), which are grounded in the hearer's life experience:

(21) People who get repeatedly hampered may find it hard to succeed.
Getting away with a lie can be difficult.
People who lie cannot be trusted.
Some people are better at lying than others.

[4] "Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, enrichments, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility. […] Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned)" (Wilson & Sperber 2004, 613).

Tackling a bad lie of a golf ball requires skill.
Some golfers are better at tackling bad lies than others.

These assumptions can be used as implicated premises allowing the addressee to derive a whole range of (weakly) implied meanings, such as those listed in (22a) and (22b), which will form yet another context the hearer may use in further processing:

(22) a. Being repeatedly caught lying can damage a politician's career.
To achieve success in politics depends on the ability to tell lies.
Politicians cannot be trusted.
b. Difficult positions of a golf ball can be a challenge to the golfer.
Being good at golf depends on learning how to tackle bad lies.
Not everyone can be good at golf.

At this point some comprehenders might stop but some might go even further and start deriving totally emergent meanings, such as the ones in (23), which are neither directly stated by utterance (1) nor directly inferable from it, meanings which the speaker may but does not have to endorse yet which are perfectly possible in the light of the assumptions that have by this stage been derived, and which can be used in the processing of whatever utterances the comprehender may encounter next.

(23) A successful politician must be good at lying.
Politicians enjoy lying.
For politicians lying is a game.
Politics is a game.

As can be seen, any assumption that is in some way salient can become a contextual assumption and can interact with the ongoing material to yield another assumption that will modify the hearer's cognitive environment by producing a cognitive effect, which is by necessity a contextual effect, since it too can be used in the interpretation process to follow.

Arguably, the analysis presented above cannot be applied to all puns considering the structural diversity they exhibit and the different communicative settings in which they appear. Obviously, a different initial context will be available to a person who has just read the name on the box containing a board game, such as (24), to someone who will spot the sign (25) over a launderette, to someone exposed to the advertising slogan in (4), repeated here as (26), or to someone who will read the title of a book in (27) or a newspaper headline in (28):

(24) Merchant of *Venus*. (The name of a board game)
(25) Wish You *Wash* Here. (The name of a laundrette)
(26) Everybody *kneads* it. (An advertising slogan for Pillsbury flour)
(27) *Barry Trotter* and the Shameless Parody. (A parody of J. K. Rowling's Harry Potter series)
(28) Science *Friction.* (A headline of an article about an argument between scientists and the British government on the topic of mad cow disease)

Nonetheless, in these cases too the general mechanism will be the same. The context that will be available to the comprehender from the start will include an expectation that the utterance he has encountered will achieve relevance by conveying information about the nature of whatever it accompanies: in (24), about what might be involved in the game, in (25), about the kind of activity that is conducted on the premises, in (26), about the product being advertised, and finally in (27) and (28), about the subject matter (or context-content) of respectively the book or the article. In these cases too the hearer will process the utterance against the background information made available by the concepts associated with the words and expressions used in the utterance and whatever information it will allow the addressee to retrieve from memory. Unlike in (1), the linguistic material surrounding the connectors in (24) – (28) does not render the utterances ambiguous. Still there is a good reason why they have been chosen instead of other expressions, for instance such as the ones in (29) – (33) below. The phonetic information made available by the concepts they encode together with the information conveyed by the co-text in which they appear allows the comprehender to retrieve from memory the words and expressions (*Venice*, *wash*, *needs*, *Harry Potter* and *fiction*) which may or may not have direct bearing on 'what the utterance is about' but which will trigger contextual effects of their own making the comprehender unable to ignore them.

(29) ? Merchant of *Mars.*
(30) ? Wish You *Launder* Here.
(31) ? Everybody *makes dough* with it.
(32) *? Barnabas Trott* and the Shameless Parody.
(33) ? Science *Dissension.*

As has been seen, though it is the comprehender who constructs the constantly evolving contexts in an attempt to derive an optimally relevant interpretation, he does so on the basis of the speaker's ostensive behaviour. After all, he cannot help treating all ostensive, i.e. deliberately produced, linguistic signals, whether spoken or written, as evidence that the communicator intends to convey a certain meaning. Thus, even though the communicator cannot present the hearer with the best possible context he can cue that context by providing him with linguistic and non-linguistic stimuli that will make it possible to identify whatever he intends to communicate.

6. The comprehender's cognitive environment and the 'connecting' qualities of the connector

Having discussed the 'disjuncting' role of the hearer's cognitive environment, i.e. its role in deriving and retaining the pun's two meanings, let us move on to identify the roots of the 'connecting' role of the pun's connector, i.e. to establish the linguistic basis for the correlation of two meanings in one form. To do so we need to take a closer look at the conceptual information which is conveyed by the pivotal expression and since puns can be based on different types of ambiguity, we need to establish what makes the pivots's conceptual content different in each case.

Relevance theorists take the view (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 92) that concepts encoded by words and expressions give the comprehender access to three types of information, stored in the three entries of each concept: (i) the information about the phonetic and grammatical properties of the word or expression realizing the concept (which is accessed via the concept's *lexical entry*), (ii) the information about the concept's logical properties amounting to its proper definition (which is accessed via the concept's *logical entry*), and (iii) the encyclopedic knowledge about the extension and/or denotation of the concept (accessed via its *encyclopedic entry*), which also includes folk and specialist assumptions, cultural beliefs and personal experiences.

As I argued elsewhere (Solska forthcoming a), depending on the type of ambiguity exhibited by the connector in a specific pun, at least five different pairings of concepts communicated by a pun's connector can be identified. These pairings are shown in the diagrams below, each of them specifying what kind of ostensive signal can be used as a punning element and which parts of the conceptual content of the two concepts communicated by that element are common to both of them.

The diagrams focus on two major details: the nature of the ostensive signal used and the conceptual information made manifest by that signal. In each case a few words of comment are offered about the kind of contextual cueing which makes a specific outcome possible. In the diagrams, both channels: written and spoken, have been taken into account. Obviously, speech is the primary medium through which language is expressed and the orthographic form of a word is not part of the lexical entry of a concept. However there are utterances whose punning qualities become apparent only in writing, since in many cases it is the graphic shape of the ostensive signal that makes one realize that the utterance is a pun, especially when non-standard spellings are involved, as in (34) and (35):

(34) Bingo Hall Worker *B-10* And Robbed. [*B-10*/beaten]
(35) *Skolars* need glasses. (Advertising slogan for Skol beer) (Bielski 1999: 39)

As for the symbols used in the diagrams, a single headed arrow identifies the concept or concepts which are made available by the ostensive signal used. A double-headed arrow represents the comprehender's oscillation between the two concepts. The shaded sections in each diagram and the equation mark (=) placed between the corresponding entries of the two concepts indicate which aspects of the conceptual information are the ones the two concepts have in common. The 'almost equal to' symbol (≈) indicates that the corresponding entries of the two concepts have some but not all aspects of their content in common. Finally, the lack of identity between corresponding concept entries is marked by the inequality symbol (≠).

5.1 Puns based on homonymy

As shown in diagram 1, in puns based on homonymy, such as (1), or on polysemy, such as (2), the distinct concepts the addressee will be led to juxtapose share the lexical entry, i.e. the entry specifying the phonetic structure and grammatical properties of the lexical item encoding a concept. However, their logical addresses are different and they provide

access to different sets of encyclopedic data.[5] In the case of such puns the oscillating effect will arise regardless of whether the utterance is produced in speech or in writing.



Diagram 1: The pairings of concepts conveyed by the connector in homonymy- and polysemy-based puns.

Whether a homonymy- or polysemy-based pun will be detected or not depends on the trivial factor of the addresser's familiarity with the particular meanings of the linguistic expressions used. For instance, a person unfamiliar with the slang meaning of *canned*, say, someone who is not a totally proficient speaker of English, may fail to see the pun in (36).

(36) I used to work for Budweiser but I got *canned*.

However, it would seem that punsters tend to provide enough cueing for the comprehenders so that if one of the meanings conveyed by the connector is not known, or unlikely to be accessed, or at least not readily available, the assumptions made available by the linguistic or non-linguistic material surrounding the key word will make it easy to infer the other meaning. For instance, though most people may lack the encyclopedic knowledge of what a Mobius strip is,[6] the presence of the concept MATHEMATICIAN in utterance (37) would allow even a complete layman to guess that the unknown word *Mobius* should be understood as 'having something to do with mathematics.' In (38), the less obvious meaning of the key word *drive*, i.e. 'driveway,' is brought to the attention of the interpreter by the accompanying photograph, showing a Mazda car parked on a driveway leading to a mansion house.

(37) "Where do mathematicians go on weekends?" "To a Mobius *strip* club!"
(38) The perfect car for a long *drive* – Mazda car. (Tanaka 1992: 77)

[5] The distinction between the two is drawn based on the etymological relatedness between the senses of a word in the case of polysemy and the lack thereof in the case of homonymy, and is thus of little value in a synchronic study, such as this one.

[6] The term *Mobius strip* refers to a surface which has only one side and only one boundary and has been named after a German mathematician who was the first to describe its mathematical properties.

5.2 Puns based on metaphor

It would seem that in puns juxtaposing the connector's metaphorical and literal meaning, which is what happens in (3), one of the meanings which are brought into contrast should be retrieved in the process of linguistic decoding while the other one, in keeping with the relevance-theoretic position on how metaphorical meanings arise (cf. Carston 2002: 349-356), should be inferentially constructed in the process of meaning adjustment in which the lexically given concept will become broadened and/or narrowed, so as to convey the unlexicalised ad hoc concept(s) envisioned by the speaker. Thus, for instance, while deriving the contextually appropriate meaning of the predicate *dying* in (3), the addressee should extend the category of entities which can die, i.e. which can reach the end of their existence, so as to include commercial companies which can cease to function in the business world and to exclude those entities that can stop being alive (e.g. human beings). However a close examination of metaphors used in puns reveals general absence of novel metaphors. As can be seen in examples (39) – (44) below, the metaphorical meanings involved are conventional, i.e. they are on the way to becoming or have become lexicalised.

(39) Have you heard of the online origami store? It *folded*.
(40) The Alpine Skiing competition started poorly and *went downhill* from there.
(41) *Burning* Questions on Tunnel Safety Unanswered. (A headline of an article in *The Guardian* on the possibility of fires in the Channel tunnel)
(42) [A] trial tow of a 6.5 million-ton iceberg would cost about $ 10 million – a sum that *chilled* inverstors. (*The Time* July 4, 2011)
(43) Love is *blind* but I am not.
(44) I'm going to be discussing global warming next week, it's quite a *heated* topic.

This might indicate that metaphor-based puns are in fact polysemous in nature and the derivation of the two concepts in such puns is in fact very much like the derivation of the two concepts in other polysemous puns in that they all exploit an extra *encoded* sense of the connector. Only for the comprehenders who have not encountered the metaphors involved would interpreting such puns involve constructing an appropriate ad hoc concept. The common roots of the two concepts in metaphor-based puns are reflected in the conceptual information communicated by the connector. As shown in Diagram 2, the end result is that the two concepts contrasted are identical not only in terms of their lexical entries: their logical and their encyclopedic entries overlap. Again the connector can successfully do its job regardless of the medium in which the pun is conveyed.



Diagram 2: The pairings of concepts conveyed by the connector in metaphor-based puns.

5.3 Puns based on perfect homophony

In puns based on perfect homophony the punning element acting as the ostensive signal will yield a punning effect regardless of whether the utterance is presented in speech or in writing. However, which of the two concepts will be accessed first will depend on whether the addressee will first read or hear the pun, which is why diagram 3, showing the conceptual content of such puns, appears in two versions. It may be observed that in puns of this sort the punning element does in fact encode only one concept which, if the pun is to be detected, will have to be contrasted with the concept encoded by another identically or similar sounding yet unexpressed 'target' expression, which the hearer first has to identify. For instance, the reader of (4) and (8) above will only see the pun if he identifies the identically sounding word *needs* and *rains* respectively. Similarly, the hearer of (4) and (8) will only see the pun if he identifies the identically sounding word *kneads* and *reigns* respectively. As shown in Diagrams 3a and 3b, in puns based on perfect homonymy the distinct concepts the addressee is supposed to identify share only a fragment of their lexical entries, namely the part specifying the phonetic form of their linguistic counterparts, yet their logical and encyclopedic entries are different.



Diagram 3a: The pairings of concepts conveyed by the connector in puns based on perfect homophony, when presented in writing.



Diagram 3b: The pairings of concepts conveyed by the connector in puns based on perfect homophony, when presented in speech.

5.4 Puns based on imperfect homophony and on paronymy

As shown in Diagram 4, in puns based on imperfect homonymy and on paronymy, the distinct concepts involved have even less in common than in the case of perfect homonyms: they share only a fragment of the phonetic form of their linguistic counterparts. Puns like this resemble puns based on perfect homophony in that their connectors too encode only one concept. However, unlike in puns based on perfect homophony, in which the two meanings emerge in the order determined by whether the ostensive signal is graphic or acoustic, the concept encoded by the connector will be accessed first regardless of the medium of transmission. The target concept will only be identified and the pun detected if the hearer's cognitive environment contains the pertinent information allowing him to identify the virtual member of the brace of concepts. Characteristically, the linguistic material surrounding the connector in such puns contains fragments of idioms or set phraseologies, or makes references to proverbs, titles of books and films. Most members of a given speech community will have in their memory the titles of many books, movies, TV shows, etc. as well as a long list of proverbs and sayings, which is why so many of them get repeatedly reused. The title of Shakespeare's comedy *The Merchant of Venice* has inspired both the name of the shop in (45) and the name of a board game in (24), repeated here as (46). The title of the movie *Planet of the Apes* is involved in both the name of a wine shop in (47) and a video rental place in (48), and the echo of the proverb *It never rains but pours* can be found in advertising slogans (49), (50) and (51):

(45) Merchant of *Tennis*. (The name of a shop selling sports equipment)
(46) Merchant of *Venus*. (The name of a board game)
(47) Planet of the *Grapes*. (Name of a wine store)
(48) Planet of the *Tapes*. (Name of a video rental place)
(49) When it rains it *pours*. (The advertising slogan for Morton salt)
(50) When it pours it *reigns*. (The advertising slogan for Michelin tyres)
(51) We've *poured* throughout her *reign*. (The advertising slogan for Guinness beer, which appeared in the year of Queen Elisabeth II's Silver Jubilee) (Redfern 1984: 134)



Diagram 4: The pairings of concepts conveyed by the connector in puns based on imperfect homophony and on paronymy.

5.5 Puns based on homography

Puns based on homography only work in texts conveyed in the written form (such as advertising slogans used in pictorial ads, names of shops and businesses, titles of books, newspaper headlines etc), as in their case the ostensive signal is the orthographic form of the word. Horizontal homography-based puns, such as (52), do not survive in speech: the two occurrences of the connector item are then perceived as imperfect homophones.

(52) I enjoy *bass* fishing and playing the *bass* guitar.

Given the generally accepted belief in the primacy of speech over writing, it is not surprising that homographic puns are often not seen as puns proper. This is the view taken by Sobkowiak (1991: 13), who contrasts such "'printed' puns" with "true puns," which for him are "in their mass, a decidedly spoken phenomenon." Koestler (1978: 144), who observes that "in the pun, two strings of thought are tangled into one acoustic knot," does not even acknowledge the existence of homographic puns.

However, given their widespread use and the fact that the mechanism which is at work is the same as in the case of other puns, homographic puns too seem to merit consideration. As shown in Diagrams 5a and 5b, what sets them off from other puns is the fact that the concepts which are brought into contrast are in fact encoded by different words, which by definition have different lexical, logical and encyclopedic entries, but which merely happen to be associated with the same graphic form. Which of the two concepts is accessed first (and is thus represented as CONCEPT$_1$) depends of which word is actually encountered at a given point in the utterance



Diagram 5a: One possible pairing of (words and) concepts conveyed by the connector in homography-based puns, when presented in writing.



Diagram 5b: The other possible pairing of (words and) concepts conveyed by the connector in homography-based puns, when presented in writing.

7. Concluding remarks

Considering the fundamental role context plays in utterance comprehension in general, it is not surprising that it also acts as a key factor in interpreting puns. The role of contextual factors in pun comprehension has always been acknowledged by researchers investigating puns and has been reflected in Attardo's (1994) not entirely successful attempt to account for what he saw as the defining properties of punning utterances, namely the 'disjunction of meaning' and the 'conjunction of form.' I hope that the analysis presented above has demonstrated that in contrast to approaches grounded in a limited mechanistic vision of context, such as Attardo's, the cognitive model of context proposed within the relevance-theoretic framework is better equipped to explain how the ostensive signals chosen by communicator and the assumptions that gradually become manifest to the comprehender affect the way the comprehender of a pun constructs a context that will allow him to recognize the punning intention of the communicator, to establish and juxtapose the pun's two meanings as well as derive whatever cognitive effects these meanings may trigger.

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About the author

Agnieszka Solska, assistant professor at the Institute of English of the University of Silesia, Poland, obtained her PhD in linguistics based on the dissertation *The Pragmatics of Verbal Irony in English* and her research interests include linguistic pragmatics, inferential models of communication especially Relevance Theory, nonliteral language, ambiguity, and language phenomena which are based on ambiguity, such as zeugma, garden path utterances and puns.

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USAGE EFFECTS ON THE COGNITIVE ROUTINIZATION OF CHINESE RESULTATIVE VERBS

BEN PIN-YUN WANG
The Pennsylvania State University
benpywang@gmail.com

Abstract

The present study adopts a corpus-oriented usage-based approach to the grammar of Chinese resultative verbs. Zooming in on a specific class of V-*kai* constructions, this paper aims to elucidate the effect of frequency in actual usage events on shaping the linguistic representations of resultative verbs. Specifically, it will be argued that while high token frequency results in more lexicalized V-*kai* complex verbs, high type frequency gives rise to more schematized V-*kai* constructions. The routinized patterns pertinent to V-*kai* resultative verbs varying in their extent of specificity and generality accordingly serve as a representative illustration of the continuum between lexicon and grammar that characterizes a usage-based conception of language.

1. Introduction

The specific linguistic structure in Chinese under the investigation of the present study has been most commonly referred to in the literature as "resultative verb compounds", which can be defined as a two-element verb compound in which "the second element signals some *result* of the action or process conveyed by the first element" (Li & Thompson 1981:54, italics original). In his book, Shi (2002) also adopts this definition and further points out that it features the "action-result" relationship between the two constituents of resultative verb compounds, a distinctive feature that distinguishes this type of V-V complex verbs from other serial verb constructions in Chinese.

Still, some researchers cast doubts on the widely-accepted assumption that such V-V structures, which are words whose part of speech is verb, with an "action-result" relationship held between V_1 and V_2 are the output of a compounding process. While adopting the term of "resultative verb compound" in his study, Shi (2002) still deems the naming of "compound" misleading in that the term suggests that this subtype of V-V constructions involve non-productive lexical process. Instead, he argues in favor of a syntactic treatment of resultative verbs since it allows many types of collocation. Also, Starosta et al. (1997) treat V_2, or the postverb, as the suffix of V_1, an affixation rather than a compounding approach, which they believe can better capture the productivity as well as the regularity of the sense of the postverb. It can thus be concluded that the issue of whether resultative verbs involve lexical or syntactic operations remains unsettled.

To avoid the foregoing controversy over the morpho-syntactic status of the postverb and the gestalt complex verb as a whole, the cover label "resultative verb" (Packard 2000) is adopted throughout this paper. The term "resultative" is employed in this study in its broadest sense, which can refer to "the state, degree, accomplishment, achievement, or effect of the action" (Shi 2002:29). Such a general term is intended to characterize the wide range of meanings encoded in resultative verb constructions in Chinese.

Via a bottom-up approach, the present study empirically delves into the usage patterns of the specific class of V-*kai* resultative verbs from a usage-based theoretical point of view. Specifically, this paper aims to elucidate the roles of frequency in structuring the linguistic representations of V-*kai* resultative verbs. Besides, to methodologically enhance the usage-basedness of this study, collocational and frequency analyses have been applied to large corpus data. It is hoped that, via an exhaustive scrutinization of the empirical data of V-*kai* complex verbs, this study can draw an accurate picture of how resultative verbs are conventionally and creatively used in naturally-occurring language.

The corpus from which the data of this study are drawn is Academic Sinica Balanced Corpus of Mandarin Chinese (Sinica Corpus) (Version 4.0), which contains nearly five million Chinese words.[1] A total of 2747 tokens of V-*kai* resultative verbs were retrieved from the corpus, which consist of combinations of 138 distinct verbs with the postverb *–kai*.

2. A usage-based conception of language

This section first reviews two characteristic theoretical assumptions shared by varied usage-based theories, mainly based on Croft and Cruse (2004), Diessel (2004), Kemmer and Barlow (2000), Mukherjee (2005) and Tummers et al. (2005). Moreover, the methodological applications of a usage-based model, specifically focused on the corpus-oriented approach, are also addressed.

2.1 Theoretical assumptions of a usage-based approach

This section expounds the essential principles underlying the theoretical aspects of a usage-based view of language. In particular, two properties germane to the establishment of linguistic representations in the grammar of a language user will be highlighted: the meanings of linguistic expressions in actual language use as well as the frequency of occurrences of specific linguistic expressions (c.f. Croft & Cruse 2004).

[1] The corpus can be accessed online at: http://dbo.sinica.edu.tw/SinicaCorpus/.

2.1.1 An utterance-grounded model

The foremost characteristic of a usage-based approach to language consists in the precedence of language use. Basically, usage-based theories posit that the language system, or grammar, of a speaker is fundamentally grounded in utterances or usage events (Kemmer & Barlow 2000). In general, an utterance or a usage event refers to "a situated instance of language use which is culturally and contextually embedded and represents an instance of linguistic behavior on the part of a language user" (Evans & Green 2006:110). A speaker's internal linguistic system is thus directly and intimately connected to the actual use of language in that "the grammar does not only constitute the knowledge repository to be employed in language use, but it is also itself the product of language use" (Tummers et al. 2005:228). In other words, grammar has an experiential basis: it is profoundly tied to one's experience with language (Bybee 2006).

In view of their grounding relation with respect to grammar, usage events assume dual roles: they both stem from and (re)define the more abstract system of linguistic knowledge (Kemmer & Barlow 2000; Tummers et al. 2005). Firstly, usage events are actual instantiation or elaboration of the more general and less detailed symbolic representations they pertain to. In that case, usage events are necessarily more specific and complex in nature (Langacker 2008). Hence, analyzing usage data can illuminate the mental structure of a speaker's grammar.

Secondly, more importantly, usage events can also be the empirical foundation of the language system. The usage-based theories of language share the assumption that "language structure emerges from language use" (Tomasello 2003:5), presuming that usage data can serve as input that constantly structures linguistic representations. In other words, "usage events drive the formation and operation of the internal linguistic system" (Kemmer & Barlow 2000:xi). Therefore, the grammar of a language user is far from fixed but dynamic in that linguistic units are "subject to creative extension and reshaping with use" (ibid., p.ix).

Such an emergent view of linguistic structures common to usage-based theories of language acknowledges the interplay between language use and other cognitive processes such as schematization and entrenchment (Langacker 1987, 2000, 2008). The process of schematization, which involves generalization of patterns and abstraction of commonalities across all sorts of usage events, gives rise to schemas. A schema is therefore bound to be less detailed and precise than the specific structure that elaborates or instantiates it (Evans & Green 2006; Langacker 2000).

In this sense, in stark contrast to the generative models (e.g. Pustejovsky 1998), the usage-based model does not intend to draw a clear-cut boundary between lexicon and grammar (Diessel 2004; Langacker 2008; Mukherjee 2005). Instead, grammar is viewed as a continuum ranging from wholly idiosyncratic, specific lexical entries to maximally general grammatical assemblies. In other words, the usage-based approach treats both lexicon and grammar as symbolic units that vary largely in their extent of specificity or level of abstraction (Langacker 1987, 2000, 2008). All these conventionalized schemas or patterns with various degrees of symbolic complexity are conceptually organized into activation networks in the speaker's mental grammar (Diessel 2004; Kemmer & Barlow

2000; Langacker 2008). In this ongoing process of establishing the network-like generalizations, the crucial role that usage events play is to link between the general schema and the specific instances.

However, for a schema to achieve a status of conventional unit easily accessed as an integrated whole, it is required to undergo sufficient entrenchment, a psychological phenomenon defined as "the cognitive routinization of linguistic units and structures on grounds of repetitive events in language use" (Mukherjee 2005:222). That is, linguistic units "emerge via the progressive entrenchment of configurations that recur in a sufficiently number of events to be established as cognitive routines" (Langacker 2008:220). It is therefore reasonable to hypothesize that the degree of entrenchment of a linguistic unit is positively correlated with the frequency of its actual occurrence in usage events.

2.1.2 A frequency-focused model

Another principal feature of a usage-based conception of language is the crucial role of frequency in shaping the language system of a speaker. Frequency in actual language use is deemed as the quantitative assessment of the degree of entrenchment (Mukherjee 2005; Tummers et al. 2005). Usage-based theories of language generally distinguish two types of frequencies: token frequency and type frequency (Bybee 1985, 2007; Croft & Cruse 2004; Diessel 2004; Tummers et al. 2005). These two types of frequency have been identified to exert distinct effects on the storage, activation, and processing of linguistic units (Diessel 2004). It has been postulated that, while token frequency leads to the routinization of specific instances, type frequency gives rise to the entrenchment of general schemas (Evans & Green 2006; Rostila 2006).

Token frequency refers to the number of occurrences of a specific linguistic unit (such as a particular sound or word) in usage data. Linguistic expressions with higher token frequencies are discovered to be more likely to undergo sound change (i.e. The Reduction Effect) but to resist analogical change (i.e. The Conserving Effect) (Bybee 2006, 2007, 2010; Bybee & Hopper 2001). The two frequency effects can be attributed to the distinct psychological status of these linguistic units on account of repetition. Due to repetition, their memory representations are strengthened, enabling independent storage of the units in mental grammar and facilitating direct access of these units without activating a higher-level schema (Bybee 2007; Diessel 2004; Tummers et al 2005). In other words, such units enjoy a higher degree of autonomy in the language system of a language user.

In contrast, type frequency, peculiar to abstract patterns or schemas, is concerned with "the number of distinct items that can occur in the open slot of a construction or the number of items that exemplify a pattern" (Bybee 2007:14). Type frequency is generally envisaged as the primary indicator of the productivity of a grammatical pattern (Croft & Cruse 2004; Diessel 2004; Tummers et al. 2005). In the usage-based approach to language, the notion of *productivity* refers to "the likelihood of being selected as the active structure used to categorize a novel expression (Langacker 2000:26). The higher

the number of possible linguistic expressions that instantiate a schema, the more entrenched the abstract pattern is in mental grammar, which in turn enhances its productivity as a template for novel uses. The schema would then have a stronger representation in the language system, rendering it more available or accessible for constructing and interpreting new expressions (Bybee 2007).

Moreover, the interaction between the effects of token and type frequency on the cognitive routinization of linguistic units also demands our attention. Technically, the entrenchment of individual types is anchored in their token numbers; therefore, token frequency should be indirectly related to the entrenchment of a schema. Nevertheless, due to the high autonomous status of frequently occurring linguistic units in language representations, such units may not contribute to the productivity of general patterns or schemas associated with them (Bybee 2007; Diessel 2004). In summary, the cognitive routinization of an abstract pattern or schema is contingent on both the number of types instantiating a schema and the number of tokens filling the pattern.

2.2 Towards a corpus-oriented usage-based approach

In terms of the methodological aspects of usage-based theories of language, the priority given to usage data and frequency count calls for the accessibility of a large collection of samples of language use for comprehensive quantitative and qualitative analyses. The availability of large corpora and concordance software is thus regarded as a methodological breakthrough for linguistic theories that focus on language use (Bybee 2007). In general, corpus-based studies empirically analyze the actual patterns of use by utilizing balanced or representative natural texts and employing automatic techniques that enable a systematic and exhaustive analysis of usage patterns across varied frequencies (Biber 2000; Gries 2006).

Integrating corpus data into the usage-based model has two apparent advantages (Mukherjee 2005). For one thing, the authenticity of the usage data recorded in corpora makes the usage-based model truly empirical. For another, corpus data provide natural, diverse contexts in which a given linguistic unit is used, which is favorable to the depiction of usage patterns related to the unit and the identification of relevant contextual factors that motivate its occurrences.

Concerned mainly with the technical state of the arts of usage-based linguistics, Tummers et al. (2005) indicate that the attribute of corpus data as off-line products of non-elicited language use accounts for the tendency of usage-based studies to employ corpora rather than other methods of gathering usage data such as surveys and experiments. They further distinguish between *corpus-illustrated* and *corpus-based* linguistics and argue that the latter would be the more suitable methodology for a conception of language that is genuinely usage-based. To be exact, corpus data should not simply serve as a data set for the selection of instances and as evidence for the mere existence of a given linguistic expression, as in corpus-illustrated studies. Rather, quantification and statistical data such as frequencies and percentages, as adopted in

corpus-based research, are required for a more systematic and detailed analysis that identifies relevant features or patterns of language use.

In search for a quantitative usage-based method, Tummers et al. (ibid., p.240) further single out two predominant clusters of quantification techniques employed in usage-based studies: frequency and collocational analyses. Information drawn from frequency counts is empirically valuable for pinpointing such usage tendency as how a given linguistic expression is typically used. In addition, collocational analyses are extensively utilized to identify the lexical/grammatical and non-linguistic association patterns with specific linguistic expressions as well as to examine the distribution of near-synonymous linguistic units.

In the present study, both of the two quantitative methods based on corpus data are used to derive a usage-based account of V-*kai* resultative verbs. Frequency counts of each individual V-*kai* combination (i.e. token frequency) was conducted first. In addition, the frequency of different categories of verbal collocates with respect to the postverb *–kai* (i.e. type frequency) was also calculated. However, before a systematic collocational analysis involved in V-*kai* resultative verbs can be provided, an apposite categorization of the verbs that can appear in the slot preceding *–kai* was in order, a methodological issue to be dealt with in the next section.

3. A frame-semantic categorization of verbal collocates of *–kai*

Previous attempts to systematically categorize verbs rely either on their grammatical behaviors or on their meaning relations with one another. For instance, Levin (1993) classifies English verbs according primarily to their syntactic alternation patterns, based on the assumption that "verb behavior can be used effectively to probe for linguistically relevant pertinent aspects of verb meaning" (ibid., p.1). To illustrate, transitive verbs that involve putting and covering, including *spray*, *brush*, *load*, *pump*, *smear*, and *stuff*, can occur in the locative alternation (e.g. *Sophie sprayed water on the bushes* vs. *Sophie sprayed the bushes with water*), and thus belong to the same verb class (ibid., p.51).

While the approach of verb categorization deriving exclusively from alternations adopted in Levin (1993) is liable to generate semantically coherent verb classes, verbs with related meanings may also be split in different classes, or verbs with disparate meanings can also be lumped in the same class (Baker & Ruppenhofer 2002). Levin's verb classes are only partially semantically motivated in that not all argument syntax reflects the inherent lexical semantics of verbs. Furthermore, the approach of verb classification on the sole basis of grammatical behaviors would be expected to have limited applicability for languages with more impoverished syntactic alternations like Chinese.

In contrast to the syntactic approach employed in Levin's (1993) study of verb classes, the frame-based approach groups words (not merely verbs) according to the underlying conceptual structures that support and motivate them, namely, *cognitive frames* or *knowledge schemata* (Fillmore & Atkins 1992). The concept of *frame*, as a fundamental construct of Frame Semantics (Fillmore 1976, 1977, 1982, 1985), refers to

"schematic representations of the conceptual structures and patterns of beliefs, practices, institutions, images, etc. that provide a foundation for meaning interaction in a given speech community" (Fillmore, Ruppenhofer & Baker 2004:26).

Additionally, Frame Semantics holds an encyclopedic view of meaning (cf. Evans & Green 2006; Fillmore 1985), contending that each linguistic expression (a lexical, phrasal, or constructional unit) evokes a schematized semantic frame or instantiates particular elements of it; thus, the frame functions as a knowledge structure against which the meaning of the expression is understood (Croft & Cruse 2004). That is, linguistic units are relativized to a structured inventory of encyclopedic knowledge that provides the cognitive underpinnings to license their grammatical behaviors such as valence or argument structure. It follows that the frame semantic approach of verb categorization resorts mainly to lexical semantic information and exempts itself from the necessity to count on syntactic criteria for their grouping; for that reason, a frame-based classification would have the advantage of allowing semantically related verbs to be grouped together despite their discrepant syntactic behaviors (Boas 2006).

For the purpose of this study, the verbs found to collocate with the postverb *–kai* are preferably classified on a semantic basis, for the two verbs in Chinese resultative verbs are generally recognized to have a semantic rather than a syntactic collocational relationship. It has been suggested that any two verbs capable of prompting for an "action-result" interpretation can be combined together to form a resultative verb (Shi 2002). In addition, the interpretation of the gestalt resultative verb derives from the meanings of the two constituents that are integrated in the semantically most natural way (Thompson 1973). It can therefore be inferred that the semantic properties of the verbal collocates are the principal factor that determines whether they can co-occur with a given postverb to form a resultative verb.

In the actual grouping procedure executed in the present study, an intuition-based categorization of the verbal collocates according to the meanings these verbs denote as they co-occur with *–kai* in resultative verbs was performed first. Such preliminary collocational categorization was then confirmed or modified based on the frames that the English equivalents of these verbal collocates are associated with. As expected, verbal collocates in the same categories usually pertain to frames that are conceptually related to each other.

4. Frequency and productivity of V-*kai* resultative verbs

This section presents the results of data analysis concerning the usage patterns of V-*kai* resultative verbs in the corpus. The distribution of individual V-*kai* complex verbs will be presented first. Then the major categories of verbal collocates of *–kai* and its different meanings involved when co-occurring with distinct verb groups in resultative verbs will also be discussed.

4.1 Distribution of V-*kai* resultative verbs in the corpus

As mentioned, the corpus on which this study is based yields a total of 2747 tokens of V-*kai* resultative verbs and 138 distinct verbs were found to collocate with the postverb *–kai*. Table 1 presents the most frequent ten V-*kai* resultative verbs, all of which occur at least 45 times in the corpus data. As can be seen, the distribution of V-*kai* constructions in the corpus is fairly skewed. To illustrate, the four most frequent V-*kai* combinations alone, namely, *lí-kāi*, *zhǎn-kāi*, *dǎ-kāi*, and *fēn-kā*, with each of their token frequencies exceeding one hundred, account for more than three-fifths (60.4%) of the data.

Rank	V-*ka*i Exemplar	Tokens	Percentage
1	*lí-kāi* 'to leave'	628	22.9%
2	*zhǎn-kāi* 'to unfold; to launch'	601	21.9%
3	*dǎ-kāi* 'to open; to switch on'	309	11.2%
4	*fēn-kāi* 'to separate'	121	4.4%
5	*bì-kāi* 'to avoid'	88	3.2%
6	*jiē-kāi* 'to uncover'	69	2.5%
7	*zhāng-kāi* 'to open'	63	2.3%
8	*fān-kāi* 'to open; to turn over'	57	2.1%
9	*lā-kāi* 'to pull apart'	48	1.7%
10	*jiě-kāi* 'to untie'	45	1.6%

Table 1: Top ten most frequent V-*kai* resultative verbs in the corpus

The finding that V-*kai* complex verbs are not equally frequent in the corpus data conforms to the probabilistic nature of language use. The different token frequencies of co-occurrences between V_1 and *–kai* are not idiosyncratic, but motivated, mainly by semantic rather than syntactic compatibility. Shi (2002) points out that a verb tends to co-occur with its most natural result in Chinese resultative verbs. The above four extremely common cases of V-*kai* complex verbs indeed have an internal semantic structure of natural action-result relationship. The significantly high frequencies of occurrences of particular V-*kai* complex verbs in actual language use would also have linguistic and cognitive consequences, namely, lexicalization and entrenchment, which will be discussed in detail later in Section 5.1.

4.2 Categories of verbal collocates within V-*kai* resultative verbs

Based on a frame-semantic approach to verb classification, some verb categories can be observed to collocate more productively and frequently with the postverb *–kai* than others. Table 2 summarizes the number and percentage of both verb types and tokens of V-*kai* resultative verbs accounted for by each of these productive categories of verbal collocates with *–kai*. Overall, the six major categories represent almost 90 percent of the

verb types found to co-occur with *–kai* and nearly 95 percent of the tokens of V-*kai* resultative verbs in the corpus data. The remaining types of verbal collocates of *–kai* and tokens of V-*kai* resultative verbs are represented by other minor, far less productive verb categories.

Categories of Verbal Collocates	Verb Types		V-*kai* Tokens	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Verbs of Motion	41	29.7 %	898	32.7 %
Verbs of Manipulation	29	21.0 %	589	21.4 %
Verbs of Separating	27	19.6 %	284	10.3 %
Verbs of Dispersal	13	9.4 %	51	1.9 %
Verbs of Expansion	8	5.8 %	666	24.2 %
Verbs of Avoiding	5	3.6 %	108	3.9 %
Total	119	89.1 %	2596	94.4 %

Table 2: Productive categories of verbal collocates with *–kai*

In fact, these major categories of verbal collocates involve interrelated verb frames to which many verb types belong (i.e. high type frequency). The verbs in these categories also tend to co-occur with *–kai* more frequently than those in other categories (i.e. high token frequency). It is worth noting that the percentage of verb types accounted for by a given category of verbal collocates does not necessarily correspond to its proportion of tokens of V-*kai* resultative verbs. For example, though the category of verbs of expansion represents only six percent of the verb types found to co-occur with *–kai*, the V-*kai* complex verbs in which V_1 belongs to this category stand for about one-fourth of the data. The mismatch between type and token frequency in the distribution results from the markedly high token frequency of the V-*kai* exemplar *zhǎn-kāi* 'to unfold; to launch'.

It is also observed that there exist regular patterns of meaning integration between V_1 and the postverb in V-*kai* resultative verbs. Take the verb category with the highest type frequency, namely, verbs of motion, as an illustration. Verbs classified in this category are all associated with semantic frames involving translational motion and share core frame elements such as Theme, Path, Source, and Goal. When co-occurring with verbs of motion, *–kai* appears to convey the meaning of (an entity's) moving away from a reference point, as in *yí-kāi* 'move-away' and *pǎo-kāi* 'run-away'.

For another example, the second most productive category of verbal collocates is verbs of manipulation. Since most manipulation verbs pertain to frame elements that can be construed as containing objects, in V-*kai* complex verbs where V_1 belongs to this category, the postverb generally designates the resultant open state of an entity, as in *zhuǎn-kāi* 'turn-open' and *qiāo-kāi* 'knock-open'. In short, when *–kai* collocates with a specific class of verbs, its meanings are accordingly modulated in a systematic fashion. The emergence of foregoing patterning points to the abstraction of schemas of V-*kai* resultative verb construction with different levels of generality, a cognitive process to be addressed in the following section.

5. Usage effects on the entrenchment of V-*kai* resultative verbs

This section discusses the effects of usage frequency on the linguistic representation of resultative verbs in Chinese grammar. It will be argued that token and type frequencies exert distinct effects on the formation and entrenchment of Chinese resultative verbs. Specifically, while high token frequency gives rise to more lexicalized V-*kai* complex verbs, high type frequency results in more schematized V-*kai* constructions. Finally, I will also touch on the contribution of the corpus-oriented usage-based approach adopted in this study to the understanding of establishing V-*kai* resultative verbs as cognitive routines.

5.1 The effect of token frequency on the lexicalization of V-*kai* resultative verbs

The frequency of co-occurrence of two linguistic units is strongly related to their constituency: "the more often two elements occur in sequence, the tighter will be their constituent structure" (Bybee & Hopper 2001:14). Moreover, the co-occurring units with high frequency can further undergo linguistic change such as phonetic weakening, semantic alteration, functional shift, and the reanalysis of their internal grammatical structure (Biq 2007). Similarly in the cases of Chinese resultative verbs, the more frequently a verb co-occurs with a particular postverb, the more likely the verb and postverb are subject to fusion into a single lexical item (Shi 2002). In that case, the recurrent usage of a specific V-*kai* complex verb would serve as the impetus of its entrenchment as a lexicalized unit.

The corpus data concerning the usage of V-*kai* resultative verbs with relatively high token frequencies (e.g. *zhǎn-kāi*, *dǎ-kāi*, and *fēn-kāi*) indicate that these complex verbs display symptoms of lexicalization. It is generally agreed upon in the literature on lexicalization that semantic and grammatical reductions are often the concomitant features of lexicalized units (cf. Liberman & Sproat 1992). Moreover, as lexicalization occurs, the internal information in connection with individual word components, be it phonological, syntactic, or semantic, is likely to be less available to the operation of grammar as a whole (Packard 2000).

As for resultative verbs, Packard (2000:250) specifically points out that "the more lexicalized the gestalt verb is, the less the argument structure of the V_2 non-head becomes part of the argument structure of the gestalt verb." In other words, while the argument structure of resultative verbs is mostly a composite of the valence of V_1 and V_2, the process of lexicalization would render the syntactic information of argument structure less accessible. This study of V-*kai* constructions will further show that not only V_2's but V_1's argument structure information can also be lost when the gestalt verbs undergo the process of lexicalization.

The analysis of the most frequently used V-*kai* complex verbs illustrates that the argument structure is indeed less compositional in terms of the respective valence of individual verbs. Take both arguments of the *zhǎn-kāi* complex verb in example (1) for

example, *xiǎo-yīng* 'little-eagle' and *chibang* 'wing' pertain to V_1 only, i.e. *zhǎn* and thus neither of the arguments is predictable from *–kai*. Likewise, in example (2), the two arguments of the V-*kai* complex verb, *dǎ-kāi*, i.e. *fùqīn* 'father' and *tang-hé* 'candy box', could be analyzed to be selected merely by the postverb *–kai*. The observation that V_1, *dǎ*, does not contribute to the argument realization of the gestalt verb could be ascribed to the semantic bleaching of its original meaning of *hitting* so that the verb denotes only a general cause of the opening of entities.

(1) *xiǎo-yīng* *bùyóudé* ***zhǎnkāi*** *le* *chìbǎng*[2]
little-eagle cannot.but spreadASP wing
'The eaglet had no choice but to spread its wings.'

(2) *fùqīn* ***dǎkāi*** *táng-hé,* *qǔ-chū* *shí-kē táng* *lái*
father open candy-box take-out ten-CL candy come
'The father opened the candy box and took out ten pieces of candy.'

Another source of evidence supporting the lexicalized inclination of considerably frequent V-*kai* complex verbs is the meaning extensions these gestalt verbs undertake. For instance, the original meaning of the complex verb *zhǎn-kāi* is considered 'spread out', as in (1). Nonetheless, the corpus data show that *zhǎn-kāi* is now predominantly used in the contexts where the gestalt verb denotes the meaning of 'launch', as in (3). Take *fēn-kā* as another example; in addition to its grammatical role of a complex verb meaning *separate*, the complex word en bloc can also be used as an adverb, with its meaning extended to *separately* or *independently*, as in (4). The usage of extremely frequent V-*kai* resultative verbs with semantic extensions and functional shift is an indicator of these lexical patterns to be highly entrenched as autonomous gestalt verbs.

(3) *gè* *hòuxuǎnrén* *yǐ* *bàn-tuǒ* *jìngxuǎn* *dēngjì*
every candidate already do-proper run.for registration
bìng *fēnfēn* ***zhǎnkāi*** *jìngxuǎnhuódòng*
and one.by.one launch campaign
'Every candidate has already finished their registrations for the campaign and launched their campaigns one by one.'

(4) *duì* *yuánzhùmín* *xuéshēng* *yīnggāi* *jízhōng* *zài* *yìqǐ*
to aborigine student should gather.up in together
huò ***fēnkāi*** *shàng-kè* *de* *wèntí*
or separately attend-class NOM question
'As for the question of whether aboriginal students should be put together or separately for the classes'

Delving into the usage data of noticeably frequent V-*kai* complex verbs confirms the previous assumption that token frequency is a reliable quantitative signpost of the degree of entrenchment. The repetitive co-occurrence between a specific verb with the

[2] Abbreviations and transcription conventions adopted in this study: ASP = aspect marker; CL = classifier; NOM = nominalizer.

postverb *–kai* establishes a gestalt status for lexicalized units with their own argument structure and semantic extension. It follows that the cases of *líkāi*, *zhǎnkāi*, *dǎkāi*, and *fēnkāi* are more likely to be reanalyzed as independent gestalt words and represented in the language user's mental lexicon.

5.2 The effect of type frequency on the schematization of V-*kai* resultative verbs

In addition to token frequency, the factor of type frequency also pertains to the usage of V-*kai* resultative verbs, for this type of complex verbs are characterized by the semantically-constrained open slot that precedes the postverb. Further, the verbal collocates of the postverb *–kai* can be semantically classified into several groups and the verb instances in each group share meaning similarities, pointing towards the establishment of subcategories of V-*kai* constructions with their own structures.

The semantic coherence within the meaning integration between distinct verb categories and the postverb in V-*kai* complex verbs, along with their formal resemblance, suggests that a network of V-*kai* constructional schemas that are organized hierarchically, from the most schematic to the most substantive, should be represented non-reductively in the linguistic system, as displayed in Figure 1. As can be observed in the diagram, a more general morpho-syntactic V-*kai* schema as one specific case of resultative verb constructions in Chinese can be abstracted. Moreover, the more abstract V-*kai* schema could be further elaborated by some more specific schemas, all of which are represented by square boxes in the diagram. For instance, the sub-schema [V_{MOTION}–*kai* 'away'] can be instantiated by the exemplar linguistic forms such as *zǒu-kāi* 'walk-away' and *rào-kāi* 'detour-away', instances of V-*kai* complex verbs represented in oval-shaped boxes in the diagram. In short, all of the V-*kai* schemas differing in their schematicity or specificity are redundantly represented in the language user's mental grammar.

In addition, various degrees of productivity regarding distinct categories of verbal collocates pinpointed in this study also reveal how well different V-*kai* sub-schemas are entrenched in grammar. In Figure 1, the degree of entrenchment of V-*kai* schemas and their instances is indicated by the extent to which the square or oval-shaped box is emboldened. In this case, the V-*kai* complex verbs in which the V_1 belongs to the major categories of verbal collocates are deemed as more conventional routines, which are more likely to be stored as productive templates for generating and interpreting novel uses, and thus constitute the core usage of V-*kai* constructions. For instance, more instances of manipulation verbs are found to collocate with *–kai* than, say, expansion verbs, in real language use, so it can be predicted that the schema [$V_{MANIPULATION}$–*kai* 'open'] is more routinized and enjoys a stronger representation in grammar.

Still, the combinations between less productive verbal collocates and the postverb showcase the more creative, peripheral usage of V-*kai* complex verbs in that they illustrate how speakers can draw on the more conventionalized routines and further deviate from them for innovative usages. For example, since fewer usage events that involve the distinct types of chatting verbs are found in the corpus data, it could be inferred that the [$V_{CHATTING}$–*kai* 'inceptive'] schema would be far less entrenched than, for instance, the [$V_{MANIPULATION}$–*kai* 'open'] schema in the linguistic system. The patterns of collocation in the usage of V-*kai* resultative verbs substantiate the fact that "while language users stick to various kinds of routines in the vast majority of communicative events they are able to deviate from these routines and produce…novel or unusual linguistic forms and structures" (Mukherjee 2005:215).

Moreover, the interface between token and type frequency can further shed light on the category formation of V-*kai* resultative verbs. The semantic similarities shared by all the instances of V-*kai* complex verbs that elaborate a particular V-*kai* pattern point to the development of different categories of V-*kai* schemas. Specifically, the properties of the verb types associated with a specific category of verbal collocates of *–kai* delimit the boundary of the ensuing V-*kai* schema. To illustrate, what the V_1 in the exemplars that instantiate the constructional schema of [V_{MOTION}–*kai* 'away'] have in common is the meaning component involving translational motion. It follows that these semantically-related verbs constitute an exemplar cluster or category that display prototype effect.

Precisely, this more productive category of V-*kai* schema [V_{MOTION}–*kai* 'away'] is further organized with respect to members that may be central or peripheral to the category. In this example, the instance of *lí-kāi*, which entertains extremely high token frequency to be well-routinized, would be perceived as more prototypical, whereas the instance of *rào-kāi*, which occurs with very low token frequency and undergoes less entrenchment, would be recognized as a more peripheral member of this category. The present study hence subscribes to the position that "[g]rammar is built up from specific instances of use that marry lexical items with constructions; it is routinized and entrenched by repetition and schematized by the categorization of exemplars" (Bybee 2006:730).

5.3 From corpus to cognition

The quantitative information on both the token and type frequency of verbal collocation in V-*kai* complex verbs extracted from the corpus data suggest distinct patterns of cognitive routinization of V-*kai* resultative verbs in the speaker's linguistic system. High token frequency of individual V-*kai* combinations is indicative of the entrenchment of particular V-*kai* resultative verbs as lexical items. In contrast, high type frequency of co-occurrence of verb instances classified in different categories with the postverb *–kai* illuminates the routinized patterns of V-*kai* resultative verbs as constructional schemas. This study thus corroborates the "From-Corpus-to-Cognition Principle" (Schmid

2000:39), which postulates that "frequency in text instantiates entrenchment in the cognitive system." In other words, the investigation of real usage data in a corpus sheds much light on how V-*kai* resultative verbs are represented and organized in the speaker's mental grammar.

With the premise that corpus data comprise large samples of actual use of the linguistic system, it follows that the "from-corpus-to-cognition" methodology adopted in this study also bridges the two extreme senses of "usage-based" mentioned in Dickinson and Givón (2000:151), namely, "user-based models" and "usage-produced data." The former more theoretical sense involves providing linguistic descriptions to represent actual mental operation of speakers. In contrast, the latter methodological sense is concerned with descriptions strictly deriving from the empirical data of actual language use. This study therefore follows the spirit of a usage-based conception of language by acknowledging the significant role of usage data in describing language structures and constructing linguistic theories (c.f. Kemmer & Barlow 2000).

6. Concluding remarks

The present study adopts a corpus-oriented usage-based approach to a subclass of Chinese resultative verbs, V-*kai* constructions, employing the quantitative techniques of collocational and frequency analysis for their distribution and productivity. A skewed distribution of various V-*kai* combinations has been sketched in the corpus data; some V-*kai* complex verbs (e.g. *lí-kāi* and *zhǎn-kāi*) pertain to notably high token frequency. The frequency occurrence of these resultative verbs can be explained by the observation that V_1 and *–kai* have a natural "action-result" semantic relationship.

In terms of the productivity of V-*kai* patterns, a frame-semantic categorization of V_1 indicates that different verb categories co-occur with the postverb in varying degrees of type frequency. The major categories of verbal collocates of *–kai* include motion verbs, manipulation verbs, separating verbs, dispersal verbs, expansion verbs, and avoiding verbs. The high productivity of these verb groups signals their higher semantic compatibility with the postverb *–kai*. Additionally, when collocating with distinct verb categories, *–kai* yields different interpretations in the ensuing resultative verbs. In other words, when *–kai* collocates with a specific class of verbs, its meaning would be modulated to cater to the most plausible result reading in the given class of resultative verbs.

Moreover, this paper has also explicated the essential roles of frequency in usage events in shaping the linguistic representations of V-*kai* resultative verbs. The V-*kai* resultative verbs with comparatively high token frequencies in the corpus have been found to exhibit signs of lexicalization. The finding that their argument structure is less compositional and that they can undertake meaning extensions shows that these lexical units are highly entrenched as autonomous gestalt verbs. The corpus-based usage data in this study therefore reveal the close relationship between the frequency of two linguistic units occurring in sequence and their ensuing constituent structure.

In addition, the observation that verbal collocation within V-*kai* resultative verbs comes in different strengths accords with the experience-driven, probabilistic view of grammatical generalizations. Besides, the finding that various types of verbs co-occur with *–kai* with different frequency of co-occurrence attracts our attention to both conventional and creative usage of V-*kai* resultative verbs. Based on large samples of real usage data of V-*kai* constructions, this study demonstrates that cognitive routines and creative uses should be in equilibrium in actual language use.

Finally, the frequency analysis undertaken in this study indicates that the effects of token and type frequency effects are both at work in structuring the usage of V-*kai* constructions, which suggests that the formation of Chinese resultative verbs should be conceived as a lexical as well as a syntactic matter. Accordingly, the routinized patterns of V-*kai* constructions that vary in their extent of specificity and generality serve as a representative illustration of the continuum between lexicon and grammar that characterizes a usage-based conception of language.

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About the author

Ben Pin-Yun Wang is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the dual-title program of Applied Linguistics and Asian Studies. In addition, he was a visiting student researcher at the University of California, Berkeley (2008-2009) and taught as a lecturer in the Academic Writing Education Center at National Taiwan University in 2010-2011. His research interests include cognitive-functional linguistics and text/discourse analysis as well as their applications to language pedagogy.

TESTING THE LIMITS OF ANAPHORIC DISTANCE IN CLASSICAL ARABIC: A CORPUS-BASED STUDY

SAMIR O. JARBOU
Jordan University of Science and Technology
samerjar@just.edu.jo

FATHI MIGDADI
Jordan University of Science and Technology
fhmigdadi@just.edu.jo

Abstract
One of the central aims in research on anaphora is to discover the factors that determine the choice of referential expressions in discourse. Ariel (1988; 2001) offers an Accessibility Scale where referential expressions, including demonstratives, are categorized according to the values of anaphoric (i.e. textual) distance that each of these has in relation to its antecedent. The aim of this paper is to test Ariel's (1988; 1990; 2001) claim that the choice to use proximal or distal anaphors is mainly determined by anaphoric distance. This claim is investigated in relation to singular demonstratives in a corpus of Classical Arabic (CA) prose texts by using word count to measure anaphoric distance. Results indicate that anaphoric distance cannot be taken as a consistent or reliable determinant of how anaphors are used in CA, and so Ariel's claim is not supported by the results of this study. This also indicates that the universality of anaphoric distance, as a criterion of accessibility, is defied.

Key words: anaphora, anaphoric distance, word boundaries, Classical Arabic, Ariel's Accessibility Scale

1. Introduction

There are various types of referring expressions and many of these can be used anaphorically to refer to other structures in discourse. Anaphoric expressions include personal pronouns, noun phrases, and demonstratives. Each of these has its own sub-categories in which each element is associated with specific contexts of occurrence. Most of the research on anaphora attempts to discover the circumstances that necessitate choosing one type of anaphoric expressions, rather than another, in a particular context (see Taboada 2008: 167). In the present study, focus is on one category of referring expressions represented by anaphoric proximal and distal demonstratives; these are investigated in a corpus of CA texts.

In many studies on proximal and distal anaphors, one of the most recurrent notions is that of *accessibility*. In general, the aim of research in this area is to identify the factors that lead a speaker to use particular referential expressions, in connection with specific

antecedent entities, in discourse (see Ariel 2001: 30; and Botley and McEnery 2001: 214). Some of the most detailed analyses of the factors governing the use of referential expressions, including anaphoric demonstratives, are those offered by Ariel (1988; 1990; 2001). The present study tests Ariel's (1988, 1990) claim that anaphoric distance between an anaphor and its antecedent in discourse is a major factor of accessibility and so of determining to use either a proximal or a distal anaphor in context.

In this paper, the determinants of using anaphoric demonstratives in CA will be examined as follows: first, I will explain the major types of anaphoric demonstratives; this is followed by a presentation of Ariel's Accessibility Scale and then a brief description of CA demonstratives. Second, I will provide a description of the CA corpus and details of the method that will be used to measure anaphoric distance for the purposes of this study. Third, I will investigate anaphoric distance in relation to the proximal and distal anaphors used in the CA corpus. This will be followed by a discussion of the results that have been obtained. Finally, I will provide a conclusion and then finish with a brief discussion of the limitations of the present study and suggestions for further research.

2. Background

Demonstratives serve different functions, and so it is important, first, to observe their main types as examined in earlier literature. The general function of demonstratives is "to coordinate the interlocutors' attentional focus in the speech situation" (Diessel 2006: 476; see also Strauss 2002; Diver 1984; Lyons 1978: 636-638; Halliday and Hasan 1976). Interlocutors usually use demonstratives to focus on entities present either in a deictic (i.e. physical) context or a textual (i.e. linguistic) one within discourse. The deictic use of demonstratives is usually referred to as *exophoric* while the textual use is generally called *endophoric* (see Diessel 1999; Himmelmann 1996; Jarbou 2010). It is traditionally known that exophoric demonstrative encode objects or people in the real world; for example, in the utterance "put *this* book on *that* table," *this* and *that* are used to point at objects existing in the physical context of interaction. On the other hand, endophoric demonstratives, which are usually referred to as 'anaphoric', cognitively point at referents (e.g. people, objects, or ideas) associated with antecedent words or expressions in discourse, as will be illustrated in example (1) shortly. Since the present study investigates demonstratives in CA texts, deictic demonstratives are beyond the scope of this study simply because they have "no antecedent that could be measured in the surrounding discourse" (Botley and McEnery 2001: 218). To further define the boundaries of this study, and following the categorization of demonstratives by Dixon (2003), the focus in this paper is on nominal anaphoric demonstratives only; other categories such as adverbial anaphors (e.g. *here* and *there*) are beyond the scope of this study.[1]

[1] Dixon (2003) divides demonstratives into (a) nominal demonstratives (b) local adverbials, and (c) verbal demonstratives having the meaning of 'do it like this' (Dixon 2003:62).

The next section provides an overview of the major types of endophoric demonstratives and explains the nature of the relations between these demonstratives and other entities in discourse.

2.1. Anaphors, referents, and antecedents

Endophoric demonstratives are either *anaphoric* or *discourse* demonstratives. These two types of demonstratives are usually described as discourse-referring means "designed to continue the existing attention focus [i.e. center of attention] established hitherto (or assumed to be so established)" in discourse (Cornish 2008: 999). In the case of anaphoric demonstratives in particular, an anaphor (i.e. anaphoric demonstrative) is, mostly, used as a tracking device that refers to "another expression or element in the discourse domain, called the antecedent" (Seuren 2009: 288). The antecedent is present in the "co-text" (Grundy 2000: 27) and anaphors are intended to "continue (sustain) a previously established focus towards" the antecedent mentioned earlier in discourse (Ehlich 1982: 330).[2] In this relation, an anaphor is a dependent term whereas an antecedent is an autonomous term (Cornish 1996: 21).

The concept of anaphora is generally explained in terms of coreferentiality. That is, a demonstrative is anaphoric when it refers to the same entity that a prior term (i.e. the antecedent) refers to in discourse (Lyons 1978: 660; Levinson 1983:67; see also Levinson 2006; Cornish 2008). In most cases, the anaphor does not refer to the antecedent itself since both mutually point at another entity outside the text, which is the referent. This anaphoric referent, however, has a cognitive nature rather than a physical one since it is "in the universe-of-discourse, which is created by the text" and is not itself located within the text (Lyons 1978: 670).

The relation between anaphors and their antecedents can be *direct* or *indirect*. When the antecedent of an anaphor is easily identifiable (usually when the antecedent is one word), the use of the demonstrative is described as involving direct anaphora, as in the following example:

(1) A: The man in apartment 222 is a criminal.
B: *That's* a policeman.

In (1), the anaphor *that* is coreferential with the antecedent *the man*. The anaphor is intended to "continue (sustain) a previously established focus towards a specific item" (here *the man*) on which attention had been oriented earlier in discourse (Ehlich 1982:330). The relation between *the man* and *that* in (1) is one of direct anaphora. However, when the antecedent of an anaphor "is more difficult to define directly," this type of relation is called indirect anaphora where "a reader or hearer may have to carry

[2] This is similar to the notion of *focus* in Sidner (1983) where *focus* and anaphora "operate to establish and maintain a reciprocal state of shared knowledge about discourse entities in focus between the producer of a text (i.e. a speaker) and the receiver of a text" (cited in Botley and McEnery 2000: 15).

out a somewhat complex process of inference to arrive at the antecedent" (Botley 2006: 74), as in example (2) below:

(2) A: They say global warming is changing our world.
B: I definitely agree with *that*.

The relation between the anaphor *that* and its referent in (2) is not straightforward or direct. The anaphor in (2) refers to the proposition of an antecedent discourse segment (i.e. the idea that 'global warming is changing our world'); it does not refer to a clearly defined object represented by the antecedent.[3] In (3) below, however, the distal anaphor *that* points at its antecedent itself (i.e. as a discourse segment). That is, it is not coreferential with its antecedent nor does it refer to the proposition expressed by the antecedent.

(3) A: One of the members said, "the proposal should be double-checked"
B: Who said *that*?

Demonstratives used in the same manner as that in example (3) are typically referred to as *discourse anaphors*. These anaphors are similar to what Lyons (1978) calls "pure textual deixis," where a demonstrative points at a antecedent discourse segment itself rather than at its referent or proposition. For Levinson (1983), the same linguistic phenomenon represents one category of what he calls "discourse deixis." Discourse anaphors function meta-linguistically since they point at expressions mentioned in previous discourse (see Botley 2006).

As has been observed in this section, depending on the nature of the relation between an anaphor and its antecedent, endophoric demonstratives are commonly divided into direct, indirect, and discourse demonstratives. In the first two uses, an anaphor is coreferential with its antecedent since these two mutually point at a referent outside the text. A discourse demonstrative, however, is not coreferential with its antecedent since it points at the antecedent itself within discourse. Several theories have been postulated in order to investigate the relation between referring expressions like anaphoric demonstratives and their antecedents in discourse. One of these theoretical accounts, presented in the next section, is that offered by Ariel (1988; 1990; 2001) in her research on referential expressions in English.

2.2. Anaphoric demonstratives within Ariel's Accessibility Scale

This section presents Ariel's (1988; 1990; 2001) Accessibility Scale, its categories and sub-categories, and discusses the four factors that Ariel believes determine the use of referential expressions. Ariel's claim concerning anaphoric proximal and distal demonstratives is also highlighted and discussed.

[3] For more information on the different types of direct and indirect anaphora, see Francis (1994); Diessel, (2006); Botley (2006).

Ariel (1988; 1990) draws attention to the notion of *accessibility* to investigate the relation between various referring expressions and their antecedents in a corpus of English. She categorizes referential expressions in an Accessibility Scale according to their degree of retrievability.[4] *Retrievability* generally refers to the degree of cognitive effort, or difficulty, by which an antecedent may be remembered or recalled by the addressee or reader. Ariel (1988; 1990; 2001) believes that some antecedents "will require less processing effort to retrieve than others, and this will influence which referring expressions are used" (Botley and McEnery 2001: 214). According to Ariel (1988; 1990), there are four determinants of retrievability or accessibility of referential expressions: the first is *anaphoric* (or *textual*) *distance* which is represented by the number of words and clauses between an anaphor and its antecedent, the second factor is *competition* between the different possible antecedents, the third factor is *saliency* which refers to whether the antecedent is topic or non-topic, and the fourth factor is *unity* which is about whether the antecedent and its anaphor are within the same world, point of view, segment, or paragraph.

Although Ariel (1988: 65; 2001: 33-38) mentions that accessibility depends on more than one factor, she mainly focuses on anaphoric distance. Based primarily on anaphoric distance, Ariel (1990: 73; 2001: 31) categorizes referring expressions into an Accessibility Scale where pronouns are High Accessibility Markers, anaphoric demonstratives are Mid Accessibility Markers, and proper names and definite descriptions are Low Accessibility Markers. The easier it is to retrieve the antecedent of a referring expression, the higher is the degree of its accessibility within Ariel's Scale. For instance, it is easier to retrieve or recognize the antecedent of a third-person pronoun (which is a High Accessibility Marker) such as *they* in "the little boys came early and *they* wanted to go to the beach" than to retrieve the antecedent of the distal demonstrative (which is an Intermediate Accessibility Marker) in "he said the crops will be ruined by rain, but nobody believed *that*". These uses of *they* and *that* can be compared with the higher difficulty in retrieving the antecedent of a definite description (i.e. Low Accessibility Marker) such as *the teacher* when its antecedent occurs in a previous paragraph with many intervening sentences between this definite description and its antecedent (for more examples, see Ariel 1990: 7-8).

[4] A similar representation is Gundel et al.'s (1993) *Givenness Hierarchy* which aims to illustrate the criteria by which a referring expression is chosen to refer to a particular entity in discourse based on the cognitive status of the referent. According to Gundel et al. (1993), using referring expressions reflects different cognitive statuses; these are arranged to form a Giveness Hierarchy consisting of six possible cognitive statuses that assist the addressee in recognizing the antecedent in discourse. However, unlike Ariel's Accessibility Scale, "the difficulty with Gundel's work is in finding testable claims that can be evaluated in a corpus. Unlike Ariel, Gundel does not give any specific metrics, such as textual distance, to allow us to measure the extent to which particular anaphoric expressions reflect particular cognitive statuses" (Botley and McEnery 2000: 10). Another area of study that can be related to Ariel's Accessibility theory and Gundel et al.'s work is Centering Theory which is "a theory of local focus in discourse that proposes different transition types between any pair of utterances. Those transitions are based on salience, but also on the expectations that the hearer might have about the focus of the next utterance" (Taboada 2008: 177); see also Grosz et al. 1995; Walker et al. 1998; and Taboada et al. 2008.

Ariel believes that the criteria she uses to construct the Accessibility Scale (i.e. as a macro structure) also apply to the categories within the Scale in that each of these has its own internal scale (i.e. a micro-scale) as well. In other words, each of the individual categories has its own sub-categories of forms that are also ordered according to their accessibility values. For instance, anaphoric demonstratives, representing Mid Accessibility Markers, are "themselves distinguished as to Accessibility" since "proximal and distal Markers serve to refer to entities over shorter and longer textual distance respectively" (Ariel 1988: 76). Based on Ariel's (1988; 1990; 2001) Accessibility Scale, proximal demonstratives are High Accessibility Markers while distal demonstratives are Low Accessibility Markers within the main category of Mid Accessibility Markers. She uses anaphoric distance as the determining factor to categorize referential expressions into High, Intermediate, and Low accessibility Markers. The same criterion (i.e. distance) is also used to label the sub-categories within each of these three categories in Ariel's Scale.

Consequently, as far as the accessibility value of anaphoric demonstratives is concerned, Ariel (1988; 1990; 2001) focuses mainly on anaphoric distance; she indicates that the other three factors (i.e. *saliency*, *competition*, and *unity*) are far more related to either High Accessibility or Low Accessibility Markers than to Intermediate Accessibility Markers.[5] Ariel constructs the internal taxonomy of Intermediate Accessibility Markers (i.e. demonstratives) primarily by depending on the factor of anaphoric distance (see Ariel 1990: 31). According to Ariel's proposal, within this internal taxonomy of demonstratives, the factors of *saliency*, *competition*, and *unity* are far less relevant than *anaphoric distance* in determining the accessibility status of proximals and distals (see Ariel 1990: 69-72). In the present study, the factors of *competition* and *saliency* are naturally neutralized since they concern cases where an anaphor can possibly refer to more than one structure that can compete for the position of an antecedent. These cases, however, as Ariel indicates, concern, and call for the use of, High Accessibility Markers rather than Intermediate ones such as demonstratives (Ariel 1990: 69-72).[6]

On the other hand, Ariel (1990) indicates that the factor of *unity* applies more to Low Accessibility Markers such as full names (i.e. first name followed by family name) than to Intermediate or High Accessibility Markers. *Unity* concerns cognitive statuses of memory where the speaker, for one reason or another, perceives that it is easy (i.e. in cases of strong unity) or, conversely, it is difficult (i.e. in cases of weak unity) to retrieve the antecedent. In cases of low accessibility, the antecedent is sometimes in a paragraph previous to the one where the anaphor is, and also there are usually many intervening sentences between the antecedent and its anaphor. This long anaphoric distance would

[5] Ariel uses *saliency* in addition to *anaphoric distance* to label the sub-categories within the internal taxonomy of High Accessibility Markers. She also uses *unity* in addition to *distance* to label the sub-categories within Low Accessibility Markers.

[6] Moreover, even in cases where there could have been competitive antecedents for any of the CA demonstratives and a decision had to be made as regards their relevant degree of saliency, these had not been included in this study. These occurrences have been very rare in the corpus as far as anaphoric demonstratives are concerned and they have been excluded from data analysis since any attempt to recognize the definite antecedents of these demonstratives always led to ambiguity and vagueness (see section 3.2 below).

adversely influence unity and accessibility thus suggesting that less unity leads to the need to use Low Accessibility Markers to guarantee retrievability. The factor of *unity* in Ariel is also mostly related to anaphoric distance since long anaphoric distance usually leads to less unity and vice versa in the case of Low Accessibility Markers. As such, unity, investigated in relation to anaphors and antecedents separated by long anaphoric distance, cannot be applied to the study of the accessibility degree of Intermediate Accessibility Markers.[7] Ariel (1988; 1990) does, however, mention that there are other criteria to measure unity between referential expressions and their antecedents but she does not investigate these in relation to demonstratives.

The present study aims to test Ariel's (1988; 1990) claim concerning anaphoric distance by applying it to an analysis of the use of anaphoric demonstratives in CA. Ariel's claims can be summed up as follows: anaphoric distance is a significant determinant of accessibility since proximal anaphors tend to be associated with antecedents at short distance while distals tend to be associated with antecedents at long distance in discourse.

In order to test the applicability of this claim with regard to CA anaphors, this study aims to answer the following basic question: are anaphoric demonstratives in CA used in relation to anaphoric distance? That is, is anaphoric distance a reliable criterion to explain differences in using proximal and distal anaphors in CA?[8] The hypothesis in this paper is that, unlike the predominant tendency which Ariel (1988; 1990) discovers for anaphors in English, anaphoric distance cannot be taken as a determinant for the use of proximal and distal anaphors in CA. Sources of data for this study of CA anaphors are represented by a huge corpus of prose texts (see section 3 below).

To sum up, Ariel (1988; 1990) claims that anaphoric distance is a major determinant concerning the use of anaphoric demonstratives in discourse, as proximals are associated with antecedents at short distance while distals are associated with antecedents at long distance. Anaphoric distance is represented by the number of words and clauses between an anaphor and its antecedent. Based mainly on anaphoric distance values, Ariel labels proximals as High Accessibility Markers while distals are Low Accessibility Markers. Ariel's claim will be examined (see section 4) in relation to how demonstratives are used in a corpus of CA texts to test the reliability of anaphoric distance as a determinant of the use of anaphors in CA. Before doing this, the next section provides an overview of demonstratives in CA.

2.3. Demonstratives in CA

Arabic belongs to the family of West Semitic languages which also includes other languages like Aramaic and Hebrew. CA was the language of poetry, public speeches,

[7] See also section (4) below for findings concerning the effect of the distance factor on the accessibility degree of demonstratives in CA.

[8] This study is not concerned with investigating the overall status of demonstratives themselves as Intermediate Accessibility Markers in comparison with other categories of referential expressions; focus is on the elements within the internal (i.e. proximal/distal) taxonomy of this category.

and literary productions in general (see Owens 2006: 38) in the Arabian Peninsula.[9] This variety was used before and shortly after the rise of Islam in the seventh century AD; the generally "accepted hypothesis is that it represents a sort of *koine* or common language used for poetry (and probably for 'elevated diction' in general) throughout the peninsula" (Beeston 1970: 13; see also Brockelmann 1977: 42, vol. I). This suggests that CA was a common and widespread literary variety and that its users also had their own dialectal or everyday varieties of spoken Arabic (see Beeston 1970: 13; Brockelmann 1977: 42, vol. I).

The number of nominal demonstratives in CA is actually large since it has more than 30 demonstratives (see Appendix B).[10] Many of these have rare occurrences in CA; their demonstrative functions are usually taken over by the following far more common demonstratives: *haaða* 'this-Sg. M.', *haaðihi* 'this-Sg. F.', *haaðaan,* 'these-Dl. M.', *haataan* 'these-Dl. F.', *ðaalika* 'that-Sg. M.', *tilka* 'that-Sg. F.', *haaʔulaaʔi* 'these-Pl. M./F.', and *ʔulaaʔika* 'those-Pl. M./F.' [11] These eight demonstratives are attested in the corpus. However, the focus in this paper is only on the following four singular demonstratives: *haaða*, *haaðihi*, *ðaalika*, and *tilka*. The other four (i.e. dual and plural) anaphoric demonstratives have not been taken into consideration in this study for two main reasons: first, they are scarce in the corpus, and, second, they are expected to exhibit the same behavior as that of singular anaphors.

Many of the demonstratives in CA share the same lexical bases to which different types of affixes are attached. Some of these affixes represent inflections for gender and number. Dual demonstratives, unlike singular and plural ones, are also inflected for case. Many of the demonstratives in CA are formed by adding affixes to the proximal bases *ðа* 'this-Sg. M.', *ðee* 'this-Sg. F.' and *ʔul* 'these-Pl. F./M.' (for details see Jarbou 2012). This behavior of CA demonstratives reflects the general behavior within West Semitic languages (see Hasselbach 2007: 24). Other affixes that are usually attached to proximal bases in CA are *haa-*, *-li-*, *-ka*, and *-n-*. The prefix *haa-* is optionally added to proximals, does not have any distance-indicating value, and functions as an attention-getter. The suffixes *-li-* and *-ka* are added to singular and plural demonstratives while *-n-* is sometimes infixed to dual demonstratives. These three morphemes are distance-indicating (see Jarbou 2012).[12]

[9] This is a broad description of CA. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a definition of CA or to study its historical origins and development. For information on the history of CA see Versteegh 2001; Owens 2006.

[10] A good number of demonstratives in CA had the same semantic function but differed in form since many of these represent dialectal variations in Old Arabic (e.g. Old Hijaazi and Old Najdi) rather than stand for different functions. For instance, the following eight different forms of demonstratives had the same function which is pointing at a proximal, singular, feminine entity: *ðih*, *ðii*, *tihi*, *ðihi*, *tii*, *ðaat*, *tih*, *taa*.

[11] In the Arabic transliteration, vowels are represented as either short or long as follows: /*a*/-/*aa*/, /*i*/-/*ii*/, and /*u*/-/*uu*/. In addition, diphthongs are transliterated as /*aj*/ and /*aw*/. See Appendix A for the description of phonemic symbols and abbreviations used in this paper.

[12] A detailed analysis of the historical origin or morphological developments related to demonstratives in CA or Old Arabic varieties is beyond the scope of this paper.

After this short overview of demonstratives in CA, in the next section I turn to describing the details of the method that has been followed to examine the effect of anaphoric distance on using demonstratives in CA.

3. Method

The prose corpus considered for analysis in this study is part of what Owens (2006: 38) refers to as "the early *ʔaadab* or belles lettres literature" of CA. This corpus consists of texts that are included in the first volume of a huge, three-volume collection referred to as *Jamaharat Khotab Al-Arab* (*JKA*) (literally 'the multitude of the orations/sermons of the Arabs'). *JKA* is the largest and most comprehensive collection of CA prose. The productions or texts in *JKA* come from different resources such as writings of grammarians of Arabic, philosophers, historians, and from books describing the different aspects of the Arab and Islamic life. A. Safwat compiled these texts and published them in 1933. Each of the volumes of *JKA* deals with a specific historical period. The texts in *JKA* represent real speeches, orations, and sermons (by kings, tribal leaders, and other prominent figures in society) in addition to narrations of prominent events, debates, arguments, descriptions, etc. that had originated in the period from the sixth century A.D. to the ninth century A.D.

The history of the examined texts dates from the pre-Islamic period to the period shortly after the rise of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula. This period covers a time span that spreads from the sixth century A.D. to the end of the seventh century. Most of the texts included in the first volume had been produced within the two major regions in the Arabian Peninsula: Hijaaz (western region of present-day Saudi Arabia) and Najd (central and eastern regions of present-day Saudi Arabia). The examined corpus represents the first half of texts in the first volume. The reason why focus was only on these texts is, firstly, because these texts are taken as representing (early) CA in the peak of its development and before language changes started to take place in the centuries that followed and, secondly, this corpus of about 40,000 words is believed to be large enough to allow for an adequate investigation of how anaphoric demonstratives had been used in CA. The corpus is in the form of texts on paper. It has been analyzed manually simply for the lack of any software that can locate antecedents of anaphoric demonstratives in Arabic, not to mention locating antecedents of indirect or discourse anaphora.

The method of data analysis followed in this paper consists of two steps: taking Ariel's investigation of accessibility that focuses mainly on anaphoric distance as a model, the first step is to measure the anaphoric distance between the CA anaphors and their antecedents as they occur in the corpus. How this was actually performed will be discussed in the next section and the results will be presented in section 4.

3.1. Measuring anaphoric distance

The issue of how to measure anaphoric distance between referring expressions and their antecedents is relatively debatable (see Taboada et al. 2008). For instance, in Givón (1983), anaphoric distance is measured based on the number of clauses between

anaphoric noun phrases and their antecedents. In another study, Botley and McEnery (2001) calculate anaphoric distance based on the number of words and sentences between anaphoric demonstratives and their antecedents.

In the present study, which focuses on demonstratives rather than on a variety of expressions that includes other types of referring expressions, anaphoric distance was calculated by counting words, rather than phrases, clauses, or sentences, between anaphors and their antecedents. It is assumed here that sentence or clause count would not give accurate measurements of anaphoric distance between anaphoric demonstratives and their antecedents, at least in CA, simply because it is common for both proximals and distals to have their antecedents in an immediately preceding sentence or clause. In other words, there are frequent occurrences, in the corpus, of proximal and distal anaphors that have the same or similar sentence-distance (see examples 6 and 7 below). For that reason, their anaphoric distance could only be measured through word-distance. Word count is here perceived as being far more "computationally feasible" (see Botley and McEnery 2001: 232) than counting sentences or clauses to measure anaphoric distance between demonstratives and their antecedents.[13]

Moreover, it is expected that sentence, clause, or phrase-count would work better when studying the relative accessibility statuses of anaphoric expressions within the category of Low Accessibility Markers. Within this latter category, an antecedent and its anaphor are usually separated by (many) intervening phrases and sentences and sometimes they are also separated across paragraph boundaries. The next section provides the definition of *word* that has been utilized in this study for the purposes of counting words and recognizing word boundaries in the CA texts.

3.2. Words and word boundaries in CA

In any single study that depends on word count to measure anaphoric distance, one needs to decide on what constitutes a word boundary. This is important in order to have a reliable tool that gives consistent measurements of anaphoric distance. However, to recognize word boundaries in a corpus of written texts, it is essential to have a practical and effective definition of what a *word* is. The definition of what constitutes a word, which has been adopted for the purposes of this study, combines the features of morphological and orthographic words.

An orthographic word is represented by a written sequence of letters which is "preceded by a blank space and followed either by a blank space or a punctuation mark" (Plag 2003: 4). In morphology, however, a morpheme (i.e. the smallest meaningful sound unit) is divided into two types: free morphemes (e.g. 'nature'), that can stand independently in speech, and bound morphemes (mostly affixes) (see Plag 2003:10). Accordingly, a morphological word can be described as a free morpheme which has or does not have bound morphemes attached to it.

In addition, as far as the grammarians of Arabic are concerned, a word or *kalima* in Arabic is *ʔima ʔisim wa ʔima fi3il wa ʔima harf' ðuu ma3na*; this can be translated as

[13] However, as mentioned earlier in this section, Botley and McEnery (2001) use word and sentence count.

follows: a word in Arabic is 'either a noun, a verb, or a letter (i.e. particle) that has meaning' (see Ibn 3aqiil 1996: 13-16). This definition identifies words as independent syntactic categories that have meaning. These categories are represented by parts of speech. This definition also indicates that a word in Arabic consists of one free morpheme that might have other morphemes attached to it. It should be taken into account that verbs in Arabic are inflected for tense, person, number, and gender. These inflections are affixed to the root of the verb to form one morphological word. For instance, although personal pronouns in Arabic are sometimes attached to verbs, any of these verbs would still be considered as one morphological, or orthographic, word. For example, *ʔkalaha* 'he ate it' is transliterated as 'ate-he-it' but is considered as a single morphological or orthographic word in Arabic.[14] Another example is that the word *biraʔsihi* 'with his head' (transliterated as 'with-head-his') is one word in spoken and written Arabic since it consists of the free morpheme *raʔs* 'head' which is a noun prefixed with the preposition *bi* 'with' and suffixed with the pronoun *hi* 'his'. In view of that, a *word* in Arabic is a morphological word which is represented in writing by a space before it and a space after it.

All parts of speech in an utterance or sentence in Arabic are morphological words, provided that they are not attached to other parts of speech. In the present study, the definition of a *word* that is adopted for the purposes of defining word boundary, which in turn is necessary for measuring anaphoric distance, is as follows: a word in an Arabic utterance or (written) sentence consists of one free morpheme that might have affixes attached to it. Based on common features between the orthographic and morphological accounts of what a *word* in CA is, and for the purposes of this paper, an orthographic word is the same as a morphological word. Examples on these morphological words in CA include content words like nouns, adjectives, and verbs in addition to function words like particles and prepositions (i.e. as independent morphemes). Throughout the whole process of data analysis in this study, anaphoric distance has been measured consistently by counting all orthographic words between each anaphor and its antecedent. The average anaphoric distance of proximals has been compared with that of distals.

However, it is unlikely that all researchers studying anaphoric expressions in different human languages could have followed the same criteria to measure anaphoric distance; some would depend on word count, others on sentence count, and still others would depend on both sentence and word count. Researchers concerned with anaphoric distance do not seem to put much emphasis on whether it is word or sentence count that is used to measure anaphoric distance. What matters most is that the criteria used to measure anaphoric distance for one type of referential expressions (e.g. proximals) be the same that is used for another type (e.g. distals) in the same study so that one can finally have comparable results for the investigated types of expressions. In any study on anaphoric distance, accuracy in comparing and classifying types of anaphoric structures depends on consistency in applying the same measurement tool to the items to be compared (see, as cited in Ariel (1990), Hinds (1983) on Japanese, Bentivoglio (1983)

[14] However, personal pronouns in Arabic can also be independent morphemes. This happens mostly in cases when they, as subjects, occur before their verbs. In these contexts, native speakers recognize the personal pronoun as one morphological word that is also represented as a single orthographic word in writing.

on Spanish, Jaggar (1983) on Hausa, and Gasser (1983) on Amharic, in addition to Ariel (1988, 1990) on English).

The texts included below in examples (4) to (7) can be taken as illustrations on how anaphoric distance has been measured using word count.[15] For instance, consider the following text (from Safwat 1933: 106) on the distal anaphor *ðaalika*: [16]

(4) *thumma ina* ***3amran dakhala*** ***Hadiiqatan*** ***lah wa***
then be **3amr entered-he** **garden** **his and**
ma3ahu ***ʤaariyatayni*** ***min*** ***ʤawaariih*** *fabalagha* ***ðaalika***
with-him **maids-two** **from** **maids-his** so-reached **that**
Tariifa
Tariifa
'3amr then entered one of his gardens with two of his maids, and so Tariifa knew of that'

In example (4), the distance between the distal anaphor *ðaalika* 'that' and its antecedent is one orthographic word only represented by *fabalagha* 'so-reached'. Another example illustrating how anaphoric distance has been calculated according to the definition of *word* and *word boundary* followed in this study is the following text (from Safwat, 1933: 69):

(5) *ʔayu ariʤaali ʔHabu ʔilajki Qaalat* ***ʔsahlu ʔnnajiib ʔsamihu alHasiib***
which men prefer to-you said-she **amenable clever meek thoughtful**
ʔnnabu alʔariib *Qaala laha hal baQya ʔHadun ʔafdhalu min* ***haaða***
principled witty said-he to her is remained anyone better than **this**
'what type of men do you think is best? She answered 'the one who is amenable, clever, meek, thoughtful, principled, and witty'. Then he asked 'is there anyone who is better than this?'

In (5), the anaphoric distance between the last word in the antecedent *ʔsahlu … alʔariib* 'easy-going… witty' and the proximal anaphor *haaða* 'this' is five words represented by *hal baQya ʔHadun ʔafdhalu min* transliterated as 'is remained anyone better than'. In this sequence of five words, we can identify five free morphemes of which two (i.e. *hal* and *min*) are function words and three (i.e. *baQya*, *ʔHadun*, and *ʔafdhalu*) are content words.

In cases of indirect and discourse anaphora, anaphoric distance was measured by counting words between the anaphor and the last word in the phrase or clause standing for the antecedent. Nevertheless, this was sometimes difficult since, in some cases of

[15] Interlinear word-by-word gloss (i.e. transliteration) immediately follows the phonemic transcription of CA examples. Morphemes affixed to the roots of CA words are transliterated, rather than represented by symbols, after a hyphen in the gloss for purposes of clarity since the purpose of providing the gloss is mainly to know the exact number of words that exist between an anaphor and its antecedent. The hyphen indicates morphemic boundary. Morphemes that are joined by a hyphen represent one orthographic word.

[16] For the purposes of illustrating how anaphoric (i.e. word) distance has been calculated, anaphors and their antecedents appear in bold in examples (4) to (7) in this paper. In some cases, this does not mean that all words between the antecedent and anaphor should be included in word count since some of these words represent the narrators' words that are intended to report what interactants say. However, the narrator's words are easily recognizable in the transliterations.

indirect anaphora, the boundaries of the antecedent were indistinct and ambiguous. These cases, therefore, were not included in the analyzed data. They appear in Table (1) below underneath the category labeled as 'unresolved'. Botley (2006: 102) reports similar results of "fuzziness" and "ambiguity" concerning the study of indirect anaphora in English since he believes that "indirect anaphora definitely poses difficulties for corpus-based linguistics, in that almost 30% of IA [i.e. Indirect Anaphora] cases analyzed were hard to classify straightforwardly."

Anaphor	Number of occurrences	Anaphoric use	Deictic use	Unresolved
haaða	142	56	72	14
ðaalika	181	122	11	48
haaðihi	33	22	8	3
tilka	23	16	2	5
Total	379	216	93	70

Table 1: Distribution of anaphoric and deictic CA demonstratives in the investigated corpus.[17]

The antecedents categorized as 'unresolved' in Table (1) were hard to define for two reasons: first, the existence of more than one linguistic constituent that can be taken as representing the antecedent; second, it was difficult sometimes to define the structural boundaries (i.e. beginning and end) of the antecedent. This step of excluding such occurrences of demonstratives, where the antecedent co-exists with other structures that can compete for the position of a more or less salient antecedent status, has further aided in neutralizing the possible effects of *saliency* or *competition* in determining accessibility.[18]

To sum up, this section has defined, and provided illustrations on, how word count has been used as a tool to measure anaphoric distance in the CA corpus. In section 4 below, proximal and distal anaphors in the CA corpus are investigated in relation to Ariel's claim concerning the effect of anaphoric distance on the choice and use of anaphors in discourse.

[17] It is noticeable in Table (1) that the number of occurrences of the feminine demonstratives in the corpus is much less than that of the masculine ones. Although searching for explanations is beyond the scope of this paper, it seems that one reason is that texts in the corpus are mainly about the public and 'political' everyday life of Arab tribes that were dominated by men; these texts are mainly about issues related to the lives of, and activities mostly performed by, men such as battles, wars, travels, etc. It can be assumed that women did not have any influential or prominent presence in the public life in Old Arab societies. Consequently, women, and demonstratives referring to them, have a limited presence in those CA texts.

[18] These two factors (i.e. saliency and competition) as explained in 2.2 above, are, expectedly, irrelevant as determinants for the choice between proximals and distals within the class of demonstratives as Intermediate Accessibility Markers.

4. Results and discussion

This section examines Ariel's (1988; 1990) claim (see section 2.2 above) by investigating anaphoric distance related to the use of the CA anaphors *haaða*, *ðaalika*, *haaðihi, tilka*. To achieve this goal, the following method has been performed in this study: after anaphoric distance was measured for each particular instance of proximal and distal anaphors, it was added to the other distance measurements for the same anaphor (i.e. either proximal or distal) in all contexts of its occurrence in the corpus. Then, the average anaphoric distance for each anaphor was calculated by dividing the total sum of distance measurements on the number of instances of that anaphor. For example, the number of occurrences of the anaphor *ðaalika* 'that' is 122 and the sum total for distance measurements for all of these is 422 words. Consequently, the average textual distance for the anaphor *ðaalika* is 3.4 words. The same has been done for the other three anaphors. After that, the average anaphoric distance measurements related to proximals were compared with those related to distals to know if this indicated any correlations between anaphoric distance and choice of anaphoric demonstratives.

The average anaphoric distance for each of the investigated anaphors is shown in Table (2) below. The average anaphoric distance for the proximal masculine *haaða* 'this-Sg. M.' and for its distal counterpart *ðaalika* 'that-Sg. M.' is, respectively, 4.1 and 3.4 words. On the other hand, the average anaphoric distance for the proximal feminine *haaðihi* 'this-Sg. F' and for its distal counterpart *tilka* 'that-Sg. F' is 3.1 and 4.2 words, respectively. Anaphoric distance measurements for the masculine pair show that average distance between the proximal anaphor *haaða* and its antecedents is longer than that between the distal anaphor *ðaalika* and its antecedents. However, the feminine anaphors show the opposite, as the average distance between the proximal anaphor *haaðihi* and its antecedents is shorter than that between the distal anaphor *tilka* and its antecedents in discourse.

Anaphor	No. of occurrences	Total word distance	Average anaphoric distance (in words)
haaða 'this'	56	230	4.1
ðaalika 'that'	122	422	3.4
haaðihi 'this'	22	69	3.1
tilka 'that'	16	68	4.2

Table 2: Average anaphoric distance measurements for the proximal and distal anaphors in the CA corpus.

The results of average distance measurements between the proximal and distal masculine anaphors and their relevant antecedents in the CA corpus are similar to those obtained by Botley and McEnery (2001) in their study of anaphoric demonstratives in English. They conclude that "on the whole, the average sentence and word distances for proximal forms are greater than those for distal forms, which runs counter to Ariel's first claim" (Botley and McEnery 2001: 223).

On the other hand, results of the anaphoric distance between the CA feminine anaphors and their antecedents support Ariel's (1988) finding that distal anaphors tend to

refer more to textually remote antecedents while proximal anaphors tend to refer more to textually close antecedents. Nevertheless, the fact that the anaphoric distance measurements for the CA feminine anaphors contradict those for the masculine anaphors shows that anaphoric distance cannot be taken as a consistent, adequate, or comprehensive determinant of accessibility concerning CA anaphors and their antecedents. Another related aspect of this inconsistency of anaphoric distance as a measure of accessibility concerns the positions of anaphors in relation to their antecedents. To be more specific, proximal and distal anaphors in CA sometimes occur in contexts of similar anaphoric distance, as in, below, examples (6) and (7) (from Safwat 1933: 41 and 106, respectively):

(6) *faQaala*	*ʔima*	***ʔiHiaaʔi***	***kulayb***	***fahaaða***	*maa*	*laa*	*yakuun*
said-he	as-for	**resurrecting-I**	**Kulaib**	**so-this**	never	not	be

'he said, 'as for resurrecting Kulaib, this is something that cannot be done'

(7) *madhat*	*ʔilaa*	*ʔan*	***dakhalat***	***3ala***	***3amru***	*wa*
walked-she	to	when	**entered-she**	**on**	**3amru**	and
ðaalika	*Hiin*	*ʔintaSafa*	*ʔanahaar*			
that	when	at- middle	the-day			

'she walked away until she (reached and) entered 3amru's lodging and that was at midday'

The anaphoric distance between the proximal *haaða* and its antecedent in (6) and that between the distal *ðaalika* and its antecedent in (7) is almost equal since the proximal anaphor immediately follows its antecedent in (6) while there is only one word (i.e. *wa* 'and') separating the distal anaphor from its antecedent in (7). To be more precise, one can notice here that there are no words between the proximal anaphor and its antecedent in (6) since *fa-* 'so' is a bound morpheme attached to the proximal *haaða*. In example (7), there is only one free morpheme which is the particle *wa* 'and' as an independent word between the distal anaphor *ðaalika* and its antecedent.[19] As a result, accessibility of CA anaphors cannot be adequately or satisfactorily measured based on anaphoric distance considerations. This result reflects those obtained by Botley and McEnery (2001: 226-229) who raise doubts regarding the reliability of anaphoric distance as a measure of accessibility of anaphoric demonstratives in English. Referring to Ariel's notion of anaphoric distance, Botley and McEnery also explain that there are a number of examples in their corpus that "present methodological difficulties not only with measuring distance but also in relying on it as a valid measure at all" (2001: 226).

It can also be added that the results of this study support the findings attained by Botley and McEnery (2001: 224) in that "Ariel's claim that proximal demonstratives will refer to antecedents that are textually closer than is the case with distal demonstratives has not received strong support" (see also Reboul 1997: 91). Based on this, it could be argued that the choice of demonstratives in CA is not merely spatial. This is similar to what many studies find about the use of exophoric proximals and distals. For instance, in her analysis of demonstratives in Finnish, Laury (1997:145–46) believes that "the use of

[19] According to the definition of a *word* that is adopted for the purposes of this paper (see section 3.2 above), *wa* 'and' is an independent morphologic/orthographic word since it is a *harf* (i.e. particle) that has a meaning in CA.

demonstratives is not based on actual, concrete distance, but rather speakers use them to call attention to particular referents and indicate accessibility" (cited in Marchello-Nizia 2005: 59; see also Hanks 1990).

In conclusion, although Ariel (1988, 1999) focuses mainly on anaphoric distance as a major determinant of accessibility concerning the use of referring expressions in English, it emerges that this criterion cannot be taken as a reliable factor concerning the use of anaphoric demonstratives in CA. The average anaphoric distance measurements for the CA proximal and distal masculine anaphors contradict those for the feminine anaphors in the investigated CA texts. Moreover, the average anaphoric distance for the masculine proximal anaphor *haaða* is longer than that for the masculine distal *ðaalika*, which runs counter to Ariel's (1988, 1999) claim that proximals are associated with antecedents at short distance in comparison to distals as associated with antecedents at longer distance in discourse. Distance measurements for the CA masculine anaphors, in particular, indicate that anaphoric distance cannot be taken as a major or consistent determinant of the choice of proximal and distal anaphors in CA.

5. Conclusion and suggestions for further study

Ariel's (1988; 1990) claim that proximals are associated with antecedents at shorter anaphoric distance than that for distals could not be substantially supported by the results of anaphoric distance measurements of the CA anaphors examined in this study. Textual distance between anaphors and their antecedents in CA is not a reliable parameter when it comes to discovering the determinants of the anaphoric use of demonstratives.

Considering the observations made in the present article and their contributions to our overall understanding of the use of anaphoric demonstratives in CA, there are some points that need to be noted in a critical fashion. Firstly, the issue of how proximal and distal anaphors are used in CA deserves further analysis to reveal the factors and determinants related to how these anaphors are used in discourse. Secondly, I examined direct and indirect anaphora as representing the same category (i.e. both are endophoric) based on their shared feature that they function within texts rather than in deictic contexts. However, further studies can investigate the determinants of using direct in comparison to using indirect anaphora in CA. The purpose here would be to know if these different functions have similar or different conditions of use.

The third point relates to the issue that the basic function of many anaphors involves sharedness of referentiality since the anaphor and its antecedent usually point at the same referent (see section 2.1 above). The feature of sharedness has different manifestations in the literature on demonstratives; for instance, Strauss (2002:135) refers to "sharedness or presumed sharedness of information" as one of the factors that determine a speaker's choice of demonstratives. Hanks (1990: 47) describes context of interaction as *symmetric* or *asymmetric* depending on whether interactants share or do not share access to the referent. Shared access "may derive from common background experience, a shared perceptual field, a shared focus of attention, or other symmetrical relations." Hanks' (1990) concepts of 'symmetry' and 'asymmetry' in addition to Strauss's (2002) notions of 'focus' and 'sharedness of information' seem to offer appropriate and promising

'tools' that can be employed to examine the major factors determining the choice and use of proximal and distal anaphors in CA.

The idea of *sharedness* to describe the relation between a referential expression and its antecedent can be easily recognized in Ariel's (1988; 1990; 2001) concept of *unity*. *Unity* in Ariel (2001: 29) refers to whether the anaphor and its antecedent are "within vs. without the same frame/ world/ point of view/ segment or paragraph." However, although Ariel (1988; 1990; 2001) does not investigate *unity* in relation to demonstratives, it is expected that investigating sharedness of "the same frame/ world/ point of view/ segment or paragraph" (Ariel 2001: 29) between an anaphor, its antecedent, and their referent, can offer significant insights concerning how CA anaphors are used in discourse.

Another issue is that although Ariel (1990) investigates *saliency* mainly in relation to High Accessibility Markers rather than to Intermediate ones such as anaphoric demonstratives, this should not be taken to indicate that the effect of such a factor is irrelevant to the use of demonstratives. Perhaps further research could reveal if *saliency* has any effects on the accessibility degree associated with the use of anaphors in CA. Further studies making use of larger or different types of corpora could help in determining if *saliency* is a relevant factor of accessibility in CA.

It is hoped here that future investigation of the possible determinants of using anaphors in CA will illustrate the importance of corpus-based studies in testing, modifying, or simply expanding the dominant perspectives and theories on anaphora. Such further research could perhaps also assist in the general aim towards providing tools and methods for a comprehensive understanding of the cognitive nature of anaphora in language.

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About the authors

Samir Jarbou obtained his PhD in rhetoric and linguistics from Indiana University of Pennsylvania, USA in 2002. He is currently employed at the Department of English Language and Linguistics, Jordan University of Science and Technology. He is mainly interested in deixis, anaphora, speech acts, and the semantics-pragmatics interface.

Fathi Migdadi is employed at the Department of English Language and Linguistics, Jordan University of Science and Technology. He received his PhD from Ball State

University, USA in 2003. His research interests include speech acts, conversation analysis, and bilingualism.

Appendix A

Following is a list of the symbols and what they stand for as used in this paper:

Symbol	Description
/ʔ/	glottal stop
/ð/	voiced interdental fricative
/3/	voiced pharyngeal fricative
/H/	voiceless pharyngeal fricative
/kh/	voiceless velar fricative
/T/	emphatic voiceless alveolar
/dh/	emphatic voiced interdental fricative
/gh/	voiced velar fricative
/Q/	voiceless uvular stop
/S/	emphatic voiceless alveolar fricative
/ʤ/	voiced palato-alveolar affricate
/a/-/aa/, /i/-/ii/, /u/-/uu/	short-long vowels
Sg.	singular
Dl.	dual
Pl.	plural
F.	feminine
M.	masculine

Appendix B

The following table illustrates the majority of singular, dual, and plural demonstratives in CA; some of these are more common than others - the very rare ones have not been included.

Demonstrative	Description	Meaning
haaða	Sg. M.	'this'
ðaʔ	Sg. M.	'this'
haaðihi, ðih, ðii, tihi, ðihi, tii, ðaat, tih, taa	Sg. F.	'this'
(haa)ðani	Dl. M.	'these two'
(haa)tani	Dl. F.	'these two'
(haa)ʔula	Pl. M/F.	'these'
(haa)ʔulaaʔi	Pl. M./F.	'these'
ðaaka	Sg. M	'that'
ðaalika	Sg. M.	'that'
tilka	Sg. F.	'that'
taalika	Sg. F.	'that'
ðaanika	Dl. M.	'those two'

Demonstrative	Description	Meaning
taanika	Dl. F.	‘those two’
ðaannika	Dl. M.	‘those two’
taannika	Dl. F.	‘those two’
ʔulaaka	Pl. M/F.	‘those’
ʔulaaʔika	Pl. M/F.	‘those’

THE PRAGMATIC FUNCTIONS OF REPETITION IN TV DISCOURSE

GHALEB RABAB'AH
Alfaisal University, Saudi Arabia
grababah@alfaisal.edu

ALI FARHAN ABUSEILEEK
Al-albayt University, Jordan
alifarhan66@gmail.com

Abstract
Since repetition is a natural phenomenon used to perform various functions in interactional discourse, adopting a pragmatic analysis to the discourse of Dr. Phil and his guests on Dr. Phil's TV show, this study attempted to explore the pragmatic functions of such repetitions as used by English native speakers. The data were gathered from conversations between native speakers of English, and based on 7 full episodes of Dr. Phil's TV Show. The researchers watched, and studied these episodes on YouTube. The study revealed that one of the salient features of TV discourse is repetition, which is employed to perform a variety of language functions. Repetition was used to express emphasis, clarity, emotions, highlight the obvious, be questionable, express annoyance, persuasion, express surprise, give instructions, and as a filler in order to take time, when the speaker was searching for a proper word to say what would come next. The study concluded that these findings had significant implications for EFL/ESL teachers and the interlanguage development of EFL/ESL learners.

Key words*:* TV discourse, media, self-repetition, repair, repetition functions, communication strategies

1. Introduction

The present research assumes that native English speakers as represented by Dr. Phil and his guests use a range of communication strategies or devices to achieve their goals, among which is self-repetition. Therefore, the present research adopts a pragmatic analysis to the discourse of Dr. Phil, the host, and his guests on Dr. Phil TV talk show. More specifically, the study looks at the pragmatic functions of repetition in TV discourse. Pragmatics is defined as the study of the intended meaning. According to Green (2008), pragmatics is:

> understanding intentional human action. Thus, it involves the interpretation of acts assumed to be undertaken in order to accomplish some purpose. The central notion n Pragmatics must then include belief, intention (or goal), plan and act (p. 2).

Similarly, Yule (1996:3) in his definition of pragmatics affirms that pragmatics is concerned with the study of meaning as communicated by a speaker (or writer) and interpreted between a listener (or a reader). Thus, pragmatics is the study of meaning in interactional context; that is, the meaning of a particular utterance can be constructed only when we place this utterance in its physical and linguistic contexts.

The study of repetition was repeatedly conducted within a broad framework of communication strategies (Genc, 2007). Communication strategies (CSs) are defined as strategies "used by an individual to overcome the crisis which occurs when language structures are inadequate to convey the individual thought" (Tarone, 1977:195). However, Faerch and Kasper (1983:36) viewed them as "potentially conscious plans for solving what to an individual presents itself as a problem in reaching a particular communicative goal."

The fact that CSs are used by both native and nonnative speakers has been supported by many researchers (e.g., Dornyei and Thurrell, 1991; Dornyei 1995; Kocoglu, 1997; Rabab'ah, 2001). Dornyei and Thurrell (1991) asserted that strategic competence (ability to use communication strategies) was "relevant to both L1 and L2, since communication breakdowns occur and must be overcome not only in a foreign language but in one's mother tongue as well." (p.17). Dornyei (1995) also described CSs as "various verbal and non-verbal means of dealing with difficulties and breakdowns that occur in everyday communication" (p. 55). Kocoglu (1997) concluded that native English speakers employed fewer communication strategies than did Turkish learners of English (e.g., self-repair, repetition and paraphrase). Similarly, Rababah (2001:3) found that "Arab learners used CSs in their native language, but when compared to the CSs used in their target language, these were fewer in terms of frequency and vary in terms of type." In another study investigating communication strategies used by Arabic as a Second Language (ASL) learners, Rabab'ah (2007) found that repetition, as a CS, was one of the most frequent strategies.

Not only was repetition given due attention in the taxonomies of communication strategies, but also its types and functions have been elaborated. Dörnyei & Scott (1997) reported that "the L2 speaker's frequent need for more time to process and plan L2 speech than would be naturally available in fluent communication associated with strategies such as the use of fillers, hesitation devices, and self-repetitions" (p.183). Dornyei & Thurrell (1994) concluded that repetition is a conversational strategy for dealing with communication 'trouble spots'. In their research on both native and non-native speakers, Stuart & Lynn (1995) found that non-native speakers resorted to repetition strategy more frequently than native speakers.

Ochs & Schieffelin (1983) described repetition as one of the most misunderstood phenomena in psycholinguistics. Indubitably, repetition is a human, social activity, clearly part of our everyday conduct and behavior and not just a marker of a "disfluent" or "sloppy" speaker (Schegloff 1987). According to Tannen (1989), repetition is a phenomenon that occurs quite naturally in conversational speech. Similarly, Fillmore (1979) stated that the frequency of its occurrence allows us to question whether repetition, in fact, may not be "native- like". They may be too much, too little or even inappropriate use of repetition. Fillers are used to gain time in search for a vocabulary or a grammatical item. Shimanoff & Brunak (1977) suggested that:

> Sophisticated speakers attempt to avoid absolute redundancy. For example, the speaker who uses 'let's say, let's suppose' will probably be perceived as a more eloquent communicator than the speaker who says 'let's let's let's suppose'" (p. 136).

Repetition in native speakers (NS) and non-native speakers' (NNS) speech, as a strategy of repair, has been intensively investigated (e.g., Schegloff et al., 1977; Tarone, 1980; Wong, 2000; Rieger, 2001; Haeyeon, 2002; Sawir, 2004; Cho, 2008; Laakso, 2010). Schegloff et al. (1977) describe the basic format of self-repair as initiation with a non-lexical initiator that is followed by the repairing segment (p. 376). These non-lexical initiators are comprised of cut-off, lengthening of sounds, and quasi-lexical fillers such as uh and um. Two of the four functions of self-repair suggested by Schegloff et al. (1977) are relevant to our study: word search and word replacement. Most of these functions involve the replacement of one lexical item by another, or in the case of repetitions, by the same lexical item, but the authors further subdivide these functions. According to Koshik & Seo (2008), search for words during communication is used by both NS and NNS, and this is not due to the fact that they do not know or have not learned the words they are looking for, but they may have momentarily forgotten them. Therefore, they resort to repetition of a lexical item while searching for an appropriate word to fill the gap.

From this perspective, Rieger (2003) also investigated repetitions, as self-repair strategies, used in conversations in two related languages: English and German. Rieger (2003:51) asserts, "Repetitions -which are also called recycling - consist of the consecutive usage of the same quasi-lexical or lexical item or items. Her study revealed that her subjects repeat more pronoun-verb combinations, more personal pronouns, and more prepositions in English than in German, and they recycle more demonstrative pronouns in German than in English. These differences are explained by structural differences in English and German, demonstrating that the structure of a particular language shapes the repair strategies of language users because it creates opportunities for recycling. Rieger concluded that repetition as a self-repair strategy is an orderly phenomenon. Similarly, Cho (2008) examined repair strategies of elementary second language learners. The study revealed that partial repetition and request for repetition were among the most frequent strategies used.

2. TV Show discourse studies

Hess-Lu¨ttich (2001) defined 'Show conversations' as conversations staged for show which address an audience, and they do not only include TV talk shows, but also dialogues on the theatrical stage. They are also prepared conversations that adopt basic communication rules, or they violate these rules in certain ways to achieve certain effects or goals. Although several studies have investigated the discourse of TV talk shows, these studies have been limited to the structure and the argumentative aspects of this discourse. For example, in examining the argumentation in two TV shows both in Germany and Switzerland, Hess-Lu¨ttich (2007) investigated the discursive strategies in terms of empirical criteria (turn taking, speaking time, etc.), and the discursive strategies

of the invited politicians in terms of qualitative data on the distribution of verbal power. The author concluded that:

> … argumentation in talk shows serves to stage politics as symbolic action rather than to argue for better solutions to existing problems. The debate is presented as a controversy, contest, even as a battle, rather than as rational discussion and argumentation." (p. 1369).

In studying the relationship between argumentation theory and discourse analysis, Rees (2007) concluded that both can benefit from each other. Bilal, H., Ahsan, H., Mujeeb, H. Gohar, S., Younis, Y, Awan, S. (2012) aimed to scrutinize the structures of two political talk shows of TV channels in Pakistan (**Capital Talk** and **Lekin (but)**) to make clear relationship between structure and meaning. Through the analysis, the researchers suggested that these TV talk shows used different tactics to "unravel the hidden truth and to project them to the public." and "gain a social power and the favor of public" (p.218). Thornborrow (2007) also examined the function of narrative discourse in the development of arguments in television talk shows. She demonstrated that TV talk arguments are "sequentially emergent from lay participants' narratives, and these narratives function to structure the production of opposing opinions and stances." Thornborrow discussed how stories are elicited, and "the problematising and evaluation of narrative actions by the host and other participants" (p. 1436). She argued that the articulation between narrative discourse and argument is one of the most important organizational features of TV talk show interaction.

However, it has been found that very limited research has investigated the communication strategies and devices used by TV show hosts. As far as the literature review is concerned, there is lack of studies that analyzed the discourse of TV shows from a pragmatic perspective (e.g., Aznárez-Mauleo´n, 2013). Aznárez-Mauleo´n noticed that in analyzing TV talk shows:

> Scholars in media studies often focus on external parameters---features such as the topic, the participants, audience targets, production---adopting what we might call a macro-perspective. This kind of description can be greatly enriched by an analysis of an essential component in most broadcast products, particularly in this kind of programme: the use of language (2013, p. 50)

Therefore, and based on that assumption, Aznárez-Mauleo´n (ibid) investigated the interactions between the TV talk host and guests. She found out that hosts use listenership devices, attention grabbing markers, repeating what the guest says, paraphrasing, and using compensatory strategies. She concluded that these strategies are related to "the hosts' role and their goals as managers of this kind of show."

3. Discourse functions

Some researchers have observed different functions of self-repetition in talk. For example, Kernan (1977:95) notes, "repetition recalls and reasserts the preceding token". Erickson (1984) finds that repeating oneself adds preciseness. Bublitz (1989) suggested that repetition is employed both to establish and maintain the continuous and smooth

flow of talk, and also to state the participants' positions so as to help to ensure comprehension of what has been said and meant. Bublitz (1989) went on to describe other functions of repetition, which include facilitating comprehension since self-repetition allows time for the speaker to plan what to say next or how to say it, and facilitates message comprehension on the part of the listener or second speaker. Bublitz added that self-repetition helps speakers to bridge gaps in conversation, and to state their position (agreement or disagreement) with respect to the other speaker's attitudes, decisions or opinions.

Repetition has been often handled 'under the rubric of communicative redundancy' (Brody 1986:255). According to Brody, "Repetition not only performs a variety of functions, but it may also be manifested in a number of different linguistic structures." (p. 255). The author argued for the multifunctionality of repetition. Norrick (1987:257) described four main functions of same-speaker repetition: semantically based, production-based, comprehension-based and interaction-based. Semantically based self-repetition may be idiomatic or may reflect the iterative nature of the described object in an iconic manner. This kind of self-repetition is also realised through avoidance of ellipsis to be emphatic. Production-based self-repetition, takes place when a speaker wants to hold the floor and to gain planning time while searching for what to say next, or planning the rest of the move or turn, and to bridge an interruption. Comprehension-based self-repetition can also be used to increase textual coherence in the ongoing talk, by the strategies of summarising, paragraphing and reintroducing a topic or a point of view. However, interaction-based self-repetition occurs when a speaker employs self-repetition to ask and answer his own questions within the same turn. It can also take the form of repeat without any change, repeat with stress on a significant word of the original utterance and repeat with expansion.

Tannen (1989) identified several functions served by repetition in conversation, whose major role was to establish coherence and interpersonal involvement:

- participatory listenership, which shows that the person is listening and accepting what has been uttered;
- ratifying listenership ,which occurs when the speaker incorporates the repeated phrase into their own narrative;
- humor;
- savouring through, which a speaker appreciates the humor in a situation;
- stalling, a function that allows time to interlocutor to find what to say next;
- expanding, which is the reformulation of an utterance followed by on-going talk; and
- repetition as participation, which helps develop the conversation.

(Tannen, 1989:47-52)

Tyler (1994:672) suggested that certain repetition patterns work as metadiscoursal markers, which signal to the listener how to interpret new information in an unfolding discourse. Similarly, Murata (1995) saw repetition as a culture-specific signal of conversational management, and considered immediate repetition of words and phrases as one feature of communicative behaviours. His study reveals that the use of immediate repetitions is closely related to the turn-taking system. McCarthy (1998:115) argued that 'repetition gives out important interactional signals' in spoken discourse, and this observation was based on the notion that self-repetition is a fundamental feature of a

speaker's lexical competence, and constitutes a basic characteristic of vocabulary patterning in talk.

Holmes & Stubbe (2003) observed that there are different functions of self-repetition in spoken discourse, and these include intensifying the force of the basic message and using repetition as a softener to manage and moderate the speech situation. Rieger (2003:1687) found that his German bilinguals repeat items for two main reasons: (1) to provide time for the planning of new utterances, that is, producing a 'filler' which compares to vocalized fillers, such as ah, er, erm, etc., and (2) to self-repair that is, attempting to correct a produced utterance.

Based on the assumption that CSs are used in times of difficulty, Bada (2010) showed two movies to non-native speakers of English (NNSE) and non-native speakers of French (NNSF). The participants' comments on these movies were analysed in order to observe prevalence, type and systematicity of repetition. The results of this study indicated that repetitions of grammatical and/or lexical elements were made irrespective of types or word class, phrase or sentence level. Most repeated elements among NNSE were observed to be verbs, pronouns and prepositions, and among NNSF, pronouns, determiners and verbs. Repetitions were made (1) as vocalized fillers, and (2) as self-repairs.

In analyzing repetition and intensity, Bazzanella (2011) asserted that "Repetition, besides being a useful cognitive device (as a simplifying/clarifying device, a filler, and a support both for understanding and memorizing), an efficient text-building mechanism, and a widespread literacy and rhetorical device, is a powerful conversational and interactional resource." (p. 249). She concluded that repetition vary in its forms and functions, according to different contexts. In a study on repetition in social interaction, Hsieh (2011) pin-pointed that self-repeats can be used to emphasise function or when the listener does not catch up what was said in the previous turn. He also found that self-repetition can be used to "double up the illocutionary force, i.e., to do emphasis or to do persuasion, by means of repeating the linguistic form" (p.163).

The literature review reveals that repetition is a natural phenomenon, which is used to accomplish various functions, that the majority of previous research on repetition focused on ESL learners, that little research focused on native English speakers, and that TV shows received little attention in CS research. The primary aim of this paper is, therefore, to explore the various functions of repetition as used by native English speakers on Dr. Phil's TV show. In other words, this study is an attempt to provide greater understanding of the functions or reasons of repetition in TV interaction. The main focus of this research is self-repetition, which is considered a pragmatic resource having various functions.

4. The study

4.1 Research questions

This study focuses on self-repetitions of native English speakers on Dr. Phil's TV show, and aims to seek answers to the following two research questions:

1. Do native English speakers repeat language items in their interactions as manifested in Dr. Phil's TV show?
2. What are the main functions of these repetitions?

4.2 Data

The researchers of the present study gathered the data from conversations between native speakers of English in *Dr. Phil*, which was launched in 2002. Dr. Phil McGraw, perhaps the most well-known mental health professional in the world, is the host of *Dr. Phil*. The analysis was based on 7 full different episodes of this show: Fighting the System, the N-Word Debate, Shocking Accusation, Parental Abuse, Young Women in Trouble, Teens Obsessed with Love, and the Kidnapping of Jaycee Lee. They were all watched and studied on YouTube. The researchers watched each episode several times, and transcribed all repetition occurrences, and classified them into their appropriate functional category. When one word was repeated in the same utterance, it was counted as a single instance of repetition; that is, not all repeated words were counted. To maximize their classification reliability, the researchers passed the categories along with their definition and the scripts to a panel of two EFL specialists, who were asked to check whether their classification was appropriate, and to provide recommendations for modifications. Their suggestions were taken into consideration.

5. Results

Concerning the first question in our study, which is related to whether native speakers of English repeat language items in their interactions as manifested on Dr. Phil's TV show, the results of the present study revealed that Dr. Phil, the host, employed self-repetition as a communication strategy that performs several functions. Since the study was limited to Dr. Phil TV show, it was noticed that both Dr. Phil and his guests used many repetitions (175 instances), which performed a wide range of functions. However, it was found that Dr. Phil resorted to repetition more than his guests did, 132 and 43 instances, respectively, which could be attributed to the fact that Dr. Phil was superior to the hosts. The hosts did not use as many repetitions as Dr. Phil did, because he possibly controls the interaction, and his main concern was eliciting all kinds of meanings to make his show successful. Table 1 shows the frequency of self-repetition in the seven episodes, which represent the data of the present study:

Episode	Dr. Phil	Guests	Total
Fighting the System	17	5	22
Shocking Accusation	18	5	23
The N-Words Debate	19	7	26
The Kidnapping of Jaycee Lee	20	5	25
Parental Abuse	19	6	25

Episode	Dr. Phil	Guests	Total
Young Women in Trouble	21	7	28
Teens Obsessed with Love	18	8	26
Total	**132**	**43**	**175**
Percentage	75.4	24.6	100%

Table 1: Frequencies and percentages of self-repetition in Dr. Phil

In answering question two, concerning the functions performed by repetitions, the study revealed that repetition was used by Dr. Phil and his guests not only to perform various functions, but it also was manifested in different linguistic structures. Repetition was employed for expressing emphasis, clarity, emotions, highlighting the obvious, being questionable, expressing annoyance, retaining a certain piece of information, persuasion, expressing surprise, giving instructions, and as a filler in order to take time, fill in the silence and hold the floor when the speaker is searching for proper words to say next. Another significant finding was that a single utterance in the interaction between Dr. Phil, the host, and his guests was used to perform a wide range of functions. For example, one utterance was used to express surprise, emphasis, and being questionable. In the following sections, these functions are discussed with examples taken from Dr. Phil's TV talk show.

5.1 Emphasis

Hsieh (2011:163) states, "Pragmatically speaking, repetition, both self-repeats and other-repeats, can be used to double up the illocutionary force, i.e., to do emphasis or to do persuasion, by means of repeating the linguistic form." The data revealed that Dr. Phil and his guests employed self-repetition because they wanted to emphasise a particular word or phrase or sometimes highlight the obvious. Dr. Phil and his guests used repetitions, but it was noticed that Dr. Phil used them more frequently. This kind of repetition is manifested in the following scripts which are taken from different episodes:

1. I don't know that at this point…but I'm telling you what… *I am going to find out* and make no mistake. *I am going to find out.*
2. You *own a hundred bucks*….let's see here...I think *you own a hundred bucks.*
3. It's very important to sue these people…when they make a big deal, *they have a right to go to court and have a right to have a trial by jury*.
4. I failed the test. I have no idea how that happened. I don't know. I *never* touched her *never never* had touched her, *never*.
5. A: *You will not see her*. *You will not see her* anymore.
   B: Oh really!!!
   A: Unless you are supervised.
   B: *You are not going to get that*?
   A: Yes I am.
   B: *You are not going to get that?*

A: Yea! I'll get supervised for sure.

6. Hey you didn't *come here as a slave*...Your ancestors *came as a slave.*

As noticed in scripts 1-4, self-repetition was used for emphasis to reassure a fact to the listener, and focus his/her attention to that fact. Repeating "I *am going to find out!", "You own a hundred bucks.", "They have the right to go to…"* is a kind of emphasis. Although repetition was used to emphasize that he did not touch the girl (script 5), the guest repeated "*never, never*" to be more persuasive. In scripts 6, the purpose of repetition was to stress what was said. Similarly, in script 6, Dr. Phil repeated "came as a slave" to emphasize a new fact.

5.2 Emotional effect

It was found that when Dr. Phil or his guests were emotionally affected, they resorted to self-repetition, which was manifested in clarification requests, especially when a particular point or the message which has been said earlier by his/her interlocutor was not clear. Clarification was made by asking a question, which required the *hearer* to answer, but in some cases, due to the significance of the idea, and in order not to be skipped without being fully understood, Dr. Phil repeated his clarification requests more than once to clarify the unclear ideas or points because he was either irritated or surprised. As can be seen in script 8, Dr. Phil seemed very irritated when he said "That seems crazy to me!" Thus, he repeated different utterances here. He repeated "Did you…?" with some kind of paraphrase or repair in saying "Did you make a threat? Did you say that?" He also repeated "What did you say?" Similarly, scripts 8 and 9 witness repetition of "Did you….?" several times, which demonstrates the fact that Dr. Phil was irritated, and puzzled. In script 7, Dr. Phil was irritated and upset; therefore, he repeated "There is a little girl" to gain the sympathy of the audience. In script 10, on the other hand, repeating "Mexican" twice illustrated how the guest felt. In script 11, the speaker repeated what he said three times because of the significance of "black and blue" marks, which aimed to raise the emotions of people who would, in turn, sympathize with her. She wanted them to feel how she felt when she was beaten by the airport security officers.

7. And *there's a little girl* involved here that doesn't have the ability to protect herself, *there's a little girl* that stands in harm way if something going there.
8. This seems crazy to me! You have a bottle of contact solution. *What did you say? Did you* make a threat? *Did you* say that? *What did you say?*
9. Come on! That doesn't make any sense …What happened? *Did you .. did you ...did you get* frustrated …*did you get* irritated? Were they rude to you…*what* …*what* happened?
10. A: *I am over it…I am over it.*
    B: Over what? Being Mexican?!!!!
    A: No, I'm *Mexican.* I'm in this great country…I was born here by blood *Mexican*
11. I had *black and blue* marks all over my body. When I went to neurologists, he said "I see hand print on your arm in *black and blue*". The officer's hand prints were on my arm *black and blue.*

5.3. Being questionable

Repetition was also used when Dr. Phil and his guests did not have an answer to some issues or concerns. It was noticed that one instance of repetition may have two functions. For example, in scripts 8 and 9 above, Dr. Phil was both emotionally affected and questionable. In the following scripts (12-15), Dr. Phil was questionable, puzzled, irritated, and annoyed. He does not understand why things happen; he had no answer to some questions.

12. *What is it that people don't get*? Either white people, African American! *What…what is that people don't get*?
13. I'm talking about if you *have ever experienced* however disgusting that might have been to you? *Have you experienced* any arousal in connection with your daughter?
14. Dr. Phil: *Is this little girl safe in your home*?
    Guest: I thought so.
    Dr. Phil: *Is this little girl safe in your home...step up here* and *be a mother step up here and be a* woman.
15. What about this Jackson incident? *...is that something that crosses the line? Is that something* shouldn't have been said?

5.4. Expressing annoyance

The data revealed that repetition was used by both Dr. Phil and his guests to express annoyance and not feeling good regarding an action. Repetition in the following scripts (16-18) is employed for expressing emotional feelings including emphasis and annoyance. Repeating "get off me", "They touched my pee" and "She is a baby!" is an indication that the speaker is very annoyed and upset because of what they did.

16. I just kept saying *get off me… get off me… get off me*
17. Guest (A) mother: What happened?
    Guest (B) child: *They touched my pee-pee*
    Guest (A) mother: Yea?!
    Guest (B) child: *They touched my pee-pee*
18. *She is a baby*, Jeremy! *She is a baby***,** Jeremy! How could you do that to her?

5.5. Persuasion

Another important function of self-repetition found in the data was persuasion. In fact, persuasion can be traced in most of the repetition instances, especially in Dr. Phil's talk because he wanted to control his guests' distrust and to encourage them. Dr. Phil and his guests repeated in order to be persuasive to their audience. As shown in the following script, Dr. Phil repeated "I can help you" three times to convince his guest to tell the truth by showing a desire to help. In order to persuade Dr. Phil of his idea, the guest in the second script stressed the word "never" and repeated it four times.

19. I want to know the truth. It's your chance to clear yourself if that what you want to do and if you need help, tell me now. *I can help you now*...you tell me. *I can help you* more than… *I can help you*. If I find out later you were lying.
20. I failed the test. I have no idea how that happened. I don't know. I *never* touched her *never never* had touched her, *never*.

5.6. Expressing surprise

In most of the episodes, repetition was also used to express surprise. In script 21, Dr. Phil also repeats "You say you have …." three times, expressing surprise to stress a point. In scripts 22 and 23, Dr. Phil seems questionable and surprised. However, repeating *'shame on you!'* in script 22 was used to express emphasis and annoyance.

21. You know that you have had a lot of emotional challenges in your life. *You say you have* a problem with rage, *you say you have* a problem with anxiety; you work in a nightly stressful situation; *you have* trouble with boundaries …you got angry; you hit things.
22. *Is it possible* that your father pled guilty to fondling a child? *Is it possible* that he has done that with you?
23. *What are you doing* here?! *What are you doing*? This child is paying for all of these.... call the police, I can't put her down; let it go now. All of that in front the child! *Shame on you! Shame on you*!

5.7. Giving instructions

In giving instructions, speakers on Dr. Phil's TV show used repetition to give instruction with an emphatic function. In script 24, for example, Dr. Phil repeated 'step up here and be…' for emphasis. When Dr. Phil saw the report in script 25, and what his guest used to do the homeless and desperate people, he ended the interview and asked people to stop the tape. Here, he repeated "Stop the tape!". Then he asked the guest to walk away and repeated "Walk". Dr. Phil was very angry, and he asked the security to take his guest because he considered what he did to people a crime.

24. Dr. Phil: *step up here and be a* mother *step up here and be a* woman.
25. Dr. Phil: *Stop the tape. Stop the tape. Walk*. I don't want to talk to you. *Walk*.
Guest: Why not?
Dr. Phil: It is very despicable.

5.8. As a filler

Repetition was used as an attempt to plan in order to take time, fill in the silence and hold the floor when Dr. Phil and his guests were searching for proper words to say next. In scripts 26 and 27, Dr. Phil repeated the definite article "the" three times, and "she wasn't" in order to gain time to retrieve what to say next. In script 28, one of his guests repeated "he had a" in order to plan and recall what he wanted to say. The presence of

hesitation indicated that the speakers were just filling a gap to retrieve the next lexical item or structure.

26. And do you and many of *the the er the* st strategies…
27. When she came back *she wasn't* er *she wasn't* a mother.
28. This is the guy who years ago kidnapped sexually assaulted and kept a woman in a in a prison… *he he had a* er *he had a* container where the woman had to go in.

6. Discussion and conclusion

The analysis concludes that Dr. Phil and his guests repeated some words and phrases to perform a wide range of functions, using several linguistic forms. They resorted to repetition to emphasise a particular proposition, sympathise, express puzzlement, convey annoyance, persuade the audience, express surprise, give instructions, and use it as a filler to plan in order to take time, fill in the silence and hold the floor. However, it was found that Dr. Phil used self-repetition more frequently. These findings concur with Aznárez-Mauleo´n (2013), who uncovered that TV hosts and guests use strategies and devices to achieve their goals. These findings also are in line with the findings of previous research on repetition and self-repair (e.g., Kernan, 1977; Brody, 1986; Norrick, 1987; Bublitz, 1989; Tannen, 1989; Tyler, 1994; Murata, 1995; McCarthy, 1998; Fung, 2007; Bada, 2010; Lee, 2010; Hsieh, 2011; Bazzanella 2011).

The findings of this research also confirm that self-repetition is a natural phenomenon that exists in all human interactions of native or non-native speakers. This concurs with Fung's view that "Self-repetition is commonly found in spoken discourse, and it could be argued that it is an interactional necessity" (2007:224). However, Stuart & Lynn (1995), Rieger (2003), Rababah (2001), and Rabab'ah (2007) found that non-native speakers resorted to self-repetition strategies more frequently than native speakers. Moreover, Schegloff (1987) considered repetition part of our everyday conduct and behavior, and not just a marker of a "disfluent" or "sloppy" speaker.

Because these repetitions have a certain function in the talk, the present research revealed that most of them are meaningful. This lends support to McCarthy (1998) that repetition has important interactional functions and meanings. Contrary to nonnative speakers, most repetitions done by native speakers as manifested in the present study, are meaningful and have significant functions in social interaction. One of the major characteristics of nonnative speakers' repeats is redundancy; in most cases, they repeat to gain time to retrieve an appropriate lexical or structural item (Shimanoff and Brunak, 1977; Fillmore, 1979).

The findings of this study are also in line with Dornyei & Scott (1997), Author (2001), and Rabab'ah (2007) that repetition is a communication strategy used to gain time to plan for what comes next due to memory lapses. In this present research, it was found that a particular utterance performed a number of functions. That is, one utterance was not only used to express emphasis, but it was also used for clarification, persuasion or emotional effect.

The results indicated that self-repetition was used as a strategy of repair. This also supports Schegloff et al., (1977) and Rieger (2003) in that repetition of one or several lexical items is considered part of the self-repair organization when their function is to

gain linguistic and/or cognitive planning time for the speaker. This study also confirms the view that self-repetition is a well-organised, orderly, and rule-governed phenomenon and not a chaotic aspect of spoken discourse (cf. Schegloff et al., 1977; Shriberg, 1994; Rieger, 2000).

These research findings have some implications for second/foreign language learners. Our study helps in putting together the communicative functions of repetition used by native speakers to meet their communicative goals in conversations. This study is also of significance in that recent studies have pointed out the importance of second language learners' use of repetition for conversational participation and language learning (Schegloff et al., 1977; Bazzanella, 2011) since repetition is a phenomenon of natural human interaction (Tannen, 1989; Rieger, 2003). This study, researching a wide range of repetitions, which vary in type and function, may help second or foreign language learners better understand the communicative functions and patterns of repetition, and know how to use them in real life situations. Teachers of English as a second/foreign language should also make their students aware of this phenomenon in natural spoken discourse.

McCarthy and Carter (1995:217) recommended a 'three I's' methodology to increase students' awareness of the nature of spoken discourse, and more specifically of repetition as a conversational discourse strategy. The 'three I's' stand for 'Illustration-Interaction-Induction'.

'Illustration means wherever possible examining real data which is presented in terms of choices of forms relative to context and use. Interaction means that learners are introduced to discourse-sensitive activities which focus on interpersonal uses of language and the negotiation of meanings...Induction takes the conscious-raising a stage further by encouraging learners to draw conclusions about the interpersonal functions of different lexical grammatical options, and to develop a capacity for noticing such features as they move through the different stages and cycles of language learning' (McCarthy and Carter, 1995:217).

Teachers may also adopt Walsh's methodology (2006), which recommended classroom recordings to identify different modes of discourse employed by teachers and students, in order to increase awareness of the importance of interaction and to maximize learning.

Finally, English language learners need to resort to self-repeats/self-repetition as a strategy while communicating in the target language because such repetitions give them time to retrieve what comes next, which, in turn, would help them in preventing communication breakdown. Instead of using fillers, such as *ah*, or *em*, self-repetition, while having in mind the various functions of this strategy, may enable them to plan ahead of time for the next lexical or structural item, and be better communicators.

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About the authors

Dr. Ghaleb Rabab'ah holds a PhD in Linguistics from the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, England. He is currently an Associate Professor of English at Alfaisal University, Saudi Arabia. His research interests include psycholinguistic aspects of second language, and language learning and teaching. He has published many research papers on linguistics, TESL, and CALL in international journals, such as Journal of Pragmatics, Poznan Studies in Contemporary Linguistics, and ITL-International Journal of Applied Linguistics.

Dr. Ali Farhan AbuSeileek is an Associate Professor at Al al-Bayt University. He has published papers and designed several CALL programs for EFL learners. His major research interest is CALL and its application in EFL teaching and testing, machine translation, and CALL program development.