



<https://doi.org/10.18778/1644-857X.23.02.07>


NGUYEN DINH CO
HUTECH UNIVERSITY, HO CHI MINH CITY, VIETNAM

 <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9771-9764>

TRAN XUAN HIEP
DONG A UNIVERSITY, DA NANG CITY, VIETNAM

 <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5236-993X>

NGUYEN TUAN BINH
UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, HUE UNIVERSITY, VIETNAM

 <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9878-711X>

Vietnam and Siam: from Friendship to Confrontation (1802–1835)

STRESZCZENIE

Wietnam i Syjam: od przyjaźni do konfrontacji (1802–1835)

W artykule przedstawiono zmiany, jakie nastąpiły w stosunkach między Wietnamem a Syjmem na początku XIX w., w okresie panowania dwóch pierwszych królów z dynastii Nguyen: Gia Longa i Minh Manga. Ze względu na uwarunkowania historyczne oraz trapiące oba kraje problemy wewnętrzne, przez pierwsze dwie dekady XIX w. Wietnam i Syjam utrzymywały przyjazne stosunki, wspierając się nawet w obliczu zagrożeń zewnętrznych. Każda ze stron miała jednak swoje własne cele i podejmowała kroki zmierzające do wzmocnienia własnej pozycji w regionie. Nieprzyjaźń w stosunkach między dworem Nguyenów a dynastią Chakri zaczęła więc stopniowo narastać, osiągając kulminację za panowania króla Minh Manga (Wietnam) i króla Ramy III (Syjam).

Słowa kluczowe: Wietnam, Syjam, dynastia Nguyen, Minh Mang, Rama III



Received: 2024-03-07. Verified: 2024-03-09. Revised: 2024-06-16. Accepted: 2024-06-28

© by the author, licensee University of Lodz – Lodz University Press, Lodz, Poland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>)

ABSTRACT

The article presents and explains the changing process of relations between Vietnam and Siam in the early 19th century during the rule of the first two kings of the Nguyen Dynasty, Gia Long and Minh Mang. Due to inherited factors from the past and internal problems, Vietnam and Siam always maintained friendly relations during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, even supporting each other against external threats. However, each side had its own goals and was taking steps to strengthen its position in the region. The malevolence in the relations between the Nguyen court and the Chakri dynasty began to grow gradually, culminating in the reigns of King Minh Mang (Vietnam) and King Rama III (Siam).

Keywords: Vietnam, Siam, Nguyen Dynasty, Minh Mang, Rama III

1. Introduction

The relationship between Vietnam and Siam is a very special relationship in Southeast Asia. Since the Nguyen Lords implemented the Southern advance policy, they directly confronted Siam in the southern region of Vietnam. During the war between Tay Son and Nguyen Anh, Siam became Nguyen Anh's ally against Tay Son. Because of this, after Nguyen Anh had ascended the throne, the Hue and Bangkok courts always maintained a close alliance. This perfect relationship continued in the early period of the reign of Rama III and King Minh Mang. However, the ambition of the two strongest kingdoms in mainland Southeast Asia led to a head-to-head confrontation in the early 1930s, which lasted until the Western countries performed actions of influence in the region.

2. The Vietnam–Siam alliance in the early 19th century

Vietnam–Siam had a powerful interaction from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, particularly in the southern region. Especially from the second half of the eighteenth century, Siam fought long wars with Burma, stabilised the northern border region, expanded economic and diplomatic activities to the south, and actively implemented the Eastwar strategy¹. Meanwhile, the

¹ D.L. Vũ [Vu], *Khi người Thái nhìn về phía đông: Cuộc chiến Xiêm–Việt năm 1833* [When Thais Look East: Siam-Vietnam War in 1833], <https://cand.com.vn/>

Nguyen lord's government had basically completed the exploration and affirmation of sovereignty in the southern region, and at the same time established a strong influence on the court of Cambodia. In the context of other kingdoms' crisis and weakness the growth of Siam and Cochinchina (Vietnam) inevitably led to the confrontation between Cochinchina and Siam during the eighteenth century in mainland Southeast Asia. In addition to influence disputes taking place in Cambodia and Laos, the Siamese kingdom also expressed its ambition to move East with the devastating attack on Ha Tien (the territory annexed to Cochinchina in 1708) in 1715 and 1771².

Since the foundation of the Nguyen Dynasty (1802), Vietnam-Siamese relations underwent a positive change. Both countries considered this a top priority in their relations with countries in Southeast Asia. Before taking the throne, Nguyen Anh's government established a reciprocal and mutually supportive relationship with the Chakri court. In addition, there was a special bond between Rama I and Nguyen Anh. In 1784, the Chakri dynasty (King Rama I) sent troops to help Nguyen Anh beat Tay Son but was defeated at the battle of Rach Gam – Xoai Mut (1785). In February 1786, Nguyen Anh and his soldiers were still hiding in Vong Cac (Bangkok) when they heard that Burma had divided into three armies to attack the Sai Nac region of Siam. King Rama I asked his general Nguyen to help with the naval battle. Nguyen Anh agreed to help and ordered Duke Dung and Nguyen Van Thanh to urge logging in Siam to build 24 warships, with full weapons and supplies, to go to war against the Burmese army³.

Chuyen-de/Khi-nguoi-Thai-nhin-ve-phia-dong-Cuoc-chien-it-nguoi-biet-nam-1833-i536207/ (acceded: 25 I 2024).

² D.C. Nguyễn [Nguyen], *Trao đổi lại về năm sinh và đóng góp của Mạc Thiên Tứ đối với vùng đất Hà Tiên và Nam Bộ* [Talking about the year of birth and Mac Thiên Tu's contribution to the land of Ha Tien and the South], "Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Lịch sử" [History Research Journal] 2019, no. 7, pp. 71–79.

³ According to Dang Van Chuong: before leading the army to battle against the Burmese army, King Rama I consulted Nguyen Anh on how to fight. He replied, "If you fight quickly, you will win" and then went with the Siamese to fight Burma. Nguyen Anh's tactics of using firepower made the Burmese soldiers afraid, fleeing in chaos, contributing to the victory for the Siamese army. The King of Siam was very impressed and grateful to have brought gold and silk to Nguyen Anh. V.C. Đặng [Dang], *Quan hệ Thái Lan-Việt Nam cuối thế kỷ XVIII – giữa thế kỷ XIX* [Thailand-Vietnam relations at the end of the 18th century – the middle of the 19th century], Huế [Hue] 2010, p. 45.

The Burmese army withdrew, and Nguyen Anh's navy again helped the Siamese king defeat the Do Ba pirates. After two victories over King Rama I, he gladly rewarded him with spoils of war⁴. According to Nguyen Duc Xuyen, when Nguyen Anh recaptured Gia Dinh⁵, the Siamese court sent messengers many times to congratulate him. In those times, Nguyen Anh mentioned their mutual support when he was still in Bangkok⁶. In February 1798, Siam was attacked by Burma again, and the King of Siam sent an envoy to Gia Dinh to ask Nguyen Anh to bring troops to help him. Nguyen Anh sent Chief of Staff Nguyen Hoang Duc and Chief of Staff Nguyen Van Tuong to command 7,000 marines and 100 warships to aid. When the Nguyen army reached Con Lon (Con Dao), the Siamese defeated Burma and sent messengers to bring the good news⁷.

Therefore, after ascending the throne, King Gia Long⁸ became more and more interested in the Vietnam–Siam relationship, bringing it to a new stage. Right in 1802, when Emperor Gia Long had just ascended to the throne in Phu Xuan⁹, the Siamese court sent messengers to congratulate him¹⁰. In response, in February 1803,

⁴ D.X. Nguyễn [Nguyen], *Lý lịch sự vụ* [Memoir], trans. Tran Dai Vinh, Hà Nội [Hanoi] 2019, p. 32.

⁵ Gia Dinh (Gia Định) was the first administrative unit established by Lord Nguyen in 1698. From then until the end of the 18th century, Gia Dinh covered and managed the entire southern region of Vietnam. By the reign of Minh Mang, in 1835, Gia Dinh was a province of Vietnam. After 1975, Gia Dinh province was merged with Saigon City and parts of Long An, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia provinces to become Saigon – Gia Dinh City. On July 2, 1976, Saigon – Gia Dinh city was officially renamed Ho Chi Minh City.

⁶ D.X. Nguyễn [Nguyen], *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁷ A year earlier, Nguyen Anh had his troops defeat the Burmese navy borrowed from Britain to fight Siam, before entering the Siamese mainland. After hearing the news, King Rama I was very grateful and gave Nguyen Anh 10 thousand pounds of salt and pepper and promised to help Nguyen Anh beat Tay Son by mountain road from Nghe An down. V.C. Đặng [Dang], *op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁸ Nguyen Anh (also known as Nguyen Phuc Anh) is a descendant of Lord Nguyen in Cochinchina, Vietnam. After the Tay Son movement overthrew and destroyed the Nguyen lord government, Nguyen Anh escaped and built up forces against the Tay Son. In 1802, Nguyen Anh defeated the Tay Son movement and ascended the throne in Phu Xuan (Hue), taking the reign name 'Gia Long'. This dynasty existed until 1945.

⁹ Phu Xuan was the capital of Vietnam during the Nguyen Dynasty (1802–1945). Today it is called Hue.

¹⁰ *Đại Nam thực lục* [Chronicle of Greater Vietnam] [hereinafter: ChGV], vol. I, Hà Nội [Hanoi] 2002, p. 518.

King Gia Long sent a mission led by Cai Co¹¹ Nguyen Van Huan and Captain Mai Van Hien to Siam to show filial piety and present gifts to the King of Siam, along with high-ranking mandarins, and his assistants helped in the previous period with a huge amount of gifts of gold, silver, and silk¹². This action is both a diplomatic response and an expression of gratitude from the Chakri court for helping Nguyen Anh during the difficult time of fleeing, and at the same time expressing the desire to cultivate the friendship of the two countries in the future new historical circumstances.

The two countries Siam and Vietnam often promptly informed each other about the important situation of each country, such as the new king consecration, national mourning, war, intercession, etc., or issues related to neighboring countries within the scope under the influence of two kingdoms (Cambodia, Laos, etc.). Therefore, the exchange and travel of the two countries' delegations took place on a regular basis, demonstrating friendly relations between the two countries. On one occasion King Gia Long himself had a private audience with Siamese historians to learn about the war between Burma and Siam when the Siamese emissary offered filial piety and gifts¹³, which shows the great concern of King Gia Long for Siam.

In February 1807, King Gia Long ordered the ceremony to submit the official statement of the mission to Siam. From there on, the route of the number of members of the visiting mission between the two countries was clearly defined. Accordingly, the Vietnamese emissaries to Siam by waterway included 50 people, and 12 people by road, when the documents were transferred, they were conveyed through Cambodia. As for Siamese envoys, they went by sea to Gia Dinh and then entered the capital by waterway, there were 50 people on the mission, 14 people by road¹⁴. King Gia Long also sent a request to King Rama I to establish regulations on the number of missions between the two countries as well as travel routes. This

¹¹ Cai Co (Chinese: 該奇, English: Battalion Commander), or Quan Co (管奇) during the Nguyen Dynasty, was a military official position during the Nguyen Dynasty.

¹² ChGV, vol. I, p. 550.

¹³ V.C. Đặng [Dang], *Những bước thăng trầm trong quan hệ Việt – Xiêm nửa đầu thế kỷ XIX* [Ups and downs in Vietnam–Siamese relations in the first half of the nineteenth century], "Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Đông Nam Á" [Journal of Southeast Asian Studies] 2005, no. 5, pp. 19–24.

¹⁴ ChGV, vol. I, p. 691.

shows that the relationship was peaceful, the exchange of missions between the two countries took place on a very regular basis and under the old rules.

According to statistics of Dang Van Chuong, in the period between 1802 and 1813, the Siamese mission went 12 times to Vietnam to give thanks, mourn, offer items, or settle disputes, regardless of the times. Siamese ships traveling to China or trading in storms had to take refuge in Vietnam's seaports; during that time, Vietnam sent five missions to Siam¹⁵. The biggest challenge to the friendly relationship between Vietnam and Siam was Cambodia. During his reign, King Gia Long and the first two kings of the Charki dynasty (Rama I and Rama II) always chose a negotiated peaceful solution to settle disputes arising in Oudong¹⁶. Both Vietnamese and Siamese dynasties regularly exchanged embassies to resolve the complicated political situation and re-establish stability in Cambodia under the rule of Ang Chan II (1796–1834).

In 1805, Regent Talaha Pok, who was pro-Siamese, died. King Rama I officially crowned Ang Chan II king of Cambodia in Bangkok in 1806¹⁷. However, one year later, Ang Chan II sent a messenger named Okna Vi Bon Rach to Phu Xuan to offer gifts and ask King Gia Long to crown him king. King Gia Long approved and sent a mission of 93 members, led by the Secretary of the Army Ngo Nhan Tinh as Chief Ambassador, scribe Vinh Thanh – Tran Cong Dan as Deputy Ambassador to bring the seal to the capital Lovek (La Bich) to confer brother Chan II became the king of Cambodia, and at the same time fixed the tribute¹⁸. The coronation ceremony took place in a very solemn atmosphere. At the end of the ceremony, the King of Cambodia sent King Gia Long the equivalent of 1.5 kg of silver¹⁹. According to Khin Sok, the fact that Ang Chan II submitted to Vietnam and gave a silver gift to King Gia Long served two purposes: first, to balance and counterbalance the

¹⁵ V.C. Đặng [Dang], *Quan hệ Thái Lan–Việt Nam...*, p. 58.

¹⁶ Oudong, also known as Udong or Odongk, was the capital of Cambodia from the 17th to the 19th century. This was the last capital before the Khmer dynasty descended on Phnom Penh.

¹⁷ In 1796, when Ang Chan was 5 years old, he was brought to the throne by Siam, but because of his young age, Pok was made Regent.

¹⁸ ChGV, vol. I, p. 707.

¹⁹ V.C. Đặng [Dang], *Những bước thăng trầm trong...*, pp. 19–24.

influence of Siam in Cambodia; second, to settle disputes within the Cambodian royal family²⁰.

The actions of the King of Cambodia devised to implement the policy of “dual vassalage” had a great influence on the assertion of King Rama I’s power in the region because Siam also needed allies to deal with the conflict. The action of the king of Cambodia (established by Siam) implementing the “submit to both” policy greatly affected the assertion of King Rama I’s power in the region. However, because Siam also needed allies to deal with the threat of Burma, as well as because of the balance of power between Vietnam and Siam in the situation at that time and partly because the peaceful relationship between Vietnam and Siam had been established since the time of Rama I, King Rama II still accepted it. The Hue court always consistently implemented the policy of peace with Siam because, on the one hand, the friendly tradition had been established before and, on the other, King Gia Long did not want the two countries to move, which would disturb the life and peace of the people of Gia Dinh citadel. Therefore, even in difficult circumstances, Gia Long’s court always acted with caution so as not to affect the relationship between Vietnam and Siam.

In 1811, the younger brother of King Cambodia An Chan II, Ang Snguon, asked for help from Siam. The Siamese army led by General Chaophraya Yommaraj Noi was stationed in the Battambang province. An Chan II was afraid that someone would report urgently to Gia Dinh. The Hue court had agreed to: “We (the Nguyen Dynasty) and Siam have sworn to maintain peace and harmony, if we wage war, the damage will not be small”²¹. However, to ensure safety, King Gia Long still let generals and soldiers patrol the border, survey the situation to handle arbitrarily. When the Siamese army invaded the border (1812), An Chan II ran to Gia Dinh to seek refuge. Gia Long’s court, on the one hand, provided money and rice to “Phien Vuong”²² and, on the other hand, sent a letter to blame Siam, and at the same time sent Le Van Duyet to guard Gia Dinh, and concurrently take charge of both distant towns, Binh Thuan and Ha Tien, to facilitate the handling of Siam and

²⁰ K. Sok, *Le Cambodge entre le Siam et le Vietnam (de 1775 à 1860)*, Paris 1991.

²¹ ChGV, vol. I, p. 829 [translation ours].

²² Phien Vuong (藩王) means “The King protects the border”. It is usually used to refer to the King of a small country that is dependent on large countries.

Cambodia's affairs²³. In addition, the Hue court sent an army to Cambodia to spy on the situation to facilitate the use of troops. According to Khin Sok's description, Vietnam sent 500 men under the leadership of the fortress Dinh Tuong (Nguyen Van Thuy), stationed at Khoh Chin, on the east bank of the Tonlesap River opposite Kompong Luong²⁴. However, the task of this army was only to observe the war between Siam and Chenla to take appropriate action. This shows a skillful but also resolute foreign policy in protecting the interests of the nation under Emperor Gia Long. Faced with the resolute attitude of Vietnam, the king of Siam sent Sai Trach Sy Na as an envoy and offered a letter to explain that it was Siam who wanted to reconcile the two brothers King Ang Chan II, and did not mean anything else²⁵. Eventually, both sides came to an agreement on the restoration of the throne to Ang Chan II the following year (1813).

Despite following the principle of implementing a policy of peace, King Gia Long always maintained vigilance, regularly sending generals in Gia Dinh, especially the border towns of Ha Tien, Long Xuyen, and Kien Giang, to spy on the activities of the Siamese army along the border and report to the court. Once every five days, Gia Dinh Citadel had to report to the central government about out-of-border affairs²⁶. It can be seen that the main foreign policy of Siam under Gia Long was to maintain peaceful relations, however, the Hue court was also very vigilant and always prepared to respond to possible instability at the border. This was clearly shown in the king's edict sent to the Governor of Gia Dinh in response to news of Siam's increased military activities at the border. King Gia Long believed that although the Siamese army was large, it could not pose a danger to the Nguyen army in Gia Dinh for the time being and requested that the army here should not make enemies outside the border and that when the Siamese army attacked first, it would not be too late to respond.

At the same time, he sent talented generals to keep the western border points, namely Xi Khe (now Tay Ninh City), Quang Hoa (Tay Ninh), Thong Binh (Dong Thap), Tuyen Uy (Long An)...²⁷ The

²³ O.M. Kiều [Kieu], *Bản triều bạn nghịch liệt truyện* [The naughty version of the story of a friend's dynasty], Sài Gòn [Saigon] 1963, p. 17.

²⁴ K. Sok, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

²⁵ ChGV, vol. I, p. 849.

²⁶ *Ibidem.*

²⁷ *Ibidem.*

spirit of King Gia Long in implementing foreign policy with Siam continued to be transmitted to his successor, King Minh Mang. In the early years of his rule, good relations between Vietnam and Siam continued to be maintained. King Minh Mang had a certain preference for the Siamese emissary, allowing the emissary of this country to attend major festivals organised by the Hue court²⁸. The alliance between Vietnam and Siam was evident when the Burmese envoy sent a letter, suggesting that Vietnam break ties with Siam and establish an alliance with Burma to fight Siam. Minh Mang's court wisely refused the gift and sent messengers to inform his allies. King Rama II heard the good news and sent a letter to the Vietnamese court to thank him. King Minh Mang also made it clear that the reason for this refusal was to follow the "old way" of his father, "not listen to other people's words to give up the friendship with the neighboring country (Siam)"²⁹. Walter Francis Vella assessed that this event proves Vietnam's goodwill towards Siam³⁰.

The reason for the establishment of the alliance between Vietnam and Siam under Emperor Gia Long and the early reign of King Minh Mang came partly from the close relationship in history but mainly from the interests of the two countries³¹. Under the reign of King Gia Long, who had just regained power, the country was still unstable, especially in the Gia Dinh area. At the beginning of the Minh Mang period, the young Emperor faced a series of problems that needed to be resolved, such as consolidation of the centralised state, complete reunification of the country, the rise of opposing forces. At that time, despite their ambition to expand their territory to the East, the Siamese were facing difficulties at home, especially the war with Burma, therefore they also needed an ally in the East.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, vol. II, p. 212.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, vol II, p. 325 [translation ours].

³⁰ W.F. Vella, *Siam under Rama III (1824–1851)*, New York 1957.

³¹ According to Tran Thi Mai, the reason why King Gia Long and King Minh Mang chose the path of peace with Siam in the early stages was influenced by the Confucian word 'ceremonial', generally because the first two emperors of the Nguyen Dynasty always remembered the story about how King Rama I helped Nguyen Anh at the time of death. T.M. Trần [Tran], *Quan hệ Việt Nam–Xiêm La đầu thế kỷ XIX* [Vietnam–Siamese Relations in the Early Nineteenth Century], "Tạp chí Lịch sử Quân sự" [Military History Journal] 2022, no. 1–2, pp. 74–80. Dang Van Chuong also argued that the good relations between the two dynasties, as well as the mutual respect between Rama I and Gia Long, contributed to strengthening the friendly neighbourly relationship between the two countries. V.C. Đặng [Dang], *Những bước thăng trầm trong...*, pp. 19–24.

3. Vietnam–Siam confrontation under Minh Mang and Rama III (1833–1835)

a) Rama III against the invaders of Vietnam (1833–1834)

The good times between Vietnam and Siam did not last long as each country had ambitions to assert its power in the region. It is not a coincidence of history that Rama III (reigned 1824–1851) and Minh Mang (reigned 1820–1841) were adversaries that did not meet each other³². Many issues gave rise to disagreements between the two ambitious emperors of the two countries, especially the influence on the two buffer countries: Laos and Cambodia. After the defeat of Burma in the war against the British (1824–1826), Siam took advantage of this opportunity to attack and invade some of the vassal territories of Burma in the Malay peninsula (present-day Malaysia). This was the main reason for Emperor Rama III to carry out actions to strengthen his forces to continue implementing and promoting his eastward policy. In 1827, Rama III invaded and completely destroyed Vientiane, forced all its inhabitants to go to Siam, and turned the kingdom into a wild forest³³. And over the next few years, the Thais placed all of the former Vientiane territories under their direct administration. The goal of the Siamese emperor was “to beat Vietnam and drive Vietnam out of Laos and Cambodia”³⁴.

Without Vientiane³⁵, the Western security of Vietnam was seriously threatened, which is why King Minh Mang resolutely did not give in to Siam on the Cambodian issue³⁶. The 1833 invasion of Vietnam was a further attempt by the Thais to expand their influence to the East. When Bangkok overpowered Hue in the battle for control of the kingdom of Vientiane (1827), Minh Mang could

³² D.L. Vũ [Vu], *Rama III, Minh Mang, and Power Paradigm in Early Nineteenth Century Mekong Valley*, “Rian Thai: International Journal of Thai Studies” 2012, vol. V, pp. 293–326.

³³ D.G.E. Hall, *History of South East Asia*, London 1955, pp. 657–658.

³⁴ W.F. Vella, *op. cit.*, p. 96 [translation ours].

³⁵ During Gia Long’s reign, the Vientiane kings Chieu An and Chau Anu submitted to and paid tribute to the Nguyen dynasty.

³⁶ In fact, King Minh Mang also took actions to maintain his sphere of influence and protect his border, such as establishing army barracks in Tran Ninh, reassigning most of the mandarins in Nghe An, those who have experience and understanding of local realities to maintain order and protect border security. V.C. Đặng [Dang], *Quan hệ Thái Lan–Việt Nam...*, p. 112.

gain ground by sending troops and war elephants to Nghe An and rest assured that Siam could go no further, but when they intervened in Cambodia, his behavior was completely different³⁷. The competition for the influence of Vietnam and Siam in Cambodia was the basic cause leading to the direct confrontation between the two kingdoms in mainland Southeast Asia. In addition, Siam not only wanted to expand its territory for Laos and Cambodia but also the land of Ha Tien (Vietnam), an area with a favorable geographical position for trade activities, in the trade network in the Gulf of Siam with countries in the region and the world (China and the West), which was also the goal that the Siamese rulers always wished to pursue.

The event that created a favorable opportunity for Siam to intervene in Cochinchina was the Le Van Khoi uprising in Gia Dinh. In 1833, Le Van Khoi (adopted son of former Governor Gia Dinh, Le Van Duyet) started an army against the imperial court and quickly controlled the whole of Cochinchina. Minh Mang sent generals Tran Van Nang, Tong Phuc Luong, Truong Minh Giang, Nguyen Xuan, Tran Van Tri, and Truong Phuc Dinh to bring more than 10,000 troops to defeat his enemies. After the initial difficulties, the imperial army gradually withdrew from the Cochinchina provinces. Le Van Khoi withdrew to entrench in Gia Dinh citadel, sent people to seek help from Siam, promised to submit, supply pearls, silk, and beautiful women as well as divide Cochinchina after the victory. King Rama III was promoting his plan to advance to the East and seize the opportunity to attack the southern territory of Vietnam.

According to Walter Francis Vella, the Siamese army divided about 60,000 troops into five armies to subdue the Nguyen army. The first line consisting of 40,000 troops, led by Chao Phraya Bodin³⁸ (known in Vietnamese history as Phi Nha Chat Tri), attacked Cambodia by land, occupied Nam Vang (i.e. Phnom Penh), and then entered Saigon. The second army of about 10,000 troops, led by

³⁷ D.L. Vũ [Vu], *op. cit.*, p. 5.

³⁸ Chao Phraya Bodin Decha (1777–1849) (Thai: เจ้าพระยาบดินทรเดชา) was a Thai general of the early 19th century. He is also known as Ratchasupawadi, Khroma-ha Thai, Chao Phraya Bo dint hara Decha, Wow Phraya Chakri Bodin Decha, and Chao Phraya Bodin. General Bodin once held the positions of Defense Minister, Interior Minister, Army Commander (แม่ทัพใหญ่), and Regent Grand Master Akhra Maha Senabodi (อัครมหาเสนาบดี) of King Rama III. He is considered one of the most powerful generals in the early stages of the Chakri dynasty.

Chao Phraya Phrakhlang³⁹ (known as Phi Nha Phat Lang by the Nguyen Dynasty), followed the sea route from the Gulf of Siam to capture Ha Tien and then followed the Vinh Te River to capture Chau Doc; then continued marching to join forces with Bodin's first army in Gia Dinh. The third army comprising mainly forces gathered from Laos followed the Mekong River down, merged with the two armies in Cochinchina, and when it moved to Cambodia, it split into two parts. A part of the army still followed the plan to go down to Cochinchina. The remaining part was divided into two armies to fight in some areas on the western border of our country. It formed the fourth and fifth armies⁴⁰.

According to Dang Van Chuong, there were only two main armies to strike Cochinchina: one to attack by land into Cambodia to attack Gia Dinh and another by water to attack Ha Tien. Three other smaller armies attacked Cam Lo (Quang Tri), Cam Cat, Cam Mon, Tran Ninh, and Siam Khong with the purpose of diversion and dispersal of the Nguyen dynasty's forces⁴¹. However, historians of the Nguyen Dynasty also recorded in *Dai Nam thuc luc* that there were three armies attacking Cochinchina, which was quite similar to the records of Walter Francis Vella. This can be confirmed: Cochinchina was the main direction in the invasion of Siam, and the other two armies in Laos and Central Vietnam were the diversionary directions.

In November 1833, the Siamese army invaded Cambodia. The King of Cambodia, Nac Chan, panicked and ran to An Giang to take refuge. With overwhelming forces, Siam quickly captured Ha Tien, threatening An Giang⁴². In Cochinchina, the generals were ordered to urgently send troops to recapture the two lost provinces and prevent the enemy troops from advancing further inland from

³⁹ Phraya Phra Khleng, whose real name is Somdet Chao Phraya Borom Maha Prayurawongse, was one of the most prominent political figures of the mid-19th century in Siam. He was the regent for King Mongkut (Rama IV). He was also one of the two generals who commanded the Siamese army in the wars with Vietnam and was promoted to the title of Somdet Chao Phraya, the highest rank that a non-royal person can achieve in Siam.

⁴⁰ W.F. Vella, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

⁴¹ V.C. Đặng [Dang], *Quan hệ Thái Lan-Việt Nam...*, p. 72.

⁴² *Cơ mật viện* [Privy Council], *Nội các triều Nguyễn* [Nguyen Dynasty Cabinet]. *Khâm định tiểu binh Nam Kỳ nghịch phi phương lược chính biên* [Kham dinh tieu binh Nam Ky nghich phi phuong luoc chinh bien], Viện Sử học dịch [Translation by the Institute of History], Hà Nội [Hanoi] 2012, p. 1128.

An Giang. At the same time, the court also mobilised more troops, war elephants, and guns to secure the Quang Hoa and Quang Phong religious areas (in present-day Tay Ninh) bordering Cambodia. Another important border area in Southwest Vietnam was An Giang, which was reinforced by the government with 10 warships, 2,000 pounds of gunpowder, 10 overpainted gun collars, and 80–100 bullets for each gun; talented and seasoned generals were sent to An Giang to join forces to fight the enemy⁴³. In the secondary direction, from the end of 1833 to the beginning of 1834, in order to disperse the Nguyen army, King Rama III ordered the Siamese army units and Laos soldiers from the bases in Luang Prabang and Nong Khai to move to Tran Ninh, Xieng Khouang, and Vietnam–Laos border areas from Nghe An to Quang Tri to attack, harass, arrest people, and bring them to the right bank of the Mekong River⁴⁴.

These were only small groups of Siamese-Laotian troops combined with some forces of ethnic minorities forced by Siam. These actions served two purposes, both to extend their control to eastern Laos after Vientiane became a province of Siam with the aim of causing border disturbances and dispersing Vietnamese forces so that Siam could easily concentrate its forces to win in Cochinchina. Recognising that the Siamese troops fighting in these places were just far away from the show of force to specialise in Cochinchina, the Hue court ordered the generals to guard the border area in Nghe An to strengthen the fortress, increase the number of troops, and take further precautions. However, the policy of King Minh Mang continued to be active defense, not initiating conflicts. He commanded the generals. This matter obviously related to the border should be prepared, should not be aggressive⁴⁵. It is clear that in the early stage, King Minh Mang continued to believe that the Siamese army did not dare to invade the border of the Middle States of Vietnam. This can be seen clearly in the secret code of the provinces of Quang Tri and Nghe An. Nowadays, when there is a Siam invader, the court immediately sends a large army so that the barbarians will not overtake the land and cause trouble. It is

⁴³ ChGV, vol. II, Hà Nội [Hanoi] 2002, p. 891.

⁴⁴ This arrest and border harassment continued to be carried out by King Rama III until the 1840s. S. Nit, B. Kennon, *A Culture in Search of Survival the Phuan of Thailand and Laos*, New Haven (USA) 1988, p. 23.

⁴⁵ ChGV, vol. III, Hà Nội [Hanoi] 2002, p. 983.

important to take precautions, particularly when the given county lies far away from the border⁴⁶.

At the end of 1833, the Siamese army mobilised another ten thousand troops from Van Tuong to attack Tam Bon, Mang Bong, Ba Lan, and Lang Thin of Cam Lo district, Quang Tri province, King Minh Mang sent troops to the defense. A few days later, the Siamese army attacked Tran Ninh (Nghe An), and the Vietnamese withdrew to Giang Man⁴⁷. The Siamese army let their troops flood into Ha Tinh, and the Vietnamese brought their troops to hold them, but the Siamese army did not advance. The Siamese and Laotian armies also tried to harass the border areas in Nghe An and Ha Tinh, forcing people to take them away to cause chaos in order to disperse the Nguyen army. From January to May, the Siamese army intensified their attacks, harassing and arresting people in other regions more fiercely⁴⁸. Meanwhile in Cochinchina, in December 1833, Chao Phraya Bodin brought most of his forces down to Chau Doc; General Chao Phraya Phrakhlung also brought a fleet of about 200 ships with 6,000 troops to Chau Doc.

In Chau Doc, Chao Phraya Bodin, and Chao Phraya Phrakhlung discussed the way forward and agreed to follow the Hau River into the Vam Nao River⁴⁹ and then to the Tien River to expand and conquer Cochinchina. The Siamese army chose the direction of the Tien River to advance in order to quickly go deep into the territory of Cochinchina and be able to easily capture the provinces of Vinh Long and Dinh Tuong. Following the Tien River estuaries

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁷ Giang Man (Giăng Mản), a rugged mountainous place in Nghe An province during the Nguyen Dynasty. Today Giang Man is located in the Huong Khe district, Ha Tinh Province, Vietnam.

⁴⁸ V.C. Đặng [Dang], *Quan hệ Thái Lan-Việt Nam...*, p. 72.

⁴⁹ In *Gia Định Thành Thông Chi* it is written: "Vam Nao, now called Vam Nao River, is the natural boundary between Cho Moi district and Phu Tan district, An Giang province". H.D. Trinh [Trinh], *Gia Định Thành Thông Chí* [Gia Định thành thông chí], trans. Pham Hoang Quan, Hồ Chí Minh [Ho Chi Minh] 2019, p. 236. In *Hoàng Việt nhất thống chí*, Le Quang Dinh also stated that this river was divided into two parts called Vam Nao Thuong Canal and Vam Nao Ha Canal. Q.D. Lê [Le], *Hoàng Việt Nhất Thống Du Địa Chí* [Hoàng Việt nhất thống du địa chí], trans. Phan Dang, Huế [Hue] 2005, p. 105. According to Vương Hồng Sen later, the Hue court allowed the Sinicization of the name Vam Nao, so it was called "Thuan Cang". Therefore, in the documents of the Nguyen Dynasty from the Minh Mang period onwards, this river was called estuary Thuan or Thuan Cang. H.S. Vương [Vuong], *Tự vị tiếng Việt miền Nam* [Southern Vietnamese dictionary], Hồ Chí Minh [Ho Chi Minh] 1999, p. 633.

into the sea, they could reach the Gia Dinh province to support Le Van Khoi's insurgents and proceed to occupy Cochinchina. When the Siamese army arrived at Vam Nao, they immediately set up fortresses on both sides of the bank to secure dangerous places. These fortifications and the forces stationed in Chau Doc citadel constituted a sure guarantee from behind so that the masses could confidently advance deeper into our territory⁵⁰.

Dai Nam Thuc Luc recorded that in the past, the Siamese invaders attacked the Chau Doc province (An Giang), then followed the Hau Giang river to Thuan Cang [Vam Nao], set up fortresses on both sides of Vam Nao to prepare to fight against the Nguyen army. Meanwhile, Truong Minh Giang and Nguyen Xuan also arrived. The Siamese army brought more than 100 warships, both large and small, against them. The Nguyen army attacked and immediately fired cannons at the pioneer general Lien Cam Hien, and the enemy withdrew into the port. At the fourth watch, Truong Minh Giang launched the army to attack until the time of the Dragon (about 9–10 am), then beat the enemy station on the left bank, destroyed 15 ships, and collected many weapons. The enemy's right-hand garrison resisted even more aggressively. The battle was in progress when reinforcements from Gia Dinh arrived, increasing the prestige of the Nguyen army. Within one day, the Nguyen army conquered the right bank; the Siamese army fled to the big battleship. The enemy troops fired guns to hold out, and at the same time, they set up embankments on both sides of the river to resist. Realising that the enemy army was still crowded and the wind direction was not favorable, Truong Minh Giang and Nguyen Xuan ordered the army to withdraw⁵¹.

The battle of Vam Nao was a glorious victory of the Nguyen army in An Giang. With only about 1,000 troops, the Nguyen army defeated an army many times larger (tens of thousands of troops, with more than 100 large and small ships) thanks to bravery. This was an important victory that blocked the advance of the Siamese army into Cochinchina, creating new mentality for the Nguyen

⁵⁰ T.T. Nguyễn [Nguyen], *Chiến thắng Vàm Nao- Cổ Hồ trong kháng chiến chống quân Xiêm cuối năm 1833 đầu năm 1834 dưới triều Nguyễn* [Vam Nao-Co Ho victory in the resistance war against Siam in late 1833 and early 1834 under the Nguyen Dynasty], <http://www.sugia.vn/portfolio/detail/1981/chien-thang-vam-nao-co-ho-trong-khang-chien-chong-xiem-cuoi-nam-1833-dau-nam-1834-duoi-trieu-nguyen.html> (accessed: 7 X 2023).

⁵¹ ChGV, vol. III, p. 948.

army to continue to win decisive victories to wipe out the Siamese invaders from their territory.

At the end of January 1834, all Nguyen troops from Vam Nao, following the Tien River branch, withdrew to the position of the old Chien Sai Headquarters at the confluence of the Tien River and the Co Ho River to build a battle. If the Nguyen army had failed in this battle, the Siamese army would have invaded Sa Dec, My Tho, the Siamese army might have lost the southern region, therefore this battle is pivotal. The Nguyen army built fortresses on both sides of the Co Ho River and set up battle boats to hold posts on the Tien River, forming a defensive posture Thuy, a set of solid links. The reinforcements also arrived one after another. The Siamese infantry followed the left bank to attack the Nguyen stronghold. The battle took place from the time of the Snake to the time of the Than (about 9–17 hours) on January 25, 1834, the Siamese army suffered many casualties and had to retreat. That night, the Siamese army came to fight again, divided into several waves, but failed, hence they had to withdraw their troops to preserve their forces. After six days of fighting, the Nguyen army broke off the Siamese attacks and held the battlefield⁵². The battle of Co Ho was the victory of the defense art combined with the counterattack of the Nguyen army. The Nguyen imperial army relied on the river and water terrain in the area of Tien – Co Ho confluence with the Chien Sai tower built earlier to connect into a solid and flexible defensive position in the transition to a state of war attack when favorable. This victory turned the tide of the war, from there on, the Nguyen army had an advantage, their position and strength helped them wipe out the Siamese army from the territory of Cochinchina as well as Cambodia.

In the direction of the road, in January 1834, about 5,000 Siamese troops from Xi Khe Canal (Tay Ninh Canal) came down, plotting to attack Gia Dinh, in order to rescue Le Van Khoi. The Cambodia army (with the help of Gia Dinh's army) defeated the invading army, forcing the Siamese army to retreat deep into the territory of Cambodia. The battle took place on December 19,

⁵² D.C. Nguyễn [Nguyen], *Vùng đất Tây Ninh trong chiến lược giữ vững an ninh biên giới của chính quyền chúa và vua nhà Nguyễn (Thế kỷ XVII – nửa đầu thế kỷ XIX)* [Tay Ninh land in the strategy of maintaining border security of the lords and kings of the Nguyen Dynasty (17th century – first half of 19th century)], “Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Lịch sử” [History Research Journal] 2020, no. 3(527), pp. 32–43.

the year of the Snake (January 28, 1834)⁵³. The Siamese army lost the battle and had to flee, the Siamese army's hope for the army wing seemed to have been dashed.

At the An Giang front, due to the catastrophic defeat, two senior Siamese generals, Chao Phraya Bodin, and Chao Phraya Phrakhleng, disagreed deeply. Chao Phraya Bodin wanted to continue advancing while Chao Phraya Phrakhleng wished to withdraw. Ultimately, Chao Phraya Bodin was forced to retreat. During the two days of December 29 and 30 of the year of the Snake (January 31 and February 1, 1834), the Siamese army carried out a number of diversionary attacks on the Nguyen stronghold to allow the large army to withdraw. The Siamese ground forces retreated to Chau Doc and the warships withdrew to Ha Tien. The Nguyen army won and immediately pursued. On January 3, the year of the Horse (February 4, 1834), the Nguyen army regained the Chau Doc citadel. The Nguyen army continued to pursue and liberated the areas occupied by the enemy in turn. On January 5, the Year of the Horse (Giap Ngo) year (February 6, 1834), Ha Tien citadel was recovered⁵⁴. The whole of Cochinchina was free of the Siamese army.

b) The Nguyen army chased the Siamese army and regained Cambodia

After recapturing Chau Doc and Ha Tien, the Nguyen army and the Cambodian army coordinated their attack on the Siamese army in Cambodia. King Minh Mang closely followed the course of the battle and issued an edict to the generals, saying that having lost many big battles, the Siamese must be afraid; but the spirit of our army is a hundred times stronger, and the company of soldiers and ships sent by Kinh will come again and again, increasing prestige. The Generals and Counsellors had to follow the edicts a few times before, choosing a dangerous place, besiege, chase, and advance, take back An Giang and Ha Tien, pacify Nam Vang, and soon bring the red flag to announce victory, hurry to play big⁵⁵. With that momentum, the Nguyen army continuously won, advancing to the citadel of Nam Vang. Without stopping, the Vietnamese continued

⁵³ ChGV, vol. IV, Hà Nội [Hanoi] 2002, p. 13–14.

⁵⁴ W.F. Vella, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁵⁵ ChGV, vol. IV, p. 11.

to pursue the Siamese army to the border, and at the same time brought Ang Chan II back to the throne.

In February 1834, the Vietnamese and Siamese troops clashed at Giang Man in Nghe An, the Vietnamese army was defeated and had to withdraw. King Minh Mang sent Kinh strategist Nguyen Van Xuan and Deputy Ambassador Pham Van Dien to bring troops to the religious capital Tran Ninh (Nghe An) to repel the Siamese army⁵⁶. By June 1834, Guardsman Le Van Thuy went out to fight the Siamese army in Quang Tri and continuously won. The Siamese army gathered more troops to attack but instead they were repelled.

The Vietnam-Siamese war brought victory to Vietnam on all fronts. This was the first direct confrontation between the two largest powers in mainland Southeast Asia. This victory confirmed Vietnam's position on the geopolitical map of the balance of power region, even overwhelming Siam in influencing Cambodia. Already in 1834, Minh Mang's court implemented a series of activities to completely eliminate Siamese influence and strengthen Vietnam's influence in Cambodia, such as establishing a series of strongholds, dividing troops to keep important places weak, stockpiling supplies in the camps, rewarding and punishing Khmer officials in the recent war with Siam and suspending the mission of Cambodian emissaries in Siam⁵⁷. It can be seen that after the war of 1833–1834 the Nguyen Dynasty managed to take full control of national defense and diplomacy in Cambodia, leaving Siamese influence out of the buffer zone between the two countries. Going one step further, King Minh Mang decided to set up Tran Tay Thanh in 1835⁵⁸, including 33 palaces and 2 districts⁵⁹. The Nguyen Dynasty gradually carried out the policy of direct rule, perfected the apparatus, consolidated the army, taught the Khmer people

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁷ D.B. Dương [Duong], *Quan hệ Việt Nam–Campuchia–Xiêm giai đoạn 1834–1848* [Relations between Vietnam–Cambodia–Siam in the period 1834–1848], “*Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Đông Nam Á*” [Journal of Southeast Asian Studies] 2008, no. 3, pp. 20–30.

⁵⁸ Tran Tay Thanh was a District (“trấn”) (equivalent to later provincial level) of Vietnam during the Nguyen Dynasty from 1835 to 1841. This is the territory of Southeast Cambodia today.

⁵⁹ Refer to the records on the establishment and assignment of personnel in the Tay citadel when it was founded (1835) in: ChGV, vol. IV, pp. 544–545, 600, 700, 800.

the Vietnamese language and script, and consolidated their absolute domination in Cambodia. In contrast, after the defeat in 1834, Siam had to withdraw its troops from the border, losing its traditional area of influence, which affected border security. Needless to say, Siam did not accept this, and a persistent confrontation between Vietnam and Siam continued until the mid-1840s when the two countries found it impossible to defeat each other and had to return to take care of their own problems before the imminent danger of Western colonialism.

4. Conclusion

In summary, in the first three decades of the 19th century, there was a transition in the relationship between Vietnam and Siam from a friendly one, seeing each other as allies, to becoming direct rivals in the region of mainland South Asia. The culmination of the confrontation was the war that took place in 1833–1834 when King Rama III decided to show his ambition by sending his officials to attack Cambodia and Ha Tien, Chau Doc of Vietnam. The Nguyen army organised resistance, defeated the Siamese invasion, wiped out Siamese troops from the territory, and drove Siam out of Cambodia.

The end of the war was the period of affirming the position of Minh Mang's court in the region, overwhelming Siam in influencing the buffer country of Cambodia. Even the Hue court extended its territory to the border with Siam. This was unacceptable for an emperor who was so ambitious as Rama III. The confrontation between Siam and Vietnam continued to squeeze into the Thieu Tri period and only ended when a treaty on territorial delimitation was signed between the three countries of Dai Nam⁶⁰, Cambodia and Siam, demonstrating the balance of power in the region of the two major countries.

⁶⁰ In 1802, Nguyen Anh ascended the throne and took the reign name Gia Long. In 1804, he named the country Vietnam. This name existed until 1838 when King Minh Mang changed it to Dai Nam. At each time, each name correctly suited historical reality.

Bibliography

PRINTED SOURCES

Đại Nam nhất thống chí [Chronicle of Greater Vietnam], vol. V, Huế [Hue] 2006.
Đại Nam thực lục [Chronicle of Greater Vietnam], vol. I–IV, Hà Nội [Hanoi] 2002.
Nguyễn [Nguyen] D.X., *Lý lịch sự vụ* [Memoir], trans. Tran Dai Vinh, Hà Nội [Hanoi] 2019.

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Cơ mật viện* [Privy Council], *Nội các triều Nguyễn* [Nguyen Dynasty Cabinet]. *Khâm định tiểu bình Nam Kỳ nghịch phi phương lược chính biên* [Kham dinh tieu binh Nam Ky nghich phi phuong luoc chinh bien], Viện Sử học dịch [Translation by the Institute of History], Hà Nội [Hanoi] 2012.
- Đặng [Dang] V.C., *Quan hệ Thái Lan–Việt Nam cuối thế kỷ XVIII – giữa thế kỷ XIX* [Thailand–Vietnam relations at the end of the 18th century – the middle of the 19th century], Huế [Hue] 2010.
- Đặng [Dang] V.C., *Những bước thăng trầm trong quan hệ Việt – Xiêm nửa đầu thế kỷ XIX* [Ups and downs in Vietnam–Siamese relations in the first half of the nineteenth century], “*Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Đông Nam Á*” [Journal of Southeast Asian Studies] 2005, no. 5, pp. 19–24.
- Dương [Duong] D.B., *Quan hệ Việt Nam–Campuchia–Xiêm giai đoạn 1834–1848* [Relations between Vietnam–Cambodia–Siam in the period 1834–1848], “*Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Đông Nam Á*” [Journal of Southeast Asian Studies] 2008, no. 3, pp. 20–30.
- Hall D.G.E., *History of South East Asia*, London 1955.
- Kiều [Kieu] O.M., *Bản triều bạn nghịch liệt truyện* [The naughty version of the story of a friend’s dynasty], Sài Gòn [Saigon] 1963.
- Lê [Le] Q.D., *Hoàng Việt Nhất Thống Du Địa Chí* [Hoang Viet nhat thong du dia chi], trans. Phan Dang, Huế [Hue] 2005.
- Nguyễn [Nguyen] D.C., *Trao đổi lại về năm sinh và đóng góp của Mạc Thiên Tứ đối với vùng đất Hà Tiên và Nam Bộ* [Talking about the year of birth and Mac Thien Tu’s contribution to the land of Ha Tien and the South], “*Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Lịch sử*” [History Research Journal] 2019, no. 7, pp. 71–79.
- Nguyễn [Nguyen] D.C., *Vùng đất Tây Ninh trong chiến lược giữ vững an ninh biên giới của chính quyền chúa và vua nhà Nguyễn* (Thế kỷ XVII – nửa đầu thế kỷ XIX) [Tay Ninh land in the strategy of maintaining border security of the lords and kings of the Nguyen Dynasty (17th century – first half of 19th century)], “*Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Lịch sử*” [History Research Journal] 2020, no. 3(527), pp. 32–43.
- Snit S., Kennon B., *A Culture in Search of Survival the Phuan of Thailand and Laos*, New Haven (USA) 1988.
- Sok K., *Le Cambodge entre le Siam et le Vietnam (de 1775 à 1860)*, Paris 1991.
- Trình [Trinh], H.D., *Gia Định Thành Thông Chí* [Gia Dinh thanh thong chi], trans. Pham Hoang Quan, Hồ Chí Minh [Ho Chi Minh] 2019.

Trần [Tran] T.M., *Quan hệ Việt Nam–Xiêm La đầu thế kỷ XIX* [Vietnam–Siamese Relations in the Early Nineteenth Century], “*Tạp chí Lịch sử Quân sự*” [Military History Journal] 2022, no. 1–2, pp. 74–80.

Vella W.F., *Siam under Rama III (1824–1851)*, New York 1957.

Vũ [Vu] D.L., *Rama III, Minh Mang, and Power Paradigm In Early Nineteenth Century Mekong Valley*, “*Rian Thai: International Journal of Thai Studies*” 2012, vol. V, pp. 293–326.

Vương [Vuong] H.S., *Từ vựng Việt miền Nam* [Southern Vietnamese dictionary], Hồ Chí Minh [Ho Chi Minh] 1999.

NETOGRAPHY

Nguyễn [Nguyen] T.T., *Chiến thắng Vàm Nao–Cổ Hồ trong kháng chiến chống quân Xiêm cuối năm 1833 đầu năm 1834 dưới triều Nguyễn* [Vam Nao-Co Ho victory in the resistance war against Siam in late 1833 and early 1834 under the Nguyen Dynasty], <http://www.sugia.vn/portfolio/detail/1981/chien-thang-vam-nao-co-ho-trong-khang-chien-chong-xiem-cuoi-nam-1833-dau-nam-1834-duoi-trieu-nguyen.html> (accessed: 7 X 2023).

Vũ [Vu] D.L., *Khi người Thái nhìn về phía đông: Cuộc chiến Xiêm–Việt năm 1833* [When Thais Look East: Siam–Vietnam War in 1833], <https://cand.com.vn/Chuyen-de/Khi-nguoi-Thai-nhin-ve-phia-dong-Cuoc-chien-it-nguoi-biet-nam-1833-i536207/> (accessed: 25 I 2024).

ABOUT AUTHORS

Dr Nguyen Dinh Co – PhD in History.

Research interests: history of Medieval Vietnam, relations between Vietnam and Southeast Asian countries in the Middle Ages, Chinese people in Vietnam.



nd.co@hutech.edu.vn

Assoc. Prof. Tran Xuan Hiep – PhD in International Relations.

Research interests: Vietnam’s foreign policy, history of Southeast Asia, international relations in the Asia-Pacific region.



hieptx@donga.edu.vn

Dr Nguyen Tuan Binh – PhD in History.

Research interests: international relations in East Asia, maritime security in Indian Ocean – Pacific, history of Vietnam and the world.



nguyentuanbinh@hueuni.edu.vn