Some problems of Alasdair Macintyre’s ‘emotivism thesis’
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18778/1689-4286.33.04Keywords:
MacIntyre, emotywizm, niewspółmierność, znaczenie, użycie, liberalizm, moralność, sprawiedliwośćAbstract
In this article Alasdair MacIntyre’s thesis concerning emotivist use of moral utterances in contemporary liberal societies is analysed. One tries to show that it needs further clarification since at least three elements of MacIntyre’s argument seem to pose certain problems; these are: ‘discussion halt’ as the source of emotivism, comprehensive doctrines as premises of respective arguments in liberal debates and the problem of incommensurability. These three problematic elements are discussed and interrelations between them are adumbrated.
References
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 2007, After Virtue, London: Duckworth.
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 1990, Three Rival Version of Moral Inquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition, London: Duckworth.
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 1988, Whose Justice? Which Rationality, London: Duckworth.
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 1994, A Partial Response to My Critics, [in:] John Horton, Susan Mendus (eds.), After MacIntyre, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 283–304.
Mason, Andrew, 1994, MacIntyre on Liberalism and its Critics: Tradition, Incommensurability and Disagreement, [in:] John Horton, Susan Mendus (eds.), After MacIntyre, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 225–244.
Mulhall, Stephen, 1994, Liberalism, Morality and Rationality: MacIntyre, Rawls and Cavell, [in:] John Horton, Susan Mendus (eds.), After MacIntyre, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 205–224.
Stevensons, Charles Leslie, 1965, Ethics and Language, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
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